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The Determinants of Merger Arbitrage Return 
An Empirical Analysis in the UK context 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the magnitude and the determinants of the return to the merger 
arbitrage strategy in the UK context. We perform empirical analysis of the three 
hypotheses namely the risk-based hypothesis, the limited arbitrage hypothesis and the 
arbitrageurs' role hypothesis. First, in the risk-based hypothesis, using a sample of 1105 
UK cash and stock mergers from 1987 to 2007, we find that the strategy generates 
significant positive return in excess of the systematic risk adjustment benchmark. The 
result is robust to a range of methods to control for systematic risk. The finding is 
consistent with the existing evidence from other markets. As for the risk-return 
characteristics of the strategy, in contrast to the US evidence, we find little evidence 
supporting the non-linear pattern. This finding is in line with the restrictions on bidder's 
ability to abandon the bid imposed by UK Takeover Code. This finding, combined with 
the evidence in the US market (strong non-linearity) and the Australian market (no non-
linearity), demonstrates the impact of takeover regulation on the risk-return 
characteristics of the strategy. 
Second, in the limited arbitrage hypothesis, we test the impact of different types of 
risks, costs and constraints (other than systematic risk) on the arbitrage return. We find 
that transaction costs are one of the important drivers of the cross-sectional variation of 
the arbitrage return. The result is robust to 4 different proxies for transaction costs, that 
is, firm size, price level, dollar trading volume, and frequency of zero return days. 
Holding costs are found to be an important determinant of the return. Idiosyncratic risk, 
the most important type of holding costs, contributes significantly to the source of the 
arbitrage return. We find that short-sale constraints appear to be another important 
holding cost that the arbitrageurs concern about. The result about the impact of short-
sale constraints is, however, still inconclusive due to the small sample size. We also test 
the agency-based model of limited arbitrage hypothesis proposed by Shleifer and 
. Vishny (1997) but find no supporting evidence. 
Third, in the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis, utilizing a manually collected dataset to 
identify arbitrageurs and their holding of target stocks, we examine how different roles 
that arbitrageurs play in the takeover process help explain the source of the return to the 
strategy. We find that arbitrage holding is significantly related to arbitrage return after a 
host of factors that can determine the bid outcome and the market's assessment of the 
bid outcome are controlled for. This finding shows that the arbitrageurs are better than 
the average investors in the market in picking better takeover bids, the investment in 
which yields higher risk-adjusted return. In contrast to the US evidence, arbitrage 
holding is found to be negatively related to bid premium and has no impact on the 
probability of bid success. The difference between this finding and the US evidence 
may be attributable to the much more stringent UK disclosure rule during the takeover 
period compared to the US counterpart. 
Overall, our study, while providing evidence broadly in support of significant return to 
the merger arbitrage strategy, also highlights the importance of recognizing the impact 
of the takeover regulation on such return. 
iii 
ACKNOWLEGDEMENT 
I could not have written and completed this doctoral thesis without the assistance of 
many people. First of all, I would like to express my profound gratitude to my 
supervisor, Professor Sudi Sudarsanam, for his encouragement, support and 
recommendation of the interesting research field. Without our inspiring discussions and 
his intellectual guidance, the thesis would not have been what it is today. 
I am indebted to my Doctoral Review Panel, Dr. Vineet Agarwal, Professor Andrew 
Burke, and Dr. Collin Pilbeam for their valuable comments during the 3 reviews 
My thanks also go to all PhD students in the Accounting and Finance group for valuable 
advices and comments on both the contents and methodology of the thesis, to Ms. 
Wendy Habgood for her patiently dealing with inevitable administrative issues. 
I am always grateful to my family in Vietnam for their warmest support during the time 
I was in the UK. Last but not least, I would like to express special thanks to Phuong 
Anh, my dearest wife. Without her love and understanding, I could not have enough 
energy and determination to complete the project. 
Finally, I would like to thank Cranfield School of Management for providing financial 
supports for my PhD degree study. 
IV 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................ 8 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 8 
2.2 Description of merger arbitrage strategy ............................................................... 8 
2.3 Theoretical framework ........................................................................... ~ ............ 12 
2.3.1 Risk-based hypothesis .................................................................................. 14 
2.3.2 Limited arbitrage hypothesis .............................................. ~ ......................... 19 
2.3.3 Arbitrageurs' role hypothesis ....................................................................... 31 
2.4 Literature gap and research question ................................................................... 45 
2.5 Chapter summary ................................................................................................ 49 
Appendix 2.1: The pricing mechanism of financial assets ............................................. 52 
Chapter 3: DATA AND METHODOLOGY .............................................................. 55 
3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 55 
3.2 Data and sample of takeover bids ........................................................................ 57 
3.2.1 Data sources ................................................................................................. 57 
3.2.2 Sample of takeover bids ............................................................................... 57 
3.3 Arbitrage return calculation ................................................................................. 60 
3.4 Bid outcome prediction model ............................................................................ 64 
3.4.1 Model description ............................................................ ~ ............................ 64 
v 
3.4.2 Model result .................................................................................................. 74 
3.5 Chapter summary ................................................................................................ 80 
Chapter 4: RISK-BASED HYPOTHESIS .................................................................. 92 
4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 92 
4.2 Hypotheses development ..................................................................................... 93 
4.2.1 The profitability of the UK merger arbitrage portfolios ............................... 93 
4.2.2 Risk-return characteristics of the strategy- regulation impact.. .................... 94 
4.3 Data and methodology ......................................................................................... 98 
4.3.1 Data and sample of takeover bids ....................................... ~ ......................... 98 
4.3.2 Portfolio construction ................................................................................... 98 
4.3.3 Empirical tests ............................................................................................ 102 
4.4 Empirical result ................................................................................................. 106 
4.4.1 Benchmarking merger arbitrage return using linear asset pricing models. 1 07 
4.4.2 Piecewise linear model ............................................................................... 1 09 
4.4.3 Contingent claim approach to estimate risk-adjusted return ...................... } 13 
4.5 Chapter summary .............................................................................................. 116 
Chapter 5: LIMITED ARBITRAGE HYPOTHESIS ............................................... 132 
5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 132 
5.2 Methodology ..................................................................................................... 134 
5.2.1 Excess return to individual arbitrage positions .......................................... 134 
5.2.2 Research desi gn .............................................. , .............. t.e ••• " ••••• " ••••••••• " •••••• 13 6 
vi 
5.3 Data and descriptive statistics ........................................................................... 145 
5.3.1 Data and sample of takeover bids ............................................................... 145 
5.3.2 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis ............................................. 146 
5.4 Benchmarking the portfolio return .................................................................... 147 
5.5 Cross-sectional determinants of merger arbitrage excess return ....................... 150 
5.5.1 Transaction Costs versus Price Pressure .................................................... 151 
5.5.2 Holding costs .............................................................................................. 153 
5.6 Chapter summary ..................................................... ~ ........................................ 156 
Chapter 6: ARBITRAGEURS' ROLE HYPOTHESIS ................... : .......... : ............. 172 
6.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 172 
6.2 Hypotheses development ................................................................................... 174 
6.2.1 The relationship between the arbitrage holding and arbitrage retum ......... 174 
6.2.2 The impact of UK takeover regulation ....................................................... 176 
6.3 Methodology ..................................................................................................... 179 
6.3.1 Empirical tests ............................................................................................ 179 
6.3.2 Control variables ........................................................................................ 186 
6.4 Data and sample selection ................................................................................. 187 
6.4.1 Sample of takeover bids ............................................................................. 187 
6.4.2 Identification of arbitrageurs and their holding .......................................... 187 
6.4.3 Summary statistics ...................................................................................... 189 
6.5 Empirical result ................................................................................................. 192 
.. 
Vll 
6.5.1 Arbitrage return and arbitrage holding ....................................................... 192 
6.5.2 Bid outcome variables and arbitrage holding ............................................. 19 8 
6.6 Chapter summary .............................................................................................. 205 
Appendix 6.1: A Sample of Rule 8.3 Filing .................................................................. 220 
Chapter 7: CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 223 
7.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 223 
7.2 Summary of empirical findings ......................................................................... 224 
7.3 Limitations and recommendations .................................................................... 227 
7.4 Contributions to knowledge and practice .................................. : ....................... 230 
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 234 
viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1: Summary of merger arbitrage abnormal return from extant studies .............. 51 
Table 3.1: Summary of the takeover bid sample selection process ................................ 82 
Table 3.2: Description of the variables in the bid outcome model ................................. 84 
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of the bid outcome model variables categorized by bid 
outcome ........................................................................................................................... 86 
Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics of the bid outcome model variables categorized by 
method of payment .......................................................................................................... 87 
Table 3.5: Logistic regression result of the bid outcome model- Full sample .............. 88 
Table 3.6: Logistic regression result of the bid outcome model- Cash sample ............. 90 
Table 3.7: Logistic regression result of the bid outcome model- Stock Sample ........... 91 
Table 4.1: Sample description ....................................................................................... 118 
Table 4.2: Annual arbitrage portfolio return series ....................................................... 119 
Table 4.3: Benchmarking merger arbitrage return series with linear pricing models ... 120 
Table 4.4: Benchmarking merger arbitrage return series with linear pricing models -
GARCH ......................................................................................................................... 122 
Table 4.5: Piecewise linear model. ................................................................................ 124 
Table 4.6: Risk adjusted return estimation using contingent claim approach ............... 125 
Table 5.1: Description of variables used in the limited arbitrage hypothesis ............... 159 
Table 5.2: Sample Description ...................................................................................... 161 
Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics of limited arbitrage variables ..................................... 162 
ix 
Table 504: Benchmarking merger arbitrage return series with linear pricing models ... 163 
Table 5.5: Cross-sectional determinants of arbitrage abnormal return - whole sample 
....................................................................................................................................... 165 
Table 5.6:: Cross-sectional determinants of arbitrage abnormal return - cash sample. 167 
Table 5.7: The impact of short-sale constraints ............................................................ 169 
Table 6.1: Description of variables for the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis ..................... 207 
Table 6.2: Distribution of arbitrage holding and the number of arbitrageurs over the 
sample period ................................................................................................................ 209 
Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis210 
Table 6.4: The relationship between arbitrage holding and arbitrage return ................ 211 
Table 6.5: Bid premium and arbitrage holding ............................................................. 214 
Table 6.6: Probability of bid success and arbitrage holding ......................................... 217 
x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1: Merger arbitrage example ............................................................................. 11 
Figure 2.2: The source of merger arbitrage return - theoretical framework ................... 13 
Figure 4.1: Number of active bids in each month from 1987-2007 .............................. 126 
Figure 4.2: Growth of arbitrage investment from 1987 to 2007 ................................... 127 
Figure 4.3: Piecewise linear model ............................................................................... 128 
Figure 4.4: Adjusted R-square against market excess return thresholds-full sample ... 129 
Figure 4.5: Scatter plot of arbitrage return against market return ................................. 130 
Figure 4.6: Adjusted R-square against market excess return thresholds-subsample .... 131 
Figure 5.1: Number of active bids in each month from 1997 to 2007 .......................... 170 
Figure 5.2: Growth of arbitrage investment from 1997 to 2007 ................................... 171 
xi 
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
Background for the research 
After a takeover bid is announced, there is an inherent uncertainty regarding the 
outcome of the bid. There is a possibility that the bid might be delayed, called off, or the 
terms of the bid are revised. Merger arbitrage, also known as risk arbitrage, is the 
investment strategy designed to profit from the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of 
a takeover bid. 
Research on the determinants of the return to the strategy can be grouped under three 
hypotheses namely the risk-based hypothesis, the limited arbitrage hypothesis and the 
arbitrageurs' role hypothesis. The primary concern under the risk-based hypothesis is 
the extent to which systematic risk can help explain the return to the strategy and the 
risk-return characteristics of the strategy. Empirical studies on this hypothesis 
unanimously document that the strategy generates significant positive return in excess 
of the systematic risk benchmark. As far as the risk-return characteristics of the strategy 
are concerned, the return to the arbitrage portfolio is found to be related to the market 
risk in a non-linear way. In particular, the strategy has zero market risk in normal 
market condition but has significant positive market risk during serve market downturn. 
The evidence supporting the non-linear pattern, however, is confined to the US market. 
The study in the Australian market reports no supporting evidence for the non-linear 
pattern. 
The limited arbitrage hypothesis and the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis complement the 
risk-based hypothesis by proposing plausible explanations for the existence of the 
excess return to the strategy, the part of the arbitrage return unexplained by systematic 
risk. Under the limited arbitrage hypothesis, the excess return exists due to the 
additional costs, risks and constraints (other than systematic risk) that the arbitrageurs 
face in implementing the strategy. Under the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis, the 
arbitrageurs earn excess return thanks to their ability to select the best takeover bids for 
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the arbitrage portfolio or, most interestingly, to their ability to influence the final 
outcome and the terms of the bid. The empirical evidence for these two hypotheses is 
scanty, inconclusive and limited to US samples. 
Most of the empirical research on the determinants of the merger arbitrage return is 
restricted to the US market. The evidence outside the US is scarce. To our best 
knowledge, there are only two studies for the Canadian and Australian market 
respectively. The common feature of these two studies is that the sample size is very 
small compared to the US samples. Specifically, the Canadian study only employs a 
sample of 37 takeover bids for the year 1997 and the Australian study'S sample size is 
193 takeover bids from 1991 to 2000. Due to their small sample size, the results of these 
two studies might not be robust. 
Factors influencing the return to the merger arbitrage strategy include takeover 
regulatory rules that affect the timing, disclosure of information, revision of offer terms, 
ability of the bidder to withdraw the offer, and the timetable for the merger process to 
be completed. These regulatory rules are different between the US and other countries. 
Thus, the results of the research in the US are not easily generalizable to other markets. 
This represents a gap in the literature. 
This doctoral study seeks to fill this gap by investigating the profitability of the strategy 
and the factors that determine the return to the strategy in the UK market. As the UK is 
the second most active merger and acquisition market in the world, the size of the UK 
sample employed in this study is much larger than other non-US samples. Hence, this 
study presents the first rigorous empirical study on merger arbitrage in a market other 
than the US market. The UK takeover regulatory regime provides a distinctive setting 
different from the US regime. This study is the first to examine the impact of takeover 
regulation on the factors that determine merger arbitrage return. The primary research 
question is: 
What is the magnitude of merger arbitrage return in the UK market and what are the 
factors that determine the return? 
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To tackle the research question, we conduct three empirical projects testing the three 
hypotheses in the UK market. In the first project testing the risk-based hypothesis, we 
estimate the return to the strategy and examine how systematic risk can help explain the 
source of the return. Given the extant empirical evidence, it is expected that the strategy 
will generate positive return in excess of a risk-adjusted benchmark return. However, 
the risk-return pattern during bull and bear markets is expected to be different in the UK 
from that in the US due to differences in their takeover regulations. The other two 
projects are aimed at uncovering the factors behind the excess return to the strategy. In 
the second project, we test the limits to arbitrage model in terms of the risks and costs 
that limit the arbitrage activities. In the third project, we focus on the roles that the 
arbitrageurs play during the takeover process and test for their impact on merger 
arbitrage return. 
Summary of findings 
Risk-based hypothesis 
With a sample of 1105 UK cash and stock takeover bids over the period of 1987-2007, 
we find that the strategy is profitable on a risk-adjusted basis. Utilizing three asset 
pricing models, namely the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor model and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, we find the risk-
adjusted return to the merger arbitrage portfolios to be around 0.5-0.6% per month or 
6.17-7.44% per annum. The result using the contingent-claim approach to control for 
any possible non-linear risk-return pattern is similar. This result is consistent with the 
findings in other markets. However, unlike in the US, our results do not show any 
strong non-linearity in the returns between bull and bear markets. The evidence for a 
positive slope between arbitrage returns and market returns in bear markets and a flat 
, 
slope in bull markets, found in the US, is extremely weak or non-existent in the UK. 
This difference, we argue, is attributable to the difference in takeover regulations. 
The major contribution of the study is to show how takeover regulations can affect the 
risk-return characteristics of the merger arbitrage strategy and to provide empirical 
evidence of such impact. The finding that there is little evidence supporting the non-
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linear risk-return pattern of the strategy in the UK is in line with the restrictions on 
bidder's ability to abandon the bid imposed by UK Takeover Code. Combined with the 
evidence in the US market (strong non-linearity) and the Australian market (no non-
linearity), the impact of takeover regulation is confirmed. 
Limited arbitrage hypothesis 
The first project examines how systematic risk can help explain the source of the merger 
arbitrage return. The empirical result in the first project, combined with the findings in 
other markets, indicates that the strategy can persistently generate positive risk-adjusted 
return or abnormal return. The second project looks at different types of risks and costs 
(other than the systematic risk) that the arbitrageurs face and tests how these risks and 
costs account for the return to the strategy. Due to additional data requirement, this 
project employs a smaller sample of takeover bids than the sample of the first project. 
The sample of this second project includes 653 takeover bids from 1997 to 2007. 
First, we test two competing theories under the limited arbitrage hypothesis namely the 
price pressure theory and the arbitrage costs theory. These two theories propose 
contrasting explanations about why the return in excess of the benchmark for systematic 
risk or abnormal return persists. The price pressure theory is grounded up on the 
agency-based limited arbitrage model proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997). The 
model postulates that the real-world arbitrageurs are likely to be capital constrained and 
might not be able to absorb the selling pressure created by the target shareholders who 
do not want to bear the deal completion risk. As a consequence, the target stock price 
may fall well below its inefficient level enabling the arbitrageurs to earn abnormal 
return. Thus, under the price pressure theory, the source of the arbitrage excess return is 
the inefficiency in the pricing of the n:erger stocks. The arbitrage cost theory, by 
contrast, proposes that positive excess return exists because the real-world arbitrageurs 
have to face different types of risks and costs other than systematic risk. The excess 
return compensates the arbitrageurs for bearing these additional risks and costs. In the 
spirits of the arbitrage cost theory, there is no inefficiency in the pricing of the merger 
stocks. The arbitrageurs earn a fair return commensurate with the risks and costs that 
they have to face. 
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The findings of this project show very little support for the price pressure theory. Using 
a range of proxies for price pressure and transaction costs, we find that the transaction 
cost effect dominates the price pressure effect. The differences in the transaction costs 
that the arbitrageurs incur appear to be one of the important forces behind the cross-
sectional variation of the merger arbitrage abnormal return. As transaction costs are one 
type of arbitrage costs that the arbitrageurs have to face, this result is consistent with the 
arbitrage cost theory. 
The other type of arbitrage costs namely holding costs is found to have significant 
impact on the arbitrage excess return. Idiosyncratic risk, one of the most important 
holding costs, significantly contributes to the source of the arbitrage return. Excess 
return increases with the level of idiosyncratic risk as the arbitrageurs require higher 
return to compensate for the risk. Finally, we find that short-sale constraints appear to 
be another important holding cost that the arbitrageurs concern about. Due to the small 
sample size, the impact of short-sale constraints is still inconclusive nevertheless. 
Arbitrageurs' role hypothesis 
Utilizing a manually collected dataset to identify arbitrageurs and their holding of the 
target stocks and a range of methods to tackle the possible endogeneity problem, the 
third project examines how the roles that arbitrageurs play in the takeover process help 
explain the return to the strategy. The study in the US context by Hsieh and Walkling 
(2005) documents that the arbitrageurs have superior skills in selecting the best takeover 
bids for their portfolio and have the ability to alter the course of the takeover process. 
The authors report that the presence of arbitrageurs is associated with higher bid 
premium and higher chance of bid success. The findings provide a good demonstration 
of the theoretical prediction propounde~ by Cornelli and Li (2002). The theoretical 
model is, however, predicated on the assumption that arbitrageurs have the ability to 
hide their identity during their trading with other investors. 
The stricter disclosure rules during the takeover period in the UK than those in the US, 
where the previous studies were conducted, provide an excellent setting to investigate 
the importance of the assumption in shaping the model's prediction. Under the UK 
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laws, it is very difficult for the arbitrageurs to trade in the target stock without revealing 
their positions. If the assumption is of material importance, we would expect a very 
different relationship between the presence of arbitrageurs and arbitrage returns, bid 
premium and the probability of bid success. 
We find that arbitrage holding is significantly related to arbitrage excess return in a non-
linear way. Below a certain arbitrage holding threshold, the arbitrage excess return 
increases with arbitrage holding; above the threshold, arbitrage excess return decreases 
with arbitrage holding. The relationship between arbitrage excess return and arbitrage 
holding remains significant after a host of factors that can determine the bid outcome 
and the market's assessment of the bid outcome are controlled for. This indicates that 
the arbitrageurs are better than the average investors in the market in picking the best 
bids that yield higher risk-adjusted return for the arbitrage portfolios. 
In contrast to Hsieh and Walkling's (2005) finding, we report a significant negative 
relationship between arbitrage holding and bid premium. The fact that the UK 
arbitrageurs are forced to reveal their trading position too soon contributes to this 
relationship. If the bidder knows that the short-term arbitrageurs are already in the 
game, it would have no incentive to raise the offer price ex ante or revise the bid upward 
ex post to attract more arbitrageurs into the contest as predicted by Cornelli and Li 
(2002). In fact, the bid premia in those bids, where the arbitrageurs have to reveal 
themselves before the bid announcement date, are significantly lower than the premia in 
those bids, where the arbitrageurs do not have to. Finally, we find that arbitrage holding 
is not significantly related to the probability of bid success. The stark difference in the 
result, when the anonymity assumption is somewhat violated, raises the need for future 
theoretical models to incorPorate a weaker version of the assumption. 
Overall, our study, while providing evidence broadly in support of significant return to 
the merger arbitrage strategy, also highlights the importance of recognizing the impact 
of the takeover regulation on such return. 
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Structure of thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 surveys the extant 
literature to identify the factors that contribute the source of the return, based on which 
the chapter proposes the research question. Chapter 3 presents the data and 
methodology issues that are common to all three empirical projects. Chapter 4 reports 
the results of the empirical tests of the risk-based hypothesis. Chapter 5 presents the 
tests of the limited arbitrage hypothesis. Chapter 6 discusses the result of the empirical 
analysis of the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Many studies on merger arbitrage conclude that the strategy can generate substantial 
positive return. In this chapter, we survey the extant literature to identify the relevant 
factors that contribute to the source of the return. On that basis, we explore the gaps in 
the existing research and propose our research question to address such gaps. The 
review of the literature in this section also serves as a guideline for the empirical work 
in the following chapters. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes a typical arbitrage 
investment. Section 2.3 presents the theoretical framework on the determinants of the 
return to the strategy. Section 2.4 discusses the gaps in the extant literature, based on 
which the section proposes the research question. Section 2.5 summarizes the chapter. 
2.2 Description of merger arbitrage strategy 
After a takeover bid is announced, the target stock is usually different from the price 
offered by the bidder or the offer price. The difference is termed the 'arbitrage spread'. 
W-hen the target stock price is smaller (greater) than the offer price, a positive (negative) 
spread is observed. The spread exists for two reasons. First, the spread reflects the time 
value of money as the bid usually takes a few months to complete (Weston et al., 2004, 
ch21). When the time value of money is the primary concern, the target stock trades at a 
small discount relative to the offer price and the spread is positive. Second, the spread 
manifests the inherent uncertainty regarding the final terms and outcome of the bid. A 
Positive spread reflects the possibility that the bid may not be consummated with the 
Original offer price or may be revised downward. In case of a negative spread, the 
market expects that a higher offer from the original bidder or a rival bidder is imminent. 
Merger arbitrage, or risk arbitrage, is the investment strategy designed to profits from 
the uncertainty about the final terms and outcome of a takeover bid. The strategy is 
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structured in the way that the arbitrageurs can lock in the arbitrage spread if the bid is 
completed. The particular trading tactics employed by the arbitrageurs depend on the 
form of payment offered to the target shareholders. Cash and stock are two primary 
forms of payment in a takeover bid. In a cash bid, the bidder offers cash to the target 
shareholders in exchange for the target stocks. In a stock bid, the target shareholders 
receive a number of the bidder's stocks for each target stock. To set up an arbitrage 
investment in a cash bid, the arbitrageurs simply buy the target stocks and sell them to 
the bidder for the final offer price when the bid is consummated. The investment in a 
stock bid involves buying the target stocks and at the same time shorting the bidder 
stocks. At the bid completion date, the arbitrageurs exchange the target stocks for the 
bidder stocks to cover the short position 1• 
The structure of the arbitrage position in both cash and stock bids warrants that, as long 
as the bid is successful, the arbitrageurs can make a minimum profit equivalent to the 
arbitrage spread. It is obvious that, when the spread is negative, the arbitrageurs bet not 
only on whether the bid can go through but also on whether the bid will be revised 
upward by the original bidder or by a rival bidder. In case of a negative spread, the 
arbitrage position is more risky because even if the bid is completed but the offer price 
is not revised upward, the arbitrageurs will surely make a loss that is equal to the 
negative spread. 
There are two fundamental aspects about the strategy. The first aspect refers to the 
information set utilized by the arbitrageurs. The merger arbitrage position is set up only 
after the merger or the bid is officially announced. In other words, the arbitrageurs 
utilize only publicly available information about the bid. Hetherington (1983) insists 
that merger arbitrage is not an insider game. Och and Pulvino (2005) state that the 
arbitrageurs never make investment based on rumours; they only invest when the 
I In some stock bids that contain option-like terms i.e. collar deals, since the exchange ratio depends on 
the levels of the bidder stock price and the target stock price at a pricing period near the bid completion 
date, the merger arbitrage trading tactics in these bids involves dynamic hedging. Please see Fuller (2003) 
and Officer (2004) for the full description of collars and Mitchell et al. (2004) for the discussion of the 
arbitrage trading tactics in bids with collars. . 
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definitive agreement about the merger or a tender offer is announced. According to 
Moore (1999) and Moore et al. (2006), the arbitrageurs do not bet on whether the bid 
occurs, instead they speculate on whether the bid will be consummated within an 
expected period of time. 
The second aspect is about the risk in the strategy. Merger arbitrage is a risky 
investment strategy because there is uncertainty about the final terms and outcome of 
the bid. In case the bid is completed at the original or a higher offer price, the 
arbitrageurs can make a handsome profit. If the bid is prolonged or revised downward, 
the arbitrageurs get smaller return or may suffer a loss. The worst scenario for the 
arbitrageurs is when the bid is called off. In such cases, as the target stock price may fall 
all the way back to level of 30-40 days2 prior to the announcement date when no 
information about the bid is factored into the price, the losses are usually much larger 
than the gains. Since substantial losses usually happen when the bid fails to complete, 
the risk in the merger arbitrage strategy is often termed 'deal completion risk'. Given 
the fact that the probability of bid failure is only around 15% (Baker and Savasoglu, 
2002; Branch and Yang, 2003), in most cases the arbitrageur can earn positive returns, 
the incidence of failed bid is rare but can result in disastrous losses. 
Figure 2.1 depicts the stock price movement of the target in two cash mergers. In Panel 
A of Figure 2.1, Preussag AG completed the acquisition of Thomson Travel Group PLC 
after 68 days. The arbitrage position in the target stock from one day after the bid was 
announced to the bid consummation date would yield an annualized return of 16.62%. 
In Panel B, the bid for Enodis PLC by Middleby Corp failed after 67 days. A similar 
arbitrage position in the target stock in this case would result in a substantial annualized 
loss of -73.35%. 
2 In Schwert (1996), on average the target stock price starts to increase 41 days prior to the date when the 
bid is officially announced. Goergen and Renneboog (2004) report empirical evidence on the pre-bid 
price run-up in the European context. The stock price run-up preceding the announcement date may result 
from insider trading or leakage of information or bidder's setting up toeholds. .. 
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Figure 2.1: Merger arbitrage example 
This figure plots the movements of target stock price in two cash mergers. Panel A represents a 
successful merger; Panel B represents a failed merger 
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Because of the uncertainty about the final terms and outcome of the bid, merger 
arbitrage can also be viewed as a risk-shifting strategy whereby the target shareholders, 
who do not want to bear the deal completion risk, sell to the arbitrageurs, who are 
willing to. In this sense, the merger arbitrageurs provide the insurance service against 
the deal completion risk and they earn positive return to compensate themselves for 
bearing the risk. 
2.3 Theoretical framework 
Three complementary hypotheses are proposed to shed light on the source of merger 
arbitrage return: the risk-based hypothesis, the limited arbitrage hypothesis and the 
arbitrageur's role hypothesis. These hypotheses are different in their assumptions about 
the market and about the marginal investors in the arbitrage game. In the most simplistic 
setting, under the assumption of a perfect capital market, the risk-based hypothesis 
states that the merger arbitrage return to well-diversified investors should be fully 
explained by the systematic risk associated with the strategy. The extant empirical 
evidence suggests that the risk-based hypothesis only offers a part of the story. Most 
studies show that the strategy generates significant positive risk-adjusted return or 
abnormal return. Thus, the other hypotheses namely the limited arbitrage hypothesis and 
the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis are proposed to help explain persistence of the 
abnormal return. Under these two hypotheses the assumptions about the market and 
marginal investors in merger arbitrage are relaxed and become more realistic. However 
in order to appreciate these two hypotheses, we first need to have good grasp of the 
simpler one - the risk-based hypothesis. We consider this the benchmark case and the 
other ones are the extension of this benchmark case. Figure 2.2 visualizes the theoretical 
framework about the determinants of merger arbitrage return. 
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Figure 2.2: The source of merger arbitrage return - theoretical framework 
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2.3.1 Risk-based hypothesis 
Theoretical background 
Like the traditional approach of most seminal theories in finance, the starting point of 
the theoretical framework for the determinants of the merger arbitrage return is based on 
the standard setting of a perfect capital market characterized by the absence of trading 
costs, information costs and the restrictions on short-selling. In this setting, the risk-
based hypothesis states that the systematic risk associated with the merger arbitrage 
strategy is the sole determinant of the return to the strategy. 
Scholes (1972) argues that financial assets are nothing more than an abstract right to an 
uncertain future income stream. A rational investor, when investing in an asset, should 
therefore only care about whether the expected return from the investment sufficiently 
compensates for the risk stemming from the uncertainty about the asset's future income 
stream. Thus, in an efficient market where price correctly reflects all available 
information, assets are priced on the risk-return tradeoff basis. Simply put, two assets 
with the same risk must offer the same expected return. In the standard setting of a 
perfect capital market, if the risk-return tradeoff is violated, a risk-less and investment-
free arbitrage opportunity will arise. The rational traders in the market will rush in to 
exploit the opportunity, thereby making the opportunity disappear quickly. This process 
will warrant that the pricing of any asset follow the risk-return tradeoff. A more detailed 
discussion about the pricing process of financial assets is provided in Appendix 2.1 
(page 52). 
The intuition behind the risk-based hypothesis is straight forward. The idea that risk 
matters comes from the nature of financial assets. The postulation that risk is the only 
precipitating factor is the consequence of the perfect capital market setting. The 
discussion in the next section will point out that when market imperfections are 
introduced, in addition to risk, other factors also contribute to the source of merger 
arbitrage return. 
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The empirical test of the risk-based hypothesis requires an asset pricing model that 
correctly quantifies the risk-return tradeoff. In the perfect capital market setting, it can 
be shown that the expected return from any investment can be expressed as a linear 
function of the common risk factors (Ross, 2001, chI) as following: 
(1) 
The left-hand side denotes the expected return of an investment strategy i conditional on 
the information set <Pt. Rf is the risk-free rate representing the expected return assuming 
no uncertainty. X is the vector representing all common risk factors that constitute the 
source of risk; Pi is the vector representing the sensitivity of the return from the 
investment strategy to the common risk factors in X. It is important to note that Pi only 
measure systematic risk of the investment strategy i, which is the part of risk that 
correlates with the common risk factors in X. Because trading costs are assumed away, 
the part of risk that is uncorrelated with the common risk factors, idiosyncratic risk, can 
be costlessly diversified away. Thus, a rational investor should only concern about 
systematic risk. Proof of the diversification effect can be found in most standard finance 
textbooks, for instance, Bodie et al. (2005, ch8). 
Assuming that we have an accurate risk -return model in the form of equation (1), if 
merger arbitrage return can be fully explained by the risk-based hypothesis, the realized 
return from the strategy should tend toward the expected return predicted by that model. 
Therefore, if we denote RA as the realized returns to the merger arbitrage portfolio and 
E[i?:;I<ptl as the expected return to the strategy, the quantity a = RA - E[~I<pt] should 
be zero on average. If we denote the return given by the risk-return model as the normal 
return, then a measures the risk-adjusted return or abnormal return. The test of the risk-
based hypothesis boils down to the test of whether abnormal return is equal to zero on 
average. 
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Empirical evidence 
Most of the studies on merger arbitrage perform the empirical tests of the risk-based 
hypothesis. These studies employed two standard risk-return models namely the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model 
(F&F) to estimate the risk-adjusted return or abnormal return to the merger arbitrage 
strategy. The results are summarized in Table 2.1. Two noticeable features emerge from 
_ these studies. First, they unanimously report that the strategy can generate substantial 
positive risk-adjusted return ranging from 7% in Baker and Savasoglu (2002) to more 
than 172% in Dukes et al. (1992). The huge variation in the reported return can be 
attributed to the differences in the way the return to the strategy is calculated3• Second, 
most of the studies are conducted in the US market (7 out of 9). Only two studies 
employ a non-US sample. On 37 Canadian cash tender offers, Karolyi and Shannon 
(1999) report merger arbitrage return of 33.90% in excess of the CAPM benchmark for 
systematic risk. Maheswaran ~nd Yeoh (2005) also find risk-adjusted return of 9.90% -
10.69% on the merger arbitrage portfolio consisting of 193 Australian cash mergers4• 
[Insert Table 2.1, see page 51J 
The results in Table 2.1 clearly show that the systematic risk specified in CAPM and 
F&F model can only explain a part of the return to the merger arbitrage strategy. The 
implicit assumption underlying these results is that the two models provide an accurate 
description about the risk-return structure of the merger arbitrage strategy. Thus, the 
positive abnormal return reported in these studies may not necessarily indicate the 
failure of the risk-based hypothesis in explaining the source of merger arbitrage return. 
Instead, the existence of the abnormal return might be the consequence of a 
misspecified risk-return model. This is the 'bad. model' problem pointed out by Fama 
(1991, 1998). 
;---------------------
4 More detail about the way to calculate the merger arbitrage returns is discussed in section 3.3 
All reported returns are annualized returns. 
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In line with this argument, Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) re-examine the risk-return 
characteristics of the merger arbitrage strategy. As CAPM and F&F assume linear risk-
return relation, the estimated abnormal return using these models might be biased if the 
true relationship turns out to be non-linear. According to Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), 
there are good reasons to believe that the return to the merger arbitrage strategy is 
related to the market risk in a non-linear way. The risk of the strategy comes from the 
uncertainty about the bid outcome, which depends mainly on the specific characteristics 
of each individual bid, not on the overall market movement. As a result, the strategy 
should have very little market risk in most cases. The extant empirical evidence 
confirms this line of argument. Most studies find that the loading on the market risk 
factor is close to zero. The non-linear risk-return relation arises because the dynamics in 
the relation become different during severe market downturn. Since the bidder may 
have economic incentive to withdraw from the bid when the market is taking a plungeS, 
the risk of bid failure increases during market downturn. Thus, the merger arbitrage 
strategy might have positive market risk when the market is in the declining state, while 
being market neutral in other market conditions. 
With the sample of 4750 US cash and stock bids from 1963 to 1999, Michell and 
Pulvino (2001) empirically test the non-linear risk-return pattern utilizing a piecewise 
linear regression model. The authors report evidence supporting the non-linear pattern. 
Specifically, when the return to the market portfolio adjusted for the risk-free rate 
(market excess return) is above -4%, the return to the merger arbitrage strategy shows 
little co-movement with the market return. However, when the market excess return 
falls below that -4% threshold, the strategy has significant positive market risk. Because 
of the non-linear risk-return relation, the size and the significance of the abnormal return 
reported in most studies that employ linear asset pricing models may change when risk 
is more properly accounted for. In this spirit, Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) apply the 
contingent-claim approach developed by Glosten and Jagannathan (1994) to control for 
the non-linear risk profile of the merger arbitrage portfolio. The result is nevertheless 
----------------------~ 
Full discussion about the bidder's economic incentives to abandon the takeover bid during severe 
market downturn is provided in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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similar to the ones obtained from the linear risk-returns models. The risk-adjusted return 
or abnormal return of 10.3% under the contingent-claim approach is both positive and 
statistically significant. 
Maheswaran and Yeoh (2005) also investigate the non-linear risk-return pattern for the 
Australian market but find no supporting evidence. The merger arbitrage portfolio 
consisting of 193 Australian cash mergers from 1991-2000 is close to market neutral in 
all market conditions. Thus, the non-linear risk-return pattern appears to be unique to 
the US market. 
The existing evidence consistently demonstrates that the merger arbitrage strategy can 
produce significant positive return in excess of the compensation for bearing risk. The 
result is robust to the choice of the markets where the strategy is conducted as well as to 
a range of methods to control for risk. This suggests that the risk-based hypothesis can 
only explain one part of the return to the merger arbitrage strategy. 
One might take the view that it does not need to do any empirical test to anticipate the 
failure of the risk-based hypothesis in fully accounting for the source of merger 
arbitrage return because the hypothesis is grounded upon a very unrealistic setting of a 
perfect capital market. It is obvious that such a market never exists. However, with 
respect to the methodological issue in the development of finance theories, criticizing a 
theory based on the realism of its assumptions is completely irrelevant. As pointed out 
by Friedman (1953), the validity of a theory must be judged on how well it can stand 
with empirical evidence not on how realistic the assumptions are because all theories by 
nature rest on unrealistic assumptions. In the spirit of the famous Modigliani and 
Miller's (1958) irrelevance proposition, there is nothing wrong with the standard setting 
of a perfect capital market as long as the analyti<:al framework built upon the setting is 
able to explain the real world. Furthermore, by introducing market imperfections to the 
setting, we can easily extend the framework to identify the precipitating factors. 
Following such logic, there are two directions to proceed from the risk-based 
hypothesis. The first direction is to improve the empirical test of the hypothesis while 
maintaining the standard setting of a perfect capital market. As the test of the hypothesis 
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hinges upon the validity of the risk-return model itself as well as the econometric 
procedure to estimate the model, more rigorous tests of the hypothesis can be 
performed. The second direction relaxes the assumption about the perfect capital market 
in order to develop new hypotheses to explain why the positive abnormal return exists. 
In the next sections, we will discuss the other two hypotheses that are developed from 
the second direction. 
2.3.2 Limited arbitrage hypothesis 
In the perfect capital market setting, it has been argued in the previous section that when 
asset price correctly reflects all available information, the systematic risk associated 
with the merger arbitrage strategy is the sole determinant of the retu~ to the strategy. 
The empirical evidence nevertheless shows that systematic risk can only be a part of the 
story. The fact that the strategy persistently produces significant positive return in 
excess of the systematic risk benchmark is puzzling. The existence of the excess return 
or abnormal return is equivalent to the existence of 'free money' left on the table. In a 
competitive market, the competition among arbitrageurs should drive away such 'free 
money'. 
The limited arbitrage hypothesis attempts to resolve the puzzle by relaxing the perfect 
capital market assumption. Due to market imperfections, the real-world arbitrageurs 
face different types of costs, risks and constraints6 other than systematic risk. These 
costs, risks and constraints constitute the source of the abnormal return to the strategy. 
The limited arbitrage hypothesis can be deemed as an extension of the risk-based 
hypothesis when the perfect capital market setting is no longer assumed. Combined with 
the systematic risk specified under the risk-based hypothesis, the additional costs and 
risks identified under the limited arbitrage hypothesis provide a much richer description 
, 
about the source of the return to the merger arbitrage strategy. 
6 Discussion about different types of risks and costs associated with arbitrage is provided by Tuckman 
and Vila (1992), Pontiff (2006), Figlewski (1979), Campbell and Kyle (1993), De Long, et al. (1990) 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002) 
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There are two competing theories about the source of the abnormal return under the 
limited arbitrage hypothesis, that is, the arbitrage cost theory and the price pressure 
theory. Under the former, the abnormal return exists due to the additional costs and 
risks (other than systematic risk) that prevent the arbitrageurs from coming into game to 
compete away the abnormal profits. Under the latter, the abnormal return exists as a 
consequence of the fact that the target stock price falls below its efficient level because 
of a selling pressure. In the following paragraphs, we discuss each theory in more detail. 
The arbitrage cost theory focuses on the costs and risks that arbitrageurs have to incur in 
establishing the arbitrage positions. If these costs are even bigger than the expected 
abnormal profits, it is rational for arbitrageurs not to come into the game. In this case, 
there is no 'free money' to be picked up. The arbitrageurs earn fair return commensurate 
with the risks and costs associated with the strategy. 
According to Pontiff (2006), there are two types of arbitrage costs that the arbitrageurs 
typically have to face: transaction costs and holding costs. Transaction costs arise from 
the arbitrageurs' establishing and closing their positions. These are one-off costs and do 
not depend on the duration of the arbitrage positions. Examples of transaction costs 
include brokerage fees, commissions, transaction taxes, price impact of trades and 
information costs. Holding costs are the costs per unit of time. Arbitrageurs are subject 
to holding costs as long as the arbitrage positions remain open. The most obvious 
holding cost is the opportunity cost of tying up capital in the arbitrage positions. Almost 
all empirical studies on merger arbitrage control for this cost by subtracting the risk-free 
return from the return to strategy. Other holding costs are due to short-sale constraints 
and idiosyncratic risk, which will be articulated later. 
The implicit assumption in the arbitrage cost theory is that the arbitrageurs have access 
to unlimited supply of capital. 'Smart money' from the professional arbitrageurs stands 
ready to flow into the game to pick up any abnormal return. Thus, after all the costs and 
risks associated with setting up the arbitrage positions are taken into account, the 
merger arbitrageurs are left with zero extra profits. Thanks to the abundance of arbitrage 
capital, the arbitrageurs on average should earn a fair return and the pricing of merger 
stOcks is efficient. 
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Under the price pressure theory, it is argued, nevertheless, that the assumption of 
unlimited capital might be untenable. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) developed a 
theoretical model showing that due to the agency relationship between the arbitrageurs 
and the investors, who provide capital to the arbitrageurs, the arbitrageurs in the real 
world may face capital constraints. The consequence of the world with capital-
constrained arbitrageurs is that the pricing of merger stock is subject to a selling 
pressure, which in turn leads to the inefficient pricing. As a result, the excess return in 
the merger arbitrage game is real and remains on the table because the arbitrageurs do 
not have enough capital to drive it away. Next, we discuss the conceptual basis and the 
empirical evidence for these two theories. 
A. Arbitrage cost theory 
Transaction costs 
In the context of merger arbitrage, the arbitrageurs incur trading costs and information 
costs. In cash bids, as the arbitrageurs only hold a long position in the target stock, they 
incur the costs of trading in the target stocks. In stock bids, as the arbitrageurs 
simultaneously hold a long position in target stocks and a short position in bidder 
stocks, they face the costs of trading in both the target and the bidder stocks. In both 
cash and stock bids, the arbitrageurs also need to gather and analyze information about 
the outcome of the takeover bid, hence incur information costs. 
Trading costs 
There are two types of trading costs: 
• Direct trading costs are those that the arbitrageur pays to the financial 
intermediaries to execute the trade. The direct costs include brokerage fees, bid-ask 
spreads, transaction taxes and other types of surcharges; 
• Indirect trading costs refer to the costs associated with adverse price 
movements when trading large quantity of stocks. For example, suppose the target stock 
IS trading at £ 10 per share, if the arbitrageur buys a small quantity of target stock, say, 
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100 shares, his trade does not affect the price, which means that he can still buy the 
stock at £10 per share. The story is different if the arbitrageur buys a large quantity of 
target stock, say, 1 million shares. In this case, the trading of the arbitrageur results in a 
surge in the demand for the stock that may increase the stock price, for instance, to £ 11. 
In this case, because of his own trading, the arbitrageur has to buy the target stock at £1 
higher than the original price. The amount £ 1 reflects the indirect trading costs. This 
_ type of indirect costs is tenned as price impact costs' in the market microstructure 
literature and is estimated using intraday high frequency data. The price impact of trade 
can be used as a measure of the stock' liquidity. The less liquid a stock is, the higher is 
the price impact. 
With a sample of 4750 US cash and stock bids from 1963 to 1999, Mitchell and Pulvino 
(2001) examine the impact of trading costs on merger arbitrage abnonnal return. In 
addition to the direct and indirect trading costs, the authors also consider the practical 
limitations that the real-world arbitrageurs place on the fonnation of the merger 
arbitrage portfolio. The first limitation is that the amount invested in each arbitrage 
position does not exceed 10% of the portfolio value. The second limitation is that the 
arbitrage position consisting of illiquid stocks that have more than 5% price impact are 
excluded from the portfolio. The empirical result shows that when" trading costs and 
practical limitations are considered, the abnonnal return drops significantly from 9.25% 
to around 3.54% per annum. The authors conclude that trading costs and practical 
limitations account for a large part of the abnonnal return; the remaining return is still 
nonetheless both statistically and economically significant. 
Maheswaran and Yeoh (2005) examine the impact of trading costs on the return to the 
merger arbitrage portfolio comprised of 193 Australian cash mergers from 1991 to 
2000. The study reports that the abnonnal return based on the Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model is close to zero after trading costs are taken into account. Thus, in the 
AUstralian context the trading costs appear to account entirely for the abnonnal return to 
the merger arbitrage strategy. 
;--------------------(2~~~)ore discussion about price impact of trades, please see Chen et al. (2005), and Lesmond et al. 
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Information costs 
To assess the risk that a takeover bid might not consummate, the arbitrageurs often need 
the expert knowledge and information in different fields ranging from finance, 
accounting, and strategy to legal and regulatory issues8, Thus, it is likely that the 
arbitrageurs face information costs in evaluating the potential outcome of a single bid. 
While the data for trading costs are available, it is not the case for information costs. 
Typically, the amount of money each arbitrageur spends on gathering and analyzing 
information about the outcome of a takeover bid is unknown to the outside world. As a 
consequence, the empirical studies regarding the impact of information costs on the 
abnormal return to the merger arbitrage strategy employs a different. research design 
compared to those studies regarding the impact of trading costs. As for the latter studies, 
the costs of trading are estimated and then offset directly against the abnormal return to 
the strategy. Since the data about information costs are generally unavailable, it is 
difficult to assess the impact of information costs using this approach. Instead, the 
studies on information costs use a two-step research design. In the first step, the 
researchers assume that the arbitrageurs must have incurred substantial information 
costs. Based on that assumption, the researchers establish the empirical implications. 
Testing such empirical implications is the second step. 
If the merger arbitrageurs do indeed spend considerable resources on acquiring 
information about the bid outcome, they may be regarded as better informed than other 
investors in the market. There are two studies that report supporting evidence for this 
implication. First, on the sample of 111 US cash tender offers from 1977 to 1983, 
Larcker and Lys (1987) find that the success rates of the offers in which arbitrageurs 
invest are significantly higher than the expected probability of success implied in the 
market prices. They postulate that the arbitrageurs must have engaged in costly 
information acquisitions enabling them to obtain superior knowledge about the outcome 
of the takeover bid. Second, Hsieh and WalkIing (2005) report a positive relationship 
between the presence of the arbitrageurs and arbitrage returns, the probability of bid 
-8 
Please see Moore (1999; 2006), Paulson (2003) and Wyser-Pratte (2009) for more insights into the 
deCiSion making process of professional merger arbitrageurs. 
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success and the probability of bid revision after other publicly available information is 
controlled for. This indicates that arbitrageurs seem to be in a better position than the 
average investors in the market to assess the outcome of a takeover bid, thereby being 
able to earn higher return. 
Holding Costs 
Idiosyncratic risk 
In our discussion in section 2.3.1 about the risk-based hypothesis, we mention that 
idiosyncratic risk should not matter if arbitrageurs can eliminate it by holding a 
diversified portfolio. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), however, argue that the real-world 
arbitrageurs may not get access to a diversified portfolio of arbitrage opportunities. 
Thus, under-diversified arbitrageurs are also concerned about idiosyncratic risk. Merton 
(1987) develops an information-based asset pricing model showing that idiosyncratic 
risk should be priced when investors do not hold diversified portfolios. Treynor and 
Black (1973) go a step further to show that an active portfolio manager or a 
sophisticated investor is subject to idiosyncratic risk regardless of his level of 
diversification. Pontiff (2006) points to idiosyncratic risk as the most important holding 
costs that arbitrageurs have to face. 
On the empirical side, it has been reported that idiosyncratic risk plays a significant part 
In explaining the cross-section variation of equity returns. Fu (2009) applies the 
exponential GARCH models to estimate the stock idiosyncratic volatility and finds 
significant positive relationship between this measure of idiosyncratic risk and expected 
returns. In reviewing the literature about costly arbitrage, Pontiff (2006) reports that 
idiosyncratic risk helps explain a range of anomalous events in financial markets. For 
example, idiosyncratic risk is considered in Pontiff (1996) to shed light on the closed-
end fund discount puzzle, in Ali et al. (2003) to explain the book-to-market anomaly, 
and in Mashruwala et al. (2006) to explain the accrual anomaly. More recently, Li et al. 
(2009) identify idiosyncratic risk as one of the causes of the value premium 
phenomenon, in which value stocks tend to outperform growth stock. Au et al. (2009) 
and Duan et al. (2009) find that the level of short interest is inversely related to the 
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magnitude of idiosyncratic risk. This indicates that idiosyncratic risk deters 
sophisticated investors from short selling the stock for hedging or for betting on a 
possible mispricing. 
In the context of merger arbitrage, idiosyncratic risk may be one of the reasons why 
arbitrageurs do not come into the game to compete away the abnormal profits. Baker 
and Savasoglu (2002) test the importance of idiosyncratic risk in explaining the cross-
sectional variation of the abnormal return to the merger arbitrage strategy. They find a 
significant positive relationship between the strategy's abnormal return and two positive 
proxies for the strategy's idiosyncratic risk: the variance of the estimated probability of 
bid success and bid premium. The first component, the variance of the estimated 
probability of bid success, measures the degree of uncertainty regarding the outcome of 
a takeover bid. The higher is the variance, the more difficult it is to accurately quantify 
the chance that the bid can go through. The second component, bid premium, represents 
the expected amount of losses that the arbitrageur might incur in the event the takeover 
bid fails to consummate. The empirical evidence reported by Baker and Savasoglu 
(2002) shows that the arbitrageurs' exposure to idiosyncratic risk is significantly related 
to the arbitrage excess return. This result is also consistent with other studies about the 
role of idiosyncratic risk as one of the important determinants of asset returns. 
Short-sale Constraints 
Short-sale is defined as the act of selling a security which is not owned by the seller. To 
sell short, the seller needs to borrow the security from the market for securities loan. 
Short-sale constraints refer to the frictions and restrictions on the securities loan market 
faced by the borrower i.e. the short-seller. As will be discussed in more detai11ater, 
Short-sale constraints impose on the short-seller ~s long as the short position remains 
open. Thus, short-sale constraints are categorized as one type of holding costs. 
In merger arbitrage, while the investment in a cash bid only requires the arbitrageurs to 
buy the target stock, in a stock bid, the arbitrageur needs to simultaneously buy the 
target stock and short sell the acquirer stock. As a result, the arbitrageur faces short-sale 
constraints only when investing in stock bids. 
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Short-sale constraints manifest in four ways. First, the arbitrageur does not have access 
to the proceeds from selling the stock he borrows, and, therefore, arbitrage always 
requires investment. Second, not all stocks are available to borrow for short selling. 
Third, to borrow a stock the arbitrageur has to pay a fee to the lender. Although such a 
fee is generally low, it can be unexpectedly high when the demand to borrow the stock 
greatly exceeds the supply. Under such circumstances, the stock is said to become 
special. Fourth, short sellers face the risk that the stock can be recalled anytime by the 
lenders.9 
With one year equity loans data provided by a major lender, Geczy et al. (2002) 
investigate the impact of short-sale constraints on the return to the merger arbitrage 
portfolio including 226 US stock bids from 1998 to 1999. The study reports that short-
sale constraints can significantly impair the profitability of merger arbitrage strategy. 
The impact of short-sale constraints is not through the cost of short selling but through 
the shortage of the stocks available for loans. Specifically, the portfolio constructed on 
the assumption of no short-sale constraints earns annualized raw return of 64%. When 
the portfolio is constructed on only the bids, in which the acquirer stocks are available 
to short, the return declines significantly to 45%. Assuming that the stocks that become 
special cannot be borrowed, the return drops to 31 %. The cost of short selling, i.e. the 
fee paid to the lender, only reduces the return by 0.26%. The study concludes that 
although short-sale constraints significantly reduce the merger arbitrage returns, the 
remaining return are still substantial. Furthermore, as the arbitrageur only faces short-
sale constraints when investing in stock bids, short-sale constraints cannot explain the 
arbitrage return in cash bids. 
The extant empirical evidence points to a range of risks and costs that deter the 
arbitrageurs from entering the merger arbitrage <game to compete away the abnormal 
profits. All the costs and risks to arbitrageurs combined may help explain why the return 
to the merger arbitrage strategy deviates significantly away from the level that 
represents the compensation for systematic risk. If this is true, then there is no 
----------------------
9 
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For a detailed discussion about the institutional features of the market for securities loan, see Thomas 
006), D' Avolio (2002), Duffie et a!. (2002), and Au et a1. (2009) 
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inefficiency in the pricing of merger stocks as no 'free lunch' is available. In the next 
section, a different view is discussed. 
B. Price Pressure Theory 
Under the arbitrage cost theory, there is nothing 'abnormal' in the excess return to the 
merger arbitrage strategy. The excess return compensates arbitrageurs for bearing the 
additional costs and risks other than the systematic risk. If the arbitrage cost theory 
holds, there would be no inefficiency in the pricing of the merger stocks. The 
arbitrageurs earn fair return commensurate with different types of risks and costs. The 
price pressure theory, by contrast, argues that the excess return to the strategy is indeed 
'abnormal'. Under the price pressure theory, the target stock price may be subject to a 
selling pressure and as a consequent, may fall below the efficient level leaving a chance 
for arbitrageurs to earn abnormal profits. Thus, according to this theory, the abnormal 
return results from the inefficiency in the pricing of the merger stocks. 
The theoretical foundation of the price pressure theory is the agency-based model of 
limited arbitrage developed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997). The model focuses on the 
agency relationship between the investors (the principal), and the arbitrageurs (the 
agent), who combine their knowledge with the capital from the principal. As the 
arbitrage game requires special type of knowledge and information, within each 
segment which can be interpreted as a particular arbitrage strategy, arbitrage is usually 
conducted by only a few highly skilled arbitrageurs. These specialized arbitrageurs are 
subject to capital constraint in two ways. 
First, since different investors hold different judgements about the profitability of 
various arbitrage strategies, each strategy or each segment does not end up with all the 
capital but a limited amount of capital. In other words, arbitrageurs specializing in a 
particular segment are often capital-constrained. 
Second, and more subtle, the fear of losing capital when things go wrong makes an 
arbitrageur voluntarily limit the amount of capital he is willing to put in each trade. As 
argued earlier, because arbitrage trading is highly specialized and obscure, it is almost 
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impossible for the outside investors to understand the ins and outs of every arbitrage 
trade. As a consequence, the outside investors make their decision about whether to 
supply the arbitrageurs with capital based on the arbitrageurs' past performance. If an 
arbitrageur placed a substantial amount of capital on a single bet and the bet goes 
wrong, it may be very difficult for him to raise additional capital in the future. Even 
though the bet is grounded upon very sound economic rationale in the first place, 
.' because of the opaque nature of the arbitrage trade, it is very difficult for the outside 
investors to judge whether the wrong bet is due to arbitrageur' incompetence or just bad 
luck. The principals face a moral hazard problem and may decide not to supply any 
additional capital to the arbitrageur. Even worse, they may start withdrawing their 
Current investment. The fear of losing capital under management limits the amount of 
capital the arbitrageur is willing to bet on each trade. 
In the context of merger arbitrage, the fact that arbitrageurs are capital-constrained can 
have direct consequence on the pricing of merger stocks. After the bid is announced, the . 
target shareholders, who do not want to bear the deal completion risk, start selling their 
shares in the target firm, thereby creating a selling pressure. When the arbitrageurs are 
capital constrained, the arbitrage community might not be able absorb the selling 
pressure. Consequently, the target stock may fall well below its efficient price enabling 
the arbitrageurs who are able to soak up this excess supply to earn substantial abnormal 
returns. The price pressure theory would predict that the larger is the selling pressure, 
the higher the excess return to the strategy. 
Baker and Savasoglu (2002) test the price pressure theory. The authors argue that the 
bigger is the target size, the higher the number of target shares are sold by the target 
Shareholders. Thus, target size can be a positive proxy for the selling pressure. If the 
price pressure theory is valid, the excess return should be positively related to target 
siZe. Interestingly, target size can also be a proxy for transaction costs. The cost of 
trading in the stocks of big firms tends to be smaller than in those of small firms since 
big stocks are usually more liquid and information about big stocks is more transparent 
(Ali et aI., 2003; Pontiff, 1996). Because target size is inversely related to transaction 
costs, if transaction costs are true driving force behind the excess return to the strategy, 
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then a negative relationship between the arbitrage excess return and target size should 
be observed. 
It is clear that the price pressure theory and arbitrage cost theory postulate opposite 
relationship between the arbitrage excess return and target size. For a sample of 1901 
US cash and stock bids from 1981 to 1996, Baker and Savasoglu (2002) find supporting 
evidence for the price pressure theory. The excess return to the merger arbitrage strategy 
is increasing in the selling pressure proxied by target size. This evidence also indicates 
that the price pressure effect dominates the transaction cost effect. 
Since the root cause of the price pressure effect is that the arbitrageurs are capital 
constrained, a direct test of the price pressure theory should be about the relation 
between the excess return to the strategy and the arbitrageurs' capital. However, Baker 
and Savasoglu (2002) find that the relation between the arbitrageurs' capital and the 
arbitrage abnormal return is not statistically significant. The authors attribute this weak 
association to the noisy measure of arbitrageur's capital since the data is only available 
for equity capital. In reality, arbitrageurs can extensively use leverage. This result casts 
some doubt on the validity of the price pressure theory. 
Officer (2007) re-examine the Shleifer and Vishny's (1997) agency-based model of 
limited arbitrage in the context of merger and acquisition by analyzing the responses of 
arbitrage spread and arbitrage return to the occurrences of arbitrage disasters defined as 
the event when the merger arbitrageurs suffer huge losses. If the constraint on 
arbitrageurs' capital has real impact on the pricing of merger stock, such impact should 
be most evident following arbitrage disasters. The arbitrage disasters would 
Significantly reduce the supply of capital to arbitrageurs for two reasons. First, 
arbitrageurs lose capital due to the losses themselves. The reduction in capital is 
Particularly serious if the arbitrageurs do not diversify their portfolios across bids. In 
that scenario, a significant proportion of the arbitrage portfolio may be exposed to the 
disastrous events. Second, outside investors may think that the huge losses result from 
the arbitrageur's incompetence. As a result, they will limit the amount of capital 
available to the arbitrageurs by not supplying more funds or even withdrawing part of 
their funds. 
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The reduction in the supply of capital from the outside investors may force the 
arbitrageurs to liquidate their positions in the pending merger bids or make the 
arbitrageurs more cautious with their investment in future merger bids. Thus, if capital 
available to arbitrageur is reduced following disastrous events as predicted by the 
agency-based limited arbitrage model, wider spreads, hence higher arbitrage returns, for 
the pending bids surrounding the disastrous events and for the bids announced shortly 
after the events should be observed. 
Analyzing the changes in arbitrage spreads and arbitrage returns of 15 arbitrage 
disasters from 1985 to 2004, Officer (2007) finds very little supporting evidence for the 
agency-based limited arbitrage model. There is no statistically significant difference 
between the pre- and post- arbitrage disaster spreads of the pending merger bids. Also 
arbitrage disasters have no impact on the arbitrage return in the pending bids and in the 
bids announced shortly after the disaster events. The author reports no change in the 
target share turnovers in the pending bids following the disaster events. This shows that 
the trading behaviours of the merger arbitrageurs are hardly affected by the disaster 
events. 
The empirical result reported by Officer (2007) shows little support for the agency-
based model of limited arbitrage. It seems that the merger arbitrageurs do not face 
capital constraint at all. Thus, Officer's (2007) finding indicates that the weak 
aSsociation between the arbitrage abnormal return and the arbitrageurs' capital found in 
Baker and Savasoglu (2002) may not come from a noisy measure of the arbitrageurs' 
capital but simply because the price pressure effect may be of second order importance 
in the merger context. 
To sum up, the arbitrage cost theory stipulates'that the excess return to the strategy 
compensate the arbitrageurs for bearing additional risks and costs other than systematic 
risk. The existing empirical evidence points to trading cost, information cost, 
idiosyncratic risk and short sale constraints as the possible drivers of the abnormal 
return to the strategy. When these risks and costs are properly controlled for, the 
abnormal return should disappear and there would be no inefficiency in the pricing of 
lllerger stocks. The price pressure theory, by contrast, proposes that the abnormal return 
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results from inefficiency in the pricing of merger stocks. As the real-world arbitrageurs 
might be capital constrained, the target stock price is subject to a selling pressure and 
falls below its efficient level. The empirical evidence about the price pressure theory is, 
nevertheless, largely inconclusive. 
2.3.3 Arbitrageurs' role hypothesis 
In the limited arbitrage hypothesis, the abnormal return exists because the real-world 
arbitrageurs face various risks, costs, and constraints other than systematic risk. The 
arbitrageur's role hypothesis proposes another plausible explanation for the persistence 
of the arbitrage abnormal return. Under this hypothesis, the existence of the arbitrage 
abnormal return is linked to different roles that the arbitrageurs play in the takeover 
process. According to Hsieh and Walkling (2005), the arbitrageurs can play 3 roles: a 
naive investor, a passive investor and an active investor. We discuss each role in detail. 
First, as naive investors, the arbitrageurs act like the average investors in market. This 
means that the arbitrageurs simply invest in a random portfolio of takeover bids and 
hope for the best. Since the arbitrageurs are often professional investors, who manage 
capital on behalf of clients (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), the possibility that they are 
naive investors seems to be far-fetched. Interestingly, the majority of empirical studies 
On merger arbitrage implicitly assume this possibility. In many studies, the way that 
takeover bids are selected for the arbitrage portfolio is mainly based on the availability 
of data. Obviously, such a portfolio is accessible to all investors in the market. When 
the 'naive arbitrageurs' earn abnormal return, any investor in the market is able to 
emulate. If this is true, two possibilities exist. First, the abnormal return represents the 
compensation for additional costs and risks other than systematic risk that the 
arbitrageurs have to face. Second, the abnormal return reflects the inefficiency in the 
pricing of merger stock. These possibilities are discussed in the limited arbitrage 
hypothesis, Section 2.3.2 
As passive investors, the arbitrageurs do better than investing in a random portfolio of 
takeover bids. Through either information acquisition or internal research, the 
arbitrageurs obtain superior knowledge about the final outcome of the takeover bid. 
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Hence, they have the ability to select the best bids for their portfolio and are able to earn 
higher risk-adjusted return than the average investors. The passive role of arbitrageurs is 
first suggested by Larcker and Lys (1987), who find that the actual success rates of the 
takeover bids that the arbitrageurs invest in are significantly higher than the probability 
of success implied in the market price lO• It is noted that the arbitrageurs are passive in 
the sense that they do not actively leverage their stakes in the target to alter the outcome 
of the takeover bid. This is to differentiate between the passive arbitrageurs with the 
active arbitrageurs discussed later. For the passive arbitrageurs, their ability to earn 
abnormal return comes from the superior knowledge about the outcome of the bid. 
As above-mentioned, the major difference between a passive arbitrageur and an active 
one is that the latter does not just 'sit on' their stakes in the target but actively leverage 
the stakes to influence the outcome of the bid. In other words, the arbitrageurs do not 
passively watch and analyze the merger process but become part of the process. The 
possibility that the arbitrageurs are active investors is particularly interesting. In the 
conventional sense, the arbitrageurs simply take a bet on whether the bid can go 
through. They win the bet if the bid is consummated and lose if the bid fails. The odd 
that they can win the bet is determined by various factors ll that are typically outside 
their control. When the arbitrageurs are passive, they can make abnormal profits if they 
can guess the odd better than other investors in the market. When the arbitrageurs are 
active, they can influence the odd that they are betting on. This is a version of self-
fUlfilling prophecy, which makes the study about the active role of arbitrageurs a 
faScinating field. The active arbitrageurs derive their abnormal return through their 
ability to influence the outcome of the takeover bids. 
Two theoretical models are devoted to explore the behaviours of these active investors 
and how these investors can influence the bid outcome. These models are developed by 
COmelli and Li (2002) and Gomes (2001). In Cornelli and Li's (2002) model, the 
arbitrageurs help to solve the free-rider problem in a takeover contest, thereby 
faCilitating the takeover. In Gomes' (2001) model, the arbitrageurs can exert influence 
-10 
II We will discuss the result of Larcker and Lys's (1987) study in detail later in this section .. 
These factors are discussed in section 3.4 
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on the bid because they can hold out the bid until the bidder offers good terms. We 
discuss each model in detail. 
Cornelli and Li's (2002) model 
The presence of arbitrageurs in the takeover contest provides a solution to the classic 
free-rider problem propounded by Grossman and Hart (1980). To illustrate Comelli and 
Li's (2002) model, we first discuss the free-rider problem. 
In a value-enhancing takeover, the bidder perceives the equity value of the target as 
V + r, where V is the equity value of the target firm under the incumbent management 
and r is the additional value that bidder can obtain if it can control the target firm. To 
make a profit, the bidder will make an offer of V + 1C to the target's shareholders, where 
n is the bid premium and n is strictly less than T. Consider an individual shareholder, 
Who holds a fraction a of the target's equity shares. Let call him D. He decides whether 
or not to tender based on the payoffs from his decision. Let's look at D's payoff matrix. 
Bid succeeds Bid fails 
Tender a(V + n) aV 
Not tender a(V + r) aV 
If we de note Ai and Az as the probability that the bid would succeed in case D chooses 
to tender and chooses not to tender respectively, the expected payoff from each decision 
IS: 
When he chooses to tender: 
(2) 
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When he chooses not to tender: 
(3) 
D decides to tender only if the payoff in (2), the case he tenders, is larger than the 
. -' payoff in (3), the case he does not tender. Mathematically, the condition for D to tender 
IS: 
(4) 
When D is a small shareholder, i.e. a is very small, his tendering decision has very little 
impact on the probability that bid will go through. In other words, for a small 
shareholder, the probability of bid success in case he chooses to tender is approximately 
equal to the probability of success in case he chooses not to (Al :::.:: A2)' In this case, (4) 
is equivalent to: 
rr>r (5) 
This condition cannot be met because the bidder only offers bid premium rr: that is 
strictly smaller than the additional value r that he can bring to the target firm. Thus, 
When D is a small shareholder, his optimal choice is not to tender. Intuitively, since D 
knows that his tendering decision has no impact on the bid outcome, he would be better 
off if he chooses not to tender. By delaying his tendering decision, in the event that the 
bid succeeds, D can share part of the enhancement value r, instead of receiving part of 
bid premium 7C, which is lower. In other words, D decides to 'freeMride' on the bidder's 
effort to enhance the target value. If the majority of the shareholders in the target are 
small shareholders like D, a value-enhancing bid can never succeed as those small 
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shareholders will choose to free-ride. Thus, the bidder faces the free-rider problem in its 
attempt to acquire the target. 
According to Comelli and Li (2002), the presence of arbitrageurs can help solve the 
free-rider problem because the arbitrageurs play the role of large shareholders. To 
elucidate why large shareholders can be a solution to the free-rider problem, we analyze 
the tendering condition (4). In the event that D instead is a large shareholder, his 
tendering decision can have significant impact on the probability of bid success. If D 
chooses to tender, the bid has higher chance of going through. In other words, Al can be 
substantially greater than Az. Thus, bidder can always choose some level of bid 
premium Tr less than the enhancement value r so that the tendering condition (4) can be 
satisfied. In such case, D's optimal choice is to tender his shares. If the large 
shareholders control the majority of the target shares, the bid will succeed and the 
bidder can make a positive profit. 
Comelli and Li (2002) argue that thanks to arbitrageurs, even when only small 
shareholders constitute the target's pre-bid ownership structure, the bid still have the 
positive chance of success. After the bid announcement, the arbitrageurs can accumulate 
shares and become the temporary large shareholders. As our analysis shows, the 
arbitrageurs' optimal choice in this case is to tender their shares, thereby facilitating the 
takeover. However one question arises naturally from this line of argument. If the pre-
bid ownership structure of the target firms already consists of several large 
Shareholders, does the presence of arbitrageurs make any difference? 
The answer is 'Yes' on two counts. First, if the number of shares controlled by the large 
Shareholders is less than what needed for the bidder to take over the target, the free-rider 
problem is still inherent. The arbitrageurs can come in and make up for the shortage. 
Second, the large shareholders do not always facilitate the takeover process. Gaspar et 
al. (2005) report empirical evidence that whether the large shareholders favour the 
takeover bid is conditional on their investment horizon. In particular, short-term 
Investors tend to sell their holdings and walk away, and therefore, speed up the 
takeover, whereas long-term investors tend to exert their power on the negotiating table 
and, contingent on the offer terms can deter or facilitate the bid. Thus, the impact of the 
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large share ownerships on bid outcome is indeterminate at best (Sudarsanam, 1995). As 
far as the arbitrageurs are concerned, owing to the fact that they only come to the 
takeover game for a quick profit, it is likely that they are short term investors. 
Arbitrageurs' short-termism enables them to facilitate the takeover bid. 
In Cornelli and Li's (2002) model, the arbitrageurs, as the short-term large shareholders 
in the target firm, help solve the free-rider problem and facilitate the takeover bid. 
Aware of such role of arbitrageurs, the bidder will increase the bid premium ex ante or 
revise the bid upward ex post to attract more arbitrageurs into the game. Thus, the 
model predicts positive relations between the presence of arbitrageurs and bid premium 
and the probability of bid success. 
Gomes's (2001) model: 
Gomes (2001) argues that the arbitrageurs' role in the takeover game is not to solve the 
free-rider problem but to hold-out the bid until the bidder can offer more favourable 
terms. In his model, the bidder can overcome the free-rider problem via a freezeout 
mechanism. In particular, the bidder makes an offer conditioned on the receipt of shares 
representing f percentage of the target equity, where f is the freezeout threshold, above 
Which the bidder can compulsorily acquires the remaining shares at the offer price. 
Thus, if the bid succeeds, those small shareholders, who choose to free-ride, are frozen-
out and forced to convey their shares to the bidder. The value of f varies across 
jUrisdictions. In the UK, under Section 428 to 430F (inclusive) of the Company Act 
1985 12, f is equal 90% of the target equity. According to Gomes (2001), more than 
90% of the takeover bid offers in the UK and in the US are freezeout-style offers. 
To illustrate why the freeze-out offers can solve the free-rider problem, we come back 
to the shareholder D. In the context of a freezeout offer, if the bid succeeds, the 
remaining shareholders are forced to 'enjoy' the bid premium and, as a result, will 
tender their shares. The payoff matrix is as followings: 
---------------------12 
See Kenyon-Slade (2004) 
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Bid succeeds Bid fails 
Tender a(V + n) aV 
Not tender a(V +n) aV 
. It is clear that D receives the same payoffs regardless of his tendering decision; hence 
there is no room for D to free-ride on this freezeout-style bid. As suggested by Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986), D's best response is to tender his shares because such action will 
enhance the chance that the bid will go through, even very slightly in case D is a small 
shareholder. When the bid succeeds, D's wealth increases by the bid premium whereas 
his wealth remains unchanged if the bid fails. The reason for D to tender is even more 
compelling if the bidder is allowed to employ coercive bidding tactics13 in this 
freezeout-style offer. For instance, the bidder can employ two-tiered offer. in which the 
minority shareholders, who choose not to tender, will receive a back-end price lower 
than the front-end offer price. Under such circumstances. the small shareholders will 
stampede to tender their shares. 
Although the freezeout-style offer can solve the free-rider problem, there arises a 
paradox. Tendering is always a better choice for the target's small shareholders even if 
the bidder offers a small premium. This runs counter to the large amount of empirical 
evidence suggesting that the target shareholders on average receive substantial premium 
(Andrade et aI., 2001; Moeller et aI., 2004). According to Gomes (2001), the bidder can 
only succeed with a low premium if the target ownership structure only consists of 
small shareholders. Due to lack of co-ordination, these small shareholders' optimal 
choice is to tender even when the premium is not adequate. 
-13 
The coercive bidding tactics are generally prohibited by the UK City Code. See Comment and Jarrell 
~1987) for more detail about coercive bidding tactics in the US context. Many antitakeover state laws 
fi ave over the years made two-tier coercive offers very difficult. See Sudarsanam (2010, ch 18 and ch21) 
or more detail. 
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The paradox can be resolved with the presence of arbitrageurs as the target's large 
shareholders. Thanks to their large stakes, one arbitrageur (if he controls sufficient 
shares) or a group of arbitrageurs can hold out the bid. In the UK market, where the 
bidder needs to obtain at least of 90% of the target's equity shares to conduct a 
freezeout merger, the arbitrage community only needs to accumulate 10% of target 
shares to be able to prevent the bidder from freezing out the remaining shareholders. 
_ The bidder, in anticipation of the arbitrageurs' hold-out power, will offer high pre-
emptive bid or revise the bid upward to ensure that the arbitrageurs will tender their 
shares. Thus, Gomes' (2001) model also predicts a positive relationship between the 
presence of arbitrageurs and bid premium. The relationship between the presence of 
arbitrageurs and the probability of bid success is not clear in Gomes' (2001) model. 
As arbitrageurs can influence the bid outcome merely by playing the role of large 
shareholders, a similar question, as in the case of Cornelli and Li (2002), arises. If the 
pre-bid ownership structure of the target firm already includes large shareholders, can 
arbitrageurs' hold-out power make any difference? Though the answer is 'Yes' in 
Cornelli and Li's (2002) model, it is a big 'No' in Gomes' (2001) model. The 
fundamental feature that makes the arbitrageurs stand out as a good candidate to solve 
the free-rider problem in Cornelli and Li's (2002) model is their short-termism. 
However, in the hold-out context of Gomes' (2001) model, short-termism turns out to 
be a bad thing. If the bidder knows that those short-term investors are likely to hold out 
the bid, it might not even care to offer high pre-emptive bid or revise the bid upward. In 
the event that the bidder walks away, it is the short-term arbitrageurs that bum their 
fingers14. In fact, other larger shareholders are better than the arbitrageurs in playing the 
hOld-out game because they are more likely to have longer investment horizon. This can 
be seen as a major weakness of Gomes' (2001) model. 
Another weakness of the Gomes' (2001) model is specific to the UK context. One of the 
model's premises is that the free-rider problem can be resolved via freeze-out style 
offers. In the UK, freezeout mechanism cannot be applied to mandatory bids. Under the 
---------------------14 
We would like to thank the PhD third review panel for suggesting this possibility. 
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UK City Takeover code, a mandatory bid is triggered when a party acquires 30% or 
more of the target's voting equityls. A mandatory bid succeeds when the bidder gets 
only 50.1 % and cannot wait to get 90% of targets voting equity. This means that the 
bidder is hampered from enforcing the freeze-out on minorities. This may affect the 
incentives of small shareholders to hold-out i.e. they don't have to fear a freeze-out and 
can still free-ride. Due to these weaknesses, we will base most of our empirical work on 
Comelli and Li's (2002) model. 
Although the two models specify different roles for the arbitrageurs to play in the 
merger process, one condition for them to assume these roles is that the arbitrage 
community accumulate large blocks of shares after the bid is announced. Interestingly, 
even though the arbitrageurs have the power to influence the outcome of bid, if the 
piece of information about their power was already reflected into price, there would be 
no advantage for the arbitrageurs. In that case, the arbitrageurs' ability to influence the 
bid outcome does not translate itself into abnormal return. As a direct consequence, the 
arbitrageurs would have no incentive to trade. Golbe and Schranz (1994) suggest one 
solution to the trading problem, that is, the bidder tips insider information to the 
arbitrageurs to attract them into the game. 
Comelli and Li (2002), however, show that it does not require any kind of insider 
information to induce the arbitrageurs to participate in the takeover contest. An 
arbitrageur enters the trading game without any prior advantageous knowledge about 
the outcome of the bid. The only advantage he possesses is that he knows his presence 
and it has been already shown that his presence can influence the bid outcome. 
Therefore, as long as his presence is not revealed, the arbitrageur has an informational 
adVantage about the final outcome and the terms of the bid. Thanks to the advantage, 
the arbitrageur has higher reservation price abo~t the target stock compared to other 
target shareholders. This enables the arbitrageur to accumulate target shares. Thus, the 
key factor for the arbitrageur to trade advantageously in the target shares is to hide his 
presence. In Comelli and Li's model, the arbitrageur can hide his trading through two 
-15 ---------- . 
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channels. First, the trading of noise traders in the same direction with the arbitrageur 
provides the camouflage for his presence (Kyle and Vila, 1991). Second, the arbitrageur 
only acquires the target shares up to the threshold that triggers disclosure obligation 
(e.g. in US, UK, it is 5%, 1 % of the target shares respectivelyI6). Overall, it is possible 
that the arbitrage community can accumulate large block of target shares without 
revealing their presence, which enables them to make abnormal return from their ability 
to influence the bid outcome. 
Next, we present some empirical evidence on the different roles that arbitrageurs play in 
the takeover process. 
Empirical evidence 
In practice, as the arbitrageurs are often the professional money managers, who invest 
on behalf of other investors for a hefty fee, it is unlikely that the arbitrageurs are the 
naive investors who invest in a random portfolio of takeover bids. Paradoxically, 
almost all of the extant empirical studies, which focus on the profitability of the merger 
arbitrage strategy, nevertheless, implicitly assume that the merger arbitrageurs are no 
better than the naive investors. The common feature of these studies is the way the 
arbitrage portfolio is formed. A takeover bid is added to portfolio whenever data 
necessary for computing arbitrage return are available. Obviously such arbitrage 
portfolio is also accessible to the average investors in the market. 
The real-world arbitrageurs are expected to be better than the average investors. The 
passive arbitrageurs possess superior knowledge about the bid outcome, thereby having 
the ability to select the best bids for their investment. The active arbitrageurs leverage 
their stakes to influence the outcome of the bid in a way that help them earn higher 
profits. The evidence about the passive role and the active role of arbitrageurs is 
-----------------------
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nonetheless scant. We are aware of only two empirical studies by Lacrker and Lys 
(1987) and Hsieh and Walkling (2005) on this subject. 
Larcker and Lys's (1987) study 
Larcker and Lys (1987) are the first to suggest that the arbitrageurs may possess 
superior knowledge about the odd that the takeover bid will eventually succeed or fail 
compared to the average investors in the market. The public knowledge, also the 
average investors' knowledge, about the outcome of the takeover bid is reflected in the 
market price of the target stock. The target stock market price P can be decomposed 
into: 
P = (1 - n)PNS + nPs (6) 
where PNS is the price of the target stock if the bid fails and Ps is the price of the target 
stock if the bid is successful. Ps is indeed the final offer price. n is the probability of bid 
Success perceived by the average investors in market. From equation (6), the market 
implied probability of bid success can be calculated as: 
(7) 
Larcker and Lys (1987) argue that the arbitrageurs are better informed about the 
Outcome of the bid if the actual or the ex post success rates of the takeover bids that they 
Invest in are greater than the market-implied probability of success calculated using 
equation (7). The authors find supporting evidence. 
LarCker and Lys (1987) examine 111 US cash tender offers, in which arbitrageurs have 
Investment positions. The arbitrageurs are identified through 13-D filings. In the US, 
when an investor owns 5% or more of the outstanding shares, he must file a 13-D form, 
which clearly states the purpose of the investment. Larcker and Lys (1987) define 
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arbitrageurs as those whose stated purpose in the 13-D filings is "arbitrage or other 
business activities". To calculate the market implied probability of bid success, the P is 
measured as the market price of the target stock on the last day that the arbitrageurs 
acquire the target stock as stated in the 13-D filings. Ps is the offer price and PNS is 
market price of the target stock 30 days prior to bid the bid announcement date. 
Larcker and Lys (1987) find that the actual success rates of these 111 cash tender offers 
(97.12%) is significantly larger than the probability of success perceived by the market 
When the arbitrageurs set up the arbitrage positions (81.11 %). Furthermore, the arbitrage 
positions generate substantial annualized abnormal return of 14.51 %. According to 
Larcker and Lys (1987), the arbitrageurs must have engaged in costly information 
acquisitions, and therefore are better informed about the bid outcome. The abnormal 
return from the arbitrage position compensates the arbitrageurs for the information 
costs. The evidence provides support for the passive role of the arbitrageurs in the 
takeover process. 
HSieh and Walkling's (2005) study 
Hsieh and Walkling's (2005) study is the first attempt to empirically shed light on the 
active role of the arbitrageurs. Prior to this study, research on the active role is purely 
theoretical. We already conducted a thorough review of two theoretical models by 
Comelli and Li (2002) and Gomes (2001) earlier in this section. In Larcker and Lys's 
(1987) study, there is no suggestion that the result may be driven by the active role of 
the arbitrageurs. The finding that the success rates of those takeover bids in which the 
arbitrageurs invest are greater than the probability of bid success perceived by the 
average investors may stem from the arbitrageurs' ability to influence the bid outcome. 
As described in Comelli and Li (2002), the presence of arbitrageurs facilitates the 
takeover bid by resolving the free-rider problem. Thus, the finding by Larcker and Lys 
(1987) can also be validly interpreted as a manifestation of the arbitrageurs' active role. 
HSieh and Walkling (2005) recognize that it is difficult to distinguish between the 
passive and the active role in empirical work. Typically we can observe the correlation 
between the presence of arbitrageurs in the takeover bid and a favourable bid outcome 
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but we cannot be sure about the direction of the causality i.e. whether the presence of 
the arbitrageurs leads to the favourable outcome or the favourable outcome attracts 
more arbitrageurs' presence into the game. Even when we can use some sophisticated 
econometric techniques to uncover the direction of the causality, the evidence can only 
confirm the passive role not the active role. In case the favourable outcome attracts 
more arbitrageurs into the game, it is clearly the evidence supporting the passive role 
_ only. In the event that the presence of the arbitrageurs helps bring about the favourable 
outcome, it is not clear that this evidence supports active role or passive role. When the 
arbitrageurs acquire large stakes in the target firm, their presence can influence the bid 
outcome but it does not show whether they actively leverage their stakes to alter the 
outcome of the takeover bid. The active role must be behaviourally observed. We 
cannot confirm the active role based on the relationship between the presence of 
arbitrageurs and bid outcome only. 
The data about how arbitrageurs actually behave is not available; only the data about 
their holding of the target stock is available. Hence, in empirical work, a compromise is 
often made. If we can infer from the data that the arbitrageurs' holding of target stock 
can exert influence on the outcome of the takeover bid, such piece of evidence is 
interpreted as supporting evidence for the active role of arbitrageurs. This is what Hsieh 
and Walkling (2005) aim to establish in their study. 
On a sample of 608 US cash and stock takeover bids from 1992 to 1999, Hsieh and 
Walkling (2005) investigate the arbitrageurs' ability to influence the outcome and the 
terms of the bid. In particular, they test the prediction of Comelli and Li's (2002) 
theoretical model that the arbitrage holding of the target stocks is positively related to 
bid premium and the probability of bid success. 
Different from Larcker and Lys (1987) who use 13-D filings to identify arbitrageurs, 
lIsieh and Walkling (2005) use 13-F filings. Under the US laws, institutions are 
required, on quarterly basis, to disclose the details of their holdings that have value 
greater than $100,000. As these institutions are not required to state whether they are 
lllerger arbitrageurs, it is necessary to employ an empirical procedure to identify 
arbitrageurs. Hsieh and Walkling (2005) define arbitrageurs as those who increase their 
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holding of the target stocks from the quarter before the bid announcement date to the 
quarter after the bid announcement date in at least 6 takeover bids in the sample. The 
logic behind the procedure is that arbitrageurs should be those who frequently buy 
target stock after the bid announcement, and hence provide the insurance against the 
deal completion risk for the target shareholders. When the arbitrageurs are identified, 
the arbitrage holding of target stocks is sum of all the increases in holding from the 
_ quarter the before the bid announcement date to the quarter before the bid ends. 
Hsieh and Walkling (2005) argue that the passive role and the active are not mutually 
eXclusive. Stated differently, the arbitrageurs can play both roles at the same time. This 
means that the direction of the causal link between arbitrage holding and bid outcome 
variables namely the bid premium and the probability of bid success can come in both 
ways. As the passive arbitrageurs have the ability to select bids with more favourable 
outcome, bids with higher premium and higher the chance of success can attract more 
arbitrage holdings. At the same time, higher level of arbitrage holding can increase bid 
premium and the probability of bid success. Thus, arbitrage holding, bid premium and 
probability of bid success are likely to be jointly determined in equilibrium. In other 
Words, these variables might be endogenously related. 
Employing a system of simultaneous equations to control for the endogeneity, Hsieh 
and Walkling (2005) find support both the active role and passive role of the 
arbitrageurs. In particular, arbitrage holding is greater in those bids with higher ex post 
arbitrage return, higher bid premium and higher chance of bid success. At the same time 
the bid premium and the probability of bid success are found to increase with the level 
of merger arbitrage holding. These relations hold even when the market's assessment of 
bid success and a host of other factors that can affect the bid outcome are controlled for. 
The authors use the arbitrage spreads at different points of time after the bid 
announcement as the proxy for the market's assessment of the bid success. With a large 
spread, the market would perceive that the bid is less likely to succeed and vice versa. 
The finding is consistent with both the passive role and the active role. The arbitrageurs 
appear to be better than the average investors in the market in assessing the outcome of 
the takeover bid and their presence can influence the bid outcome. 
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To sum up, the evidence shows that arbitrageurs are better than the average investors in 
the market and can play both the passive and the active role. In their passive role, the 
arbitrageurs have superior knowledge about the outcome of the bid. As an active 
investor, the presence of the arbitrageurs can influence the bid outcome. However, as 
mentioned earlier, Cornelli and Li (2002) postulate that one condition for arbitrageurs to 
enter the game and influence the bid outcome is that they can hide their presence. There 
.._ is hardly any evidence about this condition and further research is therefore expected. 
2.4 Literature gap and research question 
The detenninants of merger arbitrage returns have been investigated both theoretically 
and empirically in the spirit of three separate but not mutually exclusive hypotheses 
namely the risk-based hypothesis, the limited arbitrage hypothesis and the arbitrageur's 
role hypothesis. Except for the evidence on the risk-based hypothesis, the evidence on 
the others is scanty and inconclusive. Even for the risk based hypothesis, the conflicting 
evidence still exists. Under the risk-based hypothesis, most studies report that the 
strategy can persistently eam substantial positive returns in excess of the compensation 
for systematic risk. Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) find a non-linear pattern in the 
strategy's risk-return relationship in the US market. However, Maheswaran and Yeoh 
(2005) find little evidence about the non-linearity in the Australian market. Although 
these two studies document different results, little is known about why such a difference 
exists. We postulate that the difference may be attributable to the difference between the 
takeover regulatory environment between the US and Australia. 
Under the limited arbit~age hypothesis, the review in Section 2.3.2 points out that the 
extant evidence in the US market is largely inconclusive about whether arbitrage cost 
theory or price pressure theory provides a bett~r explanation about the source of the 
excess return to the strategy. As for the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis, there are only two 
eIhpirical studies examining the roles of the arbitrageurs in the takeover process. The 
IIhportance of the anonymity condition for the arbitrageurs to influence the bid outcome 
has hardly been tested. If the condition is of material importance, it can be speculated 
that in the jurisdictions where the stringent disclosure rules are imposed, it would be 
Very difficult for arbitrageurs to exert any influence on the bid outcome. 
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Most of the empirical evidence is reported only for the US samples. For the non-US 
samples, to our best knowledge, only two studies by Karolyi and Shannon (1999) and 
Maheswaran and Yeoh (2005) empirically examine the source of merger arbitrage 
return for Canadian and Australian markets respectively. Compared to the US studies, 
the sample size of these non-US studies is very small. The sample size is 37 for the 
Canadian study and 193 for the Australian study. Thus, the robustness of these non-US 
studies should be put into question. What is more, these non-US studies only test the 
risk-based hypothesis. The empirical evidence on the limited arbitrage hypothesis and 
arbitrageurs' hypothesis is only limited to US samples. 
Factors influencing return to merger arbitrage include takeover regulatory rules that 
affect the timing, disclosure of information, revision of offer terms, ability of the bidder 
to withdraw the offer, and the timetable for the merger process to be completed. These 
regulatory rules are different between the US and other countries. Thus, the results of 
the research in the US are not easily generalisable to other markets. The inconclusive 
empirical evidence from the US studies and the lack of evidence from other markets 
represent a big gap in the literature on the determinants of merger arbitrage return. 
This doctoral study seeks to fill this gap by investigating the profitability of the strategy 
and the factors that determine the return to the strategy in the UK market. As the UK is 
the second most active merger and acquisition market in the world (Sudarsanam, 2003), 
the size of the UK sample employed in this study is much larger than other non-US 
samples. Hence, this study presents the first rigorous empirical study on merger 
arbitrage in a market other than the US market. The UK takeover regulatory regime 
provides a distinctive setting different from the US regime. This study is the first to 
eXamine the impact of takeover regulation on the factors that determine merger 
arbitrage return. The primary research question is': 
What is the magnitude of merger arbitrage return in the UK market and what are the 
factors that determine the return? 
To answer the question, we conduct three empirical projects to test the three 
corresponding hypotheses namely the risk-based hypothesis, the limited arbitrage 
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hypothesis, and the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis in the UK context. Next, we briefly 
discuss each proj ect. 
Risk-based hypothesis 
This project is the logical starting point to investigate the determinants of the return to 
the merger arbitrage strategy in the UK market. In this project, we estimate the size of 
the return to the merger arbitrage portfolio and examine the role of systematic risk in 
explaining the source of the return. As the hypothesis is grounded upon the assumption 
of a perfect capital market, it has been shown in Section 2.3.1 that in this setting 
systematic risk should be the sole determinant of the return to the strategy. Based on the 
existing empirical evidence from other markets, it is expected that the strategy can 
generate significant positive return in excess the benchmark for systematic risk. 
In addition to examining to what extent systematic risk can help shed light on the source 
of the return to the strategy, we also explore the impact of the UK takeover regulations 
on the risk-return characteristics of the merger arbitrage portfolio. For the US market, 
Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) find that the risk-return relationship differs between the 
bear and bull markets. However, Maheswaran and Yeoh (2005) do not find such pattern 
in the Australian market. Although these studies report the different empirical results, 
they do not go far enough to uncover the reasons underlying the difference. In this 
study, we make an inquiry into the difference and postulate that the difference in the 
riSk-return pattern of the strategy in different markets may be attributable to the 
difference in the takeover regulations. We establish hypotheses based on such inquiry 
and perform empirical tests. All empirical tests and results of the risk-based hypothesis 
are reported in Chapter 4. 
V· UDJted arbitrage hypothesis 
The second project moves away from the perfect capital market setting to identify and 
test different types of risks, costs and constraints other than systematic risk that the real-
World arbitrageurs face in implementing the strategy. As reviewed in Section 2.3.2, 
Under the limited arbitrage hypothesis, there are two competing theories about the 
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determinants of the arbitrage excess return. The empirical evidence in the US is still 
inconclusive about which theory is correct. In this project, by re-examining this issue, 
we can help to resolve the conflicting evidence in the US market. Further, we also look 
at the impact of a range of arbitrage costs and risks on the arbitrage excess return, that 
is, transaction costs, holding costs, idiosyncratic risk, and short-sales constraints. All 
empirical tests and results of the limited arbitrage hypothesis are reported in Chapter 5. 
Arbitrageurs' role hypothesis 
In the third project, we explore how the roles that the arbitrageurs can play in the 
takeover process can help explain the return to the strategy. We follow the approach 
suggested by Baker and Savasoglu (2002) and Hsieh and Walkling (2005) to identify 
arbitrageurs and their holding of the target stocks. We test whether arbitrage holding can 
explain the cross-sectional variation of the return to the strategy after a host of factors 
that can determine the bid outcome and the market's assessment of the bid outcome are 
taken into account. A significant relationship between arbitrage return and arbitrage 
holding would indicate that the arbitrageurs are better than the average investor in the 
market in selecting the takeover bids, investment in which can yield higher risk-adjusted 
return. 
What is more, we test whether the level of arbitrageurs' holding of target stocks has 
positive impact on bid premium and the probability of bid success as predicted by 
Cornelli and Li's (2002) model. One of the premises of the model is that the 
arbitrageurs can hide their presence when acquiring stakes in the target. The anonymity 
gives the arbitrageurs an edge in trading with other investors in the market enabling 
them to earn abnormal return. The strict UK disclosure rules during the takeover period 
make the anonymity assumption rather tenuous. As'argued later in Chapter 6, since the 
disclosure rules during the takeover period are much stricter in the UK than in the US, 
. We would expect different results about the UK arbitrageurs' ability to influence the bid 
outcome. All empirical tests and results of the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis are reported 
in Chapter 6. 
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2.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter surveys the existing literature on the determinants of the return to the 
merger arbitrage strategy. Research on merger arbitrage can be grouped under three 
hypotheses namely the risk-based hypothesis, the limited arbitrage hypothesis and the 
arbitrageurs' role hypothesis. The risk-based hypothesis concerns about how systematic 
risk can help explain the return to strategy and the risk-return characteristics of the 
strategy. The extant empirical evidence unanimously report that the strategy can 
generate significant positive return in excess of the benchmark for systematic risk. As 
far as the risk-return characteristics of the strategy are concerned, the returns to the 
arbitrage portfolio are found to be related to the market risk in a non-linear way. In 
particular, the strategy has zero market risk in normal market condition but has 
significant positive market risk during serve market downturn. The empirical evidence 
on the non-linear pattern is, however, confined to the US market. The study in the 
Australian market reports no supporting evidence for the non-linear pattern. 
The fact that the strategy can generate substantial return in excess of the compensation 
for bearing systematic risk serves as the baseline for the limited arbitrage hypothesis 
and the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis. These hypotheses attempt to explain the excess 
return to strategy, the part of the return unexplained by systematic risk. Under the 
limited arbitrage hypothesis, the excess return exists due to the additional costs, risks 
and constraints that the arbitrageurs face in implementing the strategy. Under the 
arbitrageurs' role hypothesis, the arbitrageurs earn abnormal return thanks to their 
ability to select the best takeover bids for the arbitrage portfolio or, most interestingly, 
to their ability to influence the final outcome and the terms of the bid. The empirical 
evidence for these two hypotheses is scanty, inconclusive and limited to US samples. 
Based on the literature survey, it is clear that most of the research on merger arbitrage 
focus on testing the risk-based hypothesis. There is little evidence on the limited 
arbitrage hypothesis and the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis. Furthermore, the majority of 
evidence is concentrated in the US market. Surprisingly, given that the UK is the second 
most active merger and acquisition market in the world after the US, there is still no 
empirical evidence on merger arbitrage for the UK market. As the UK has distinctive 
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takeover regulatory regime, the US results are not easily generalizable to the UK 
context. This represents the gap in the literature. This doctoral study aims to fill the gap 
by investigating the source of the return to the merger arbitrage strategy in the UK 
context. The research question of the study is: 
What is the magnitude of merger arbitrage return in the UK market and what are the 
factors that determine the return? 
To tackle the research question, we conduct three empirical projects testing the three 
hypotheses identified from the literature survey in the UK context. In the first project 
testing the risk-based hypothesis, we estimate the return to the strategy and examine 
how systematic risk can help explain the source of the return. Given the extant empirical 
evidence, it is expected that the strategy will generate positive abnormal return in excess 
of a risk-adjusted benchmark return. However, the pattern of abnormal return during 
bUll and bear markets is expected to be different in the UK from that in the US due to 
differences in their takeover regulations. The other two projects are aimed at uncovering 
the factors behind the abnormal return to the strategy. In the second project testing the 
limited arbitrage hypothesis, we test the limits to arbitrage model in terms of the risks 
and costs that limit the arbitrage activities. In the third project testing the arbitrageurs' 
role hypothesis, we focus on the roles that the arbitrageurs play during the takeover 
process and test for their impact on merger arbitrage return. 
In the next chapter, we discuss the data and some common methodological issues for 
the three empirical projects. 
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TABLES 
Table 2.1: Summary of merger arbitrage abnormal return from extant studies 
This table summarizes the results of 9 studies that apply the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (F&F) and contingent-claim approach to 
calculate the risk-adjusted return to the merger arbitrage strategy. Two approaches are applied to 
calculate the merger arbitrage portfolio return. In the event-time approach, the return to the 
investment in each bid is computed for the period starting a few days after the announcement 
date ending at the date, on which the bid is completed or terminated; the portfolio return is the 
average of the annualized returns from all bids in the sample. In the calendar-time approach, a 
bid is included in the portfolio at a few days after the announcement date and excluded from the 
portfolio at the date, on which the bid is competed or terminated. The portfolio return at each 
point of time is the average of the returns from all active bids in the portfolio at that time. The 
calendar time approach produces a time series of merger arbitrage portfolio return. 
Annualized abnormal returns 
Studies Sample Contingent CAPM F&F Claim 
Event-time approach 
Larcker and Lys (1987) 111 US cash tender 14.51% N/A N/A 
offers from 1977 to 1983 
Dukes (1992) et a1. 761 US cash tender 172% N/A N/A 
offers from 1971 to 1985 
Thosar and Trigeorgis 63 US cash tender offers 42.08% N/A N/A (1994) from 1981 to 1987 
Karolyi and Shannon 37 Canadian cash tender 33.90% N/A N/A (1999) offers in 1997 
Calendar-time approach 
Mitchell and Pulvino 4750 US cash and stock 9.90% 9.25% 10.30% (2001) deals from 1963 to 1999 
Baker and Savasoglu 1901 US cash and stock 9.77% 7.31% N/A (2002) deals from 1981 to 1996 
Jindra and Walkling 362 US cash tender N/A 26.82% NIA (2004) offers from 1981 to 1995 
Maheswaran and Yeoh 193 Australian cash 10.69% 9.90% N/A (2005) deals from 1991 to 2000 
Branch and Yang (2006) 1309 US cash and stock 22.42% N/A N/A deals from 1990 to 2000 
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Appendix 2.1: The pricing mechanism of financial assets 
To make a parrot into a learned financial economist, he only needs to learn the 
single word" arbitrage" (Ross, 1987) 
As the aim this study is to shed light on the source of the return to merger arbitrage 
. strategy, a good understanding of the "arbitrage" concept as well as how asset is priced 
in financial market is a pre-requisite. In this section, we will show two points: 
• First, in theory arbitrage is a unique investment strategy that reqUires no 
investment and entails no risk but yields positive return; 
• Second, financial asset is priced on a risk-return tradeoff basis. Specifically, 
assets in high risk class must offer higher expected return than those in the low 
risk class. 
Arbitrage can be deemed as one of the most important concepts in finance theories. The 
definition of this concept therefore can be· found in almost all standard finance 
textbooks. Hull (2005) defines arbitrage as the trading strategy that takes advantage of 
two or more securities being mispriced relative to each other. 
A simple example of the mispricing which gives rise to an arbitrage opportunity is the 
situation whereby two fundamentally identical assets are trading at different prices. 
Suppose two assets A and B have exactly the same payoffs in all future states and the 
likelihood of realizing the payoff in each state is also the same for the two assets. It is 
evident that A and B should have the same price. If the price of A is £x higher than the 
price of B (x is positive), an arbitrage opportunity would arise from this relative 
mispricing between A and B. In this case, A is said to be relatively overpriced and B is 
relatively underpriced. To capture this opportunity, an arbitrageur, the one who conduct 
the arbitrage strategy, will simultaneously purchase B, the underpriced asset, and sell 
short A, the overpriced asset. Short selling is defined as the act of selling a particular 
asset which is not owned by the seller. In this example, to short sell A, the arbitrageur 
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needs to borrow A in the market for securities loan. If capital markets are perfect in the 
sense that there are no trading costs as well as no restrictions on the market for 
securities loan, the arbitrageur can use the proceeds from short selling A to purchase B. 
In doing so, the arbitrageur has zero net investment and can realize upfront profit 
equivalent to ix, the size of the mispricing. Furthermore, since A and B have the same 
future payoffs, the arbitrageur knows with certainty that the arbitrage strategy has zero 
net future cash flows. In this sense, the arbitrage strategy entails no risk. 
Given the ex ante knowledge that the arbitrage process is riskless, investment-free but 
yields positive profits, the arbitrageur can take an arbitrarily large position to bet on the 
mispricing. The direct result of this process is the surge in both the demand for B and 
the supply of A, which will drive up the price of B and lower the price of A. The 
arbitrage process stops only when the two assets trade at the same price as dictated by 
their fundamental characteristics and the market equilibrium price of the two assets is 
obtained. When the market price is in equilibrium, no-arbitrage opportunity is 
permitted. Any deviation from the equilibrium will give rise to an arbitrage opportunity 
and the arbitrage process will drive asset price back to the pricing equilibrium level. 
The example illustrates two important points about the characteristic of arbitrage and 
the role of arbitrage in the pricing of financial asset. First, arbitrage is a unique trading 
strategy because it requires no investment, entails no risk but yields positive return. 
Second, due to its unique characteristics, arbitrage plays a crucial role in how financial 
assets are priced. While in economics the equilibrium price is obtained when supply is 
equal to demand, in finance the pricing equilibrium on securities market is reached and 
maintained when no arbitrage opportunity is permitted.17 
-
17Th . 
e no-arbitrage condition is the cornerstone of many financial theories. Ross (2001) terms the 
~onditio? as the fundamental theorem of finance The no-arbitrage argument is also the centre of the 
amous UTelevance proposition of Modigliani and Miller (1961; 1958) which lays out the foundation for 
corporate fmance literature. In a review of asset pricing literature, Campbell (2000) states that the theor~tical developments in asset pricing over the last 20 years have taken place within a well-established 
paradIgm which emphasizes the structure placed on financial asset returns by the assumption that asset 
markets do not permit the arbitrage opportunity. 
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In our simple example, the arbitrage process helps maintain the law of one price in 
financial market i.e. two identical assets cannot have the different price. This result can 
be generalized to the case where two securities having the same risk should offer the 
same expected return. As a financial asset is nothing more than an abstract right to an 
uncertain income stream (Mashruwala et al., 2006; Scholes, 1972), a rational investor 
when making investment decision in an asset only cares about whether the expected 
return on the investment sufficiently compensates for the risk stemming from the 
uncertainty about the asset's future income stream. Thus, two assets having the same 
risk can be considered identical. If these assets offer different expected return, an 
arbitrage opportunity would arise. By setting a similar arbitrage position as in the above 
example, an arbitrageur can gain positive expected return without incurring any 
investment and risk. The arbitrage process stops only when the two assets offer the 
same expected return and a pricing equilibrium that allows no arbitrage opportunity is 
obtained. A similar arbitrage situation can also arise when two assets that offer the same 
expected return but have different risk. 
To this stage we obtain the core idea of the pricing process in financial market. All 
rational investors will price an asset on a risk-return basis. The no-arbitrage condition 
guarantee that the expected return on the investment in a particular asset is solely 
determined by how risky the asset is. Stated differently, the compensation for risk is the 
sole determinant of asset returns. The pricing process in financial market based on risk-
return tradeoff is fundamental to our discussion of different hypotheses that explain the 
source of merger arbitrage return. 
54 
Chapter 3: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
To tackle the research question:' What is the magnitude of merger arbitrage return in 
. the UK market and what are the factors that determine the return?', we carry out three 
empirical projects, each of which corresponds to one of the three hypotheses namely the 
risk-based hypothesis, the limited arbitrage hypothesis and the arbitrageur's role 
hypothesis. These three empirical projects employ different methodologies and datasets 
First, in the risk based hypothesis, we estimate the profitability and the risk-return 
characteristics of the merger arbitrage strategy in the UK market. The analysis is 
conducted at portfolio level. Three calendar-time portfolio return series are constructed 
based on different weighting schemes. The dominating econometric technique is time 
series regression analysis. The sample of takeover bids cover a 21 year period from 
1987 to 2007. 
Second, in the limited arbitrage hypothesis, we examine the impact of different types of 
risks and costs on the abnormal return to the strategy. The level of analysis is on 
individual takeover bids. The method of analysis is cross-sectional regression. As 
additional data on each individual takeover bid are required and some data are collected 
manually, the sample of takeover bids is restricted to cover 11 year period from 1997 to 
2007. 
Third, in the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis, we inyestigate how different roles that the 
arbitrageurs play in the takeover process provide an answer to the source of the 
abnormal return to the strategy. In particular, we examine the relationship between the 
arbitrageurs' holding of target stocks and arbitrage return, bid premium and the 
probability of bid success. The level of analysis is on individual takeover bids and the 
method of analysis is cross-sectional regression. Special emphasis regarding 
methodological issues will be placed on solving the possible endogeneity problem in the 
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cross-sectional regression analysis. As we need to manually collect some data on 
individual takeover bids, the sample of takeover bids is restricted to cover 11 year 
period from 1997 to 2007. This is the same as the sample of takeover bids used in the 
second project testing the limited arbitrage hypothesis. 
It is clear that the methodology and data requirements for each empirical project are 
different from one another. Thus, we will describe the methodology and data for the 
three empirical projects in detail when they are conducted in the following chapters. In 
this chapter, we only discuss the methodology and data issues that are common to all 
three empirical projects. 
As far as data are concerned, all three projects require a sample of takeover bids as the 
merger arbitrage strategy is essentially the bet on the outcome of the bid. Thus, we 
discuss the process of obtaining the sample of takeover bids as the common issue for the 
three empirical projects in this chapter. 
As for methodology, the method to calculate the arbitrage return and the bid outcome 
model are considered two common issues. The rationale for the former is quite obvious. 
The three empirical projects are aimed at shedding light on the source of the return to 
arbitrage strategy. For the latter, the bid outcome model is designed to estimate the 
probability of bid success, which is the input to calculate one important variable in the 
second project testing the limited arbitrage hypothesis. In the third project on the 
arbitrageurs' role hypothesis, the bid outcome model is utilized to examine the 
relationship between the· presence of arbitrageurs and the probability of bid success. 
Thus, we discuss the method to calculate arbitrage return and the bid outcome model in 
this chapter. 
This chapter is structured as followings. Section 3.2 describes the data sources and the 
process to select the sample of takeover bids. Section 3.3 discusses the methodology to 
compute the arbitrage return to the investment in each takeover bid. Section 3.4 
describes the model to estimate the probability of bid success. Section 3.5 summarizes 
the chapter. 
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3.2 Data and sample of takeover bids 
3.2.1 Data sources 
In this project, three databases will be employed to select the sample of takeover bids 
and to collect data for other variables. We will briefly describe each database. 
0) Thomson online SDC. This database is the main source to select the sample of 
takeover bids. Most of the fundamental information about a takeover bid is available in 
SDC in a tabulated and downloadable format. 
(2) Datastream. We use this database to collect financial data of the target and the 
bidder firm. In this project, to calculate merger arbitrage return, we need share prices, 
dividends for the period covering the duration of the takeover bids. 
(3) Perfect Filings. This database contains all filings that firms are required to submit to 
regulatory authorities. The fillings are classified according to UK regulations; hence 
searching for a particular type of filings is very convenient. We use this database to fill 
in the missing information of the data taken from Thomson online SDC. As will be 
discussed in section 6.4, this database is the source based on which we identify 
arbitrageurs, their holding of the target stocks, and other variables. 
3.2.2 Sample of takeover bids 
We use two samples of takeover bids for the three empirical projects. In the first project 
testing the risk-based hypothesis, the sample covers 21 year period from 1987 to 2007. 
The second and the third project use the same sample of takeover bids, which is a subset 
of the sample for the first project. This second sample is restricted to cover 11 year 
period from 1997 to 2007. 
§ample for risk-based hypothesis 
While the previous studies on the non-US markets only consider samples of c~sh bids, 
in this study we also include stock bids in our UK sample. The inclusion of the two 
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most popular types of takeover bids in the sample would ensure that our simulated 
merger arbitrage return series closely mirrors the real world. Data about the UK 
takeover bids are taken from Thomson on-line SDC database. Because SDC recorded 
only a small number of bids prior to 1987, our sample period starts from 0110111987 
and ends at 31112/2007. 
To be included in our initial sample, several criteria must be met. 
The bidder is seeking to control more than 50% of the target shares. 
The bid announcement date is from 0110111987 to 31112/2007 
The bid's consideration structure is either pure cash or pure stock. In cash bids, 
bidder offers cash in exchange for target's shares. In stock bids, a fixed number of 
bidder's shares are exchanged for each target share. 
F or cash bids, target must be a public company listed on a UK stock exchange; 
for stock bids, both bidder and target are required to be publicly traded companies. 
These criteria result in the initial sample of 1392 takeover bids. Among these bids, 38 
are excluded because they are just rumours or bidders' intention. The information about 
the announcement date and the resolution date are missing for a number of bids. After 
doing a search on Perfect Filings and Factiva to fill in the missing information, we 
discard further 97 bids. We also drop another group of 89 bids because the 
announcement date and the resolution date18 as recorded by SDC are the same making it 
impossible to invest in those bids. 
The final step in selecting the sample of the UK takeover bids is to get the financial data 
for the target and the bidder firms. We require that data about share price and market 
18 
, For successful takeover bids, the resolution date is the date on which the bid is declared 'effective' or 
unconditional' as recorded in SOC. For failed bids, the resolution date is the date on which the bidder 
withdraws from the bid. 
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value over the offer period are available from Datastream for target firms in the case of 
cash bids and for both target and the bidder firms in case of stock bids. This requirement 
further reduces the initial sample by 63 bids. 
The final sample for the risk-based hypothesis consists of 1105 UK cash and stock 
takeover bids. Since there is no bid in January 1987, the sample starts from 01102/1987 
and ends at 31/12/2007. 
Sample for limited arbitrage hypothesis and arbitrageurs' role hypothesis 
The second sample of takeover bids for the limited arbitrage hypothesis and the 
arbitrageurs' role hypothesis is the subset of the first sample for the risk-based 
hypothesis. The second sample is obtained from the first sample by imposing 4 
additional criteria: 
The bid announcement date is from 0110111997 to 31112/2007. This criterion 
reduces the first sample by 304 bids. 
The bid duration, which is the number of days between the announcement date 
and the resolution date, is at least 21 days. For successful bids, the resolution date is the 
date on which the bid is declared to be effective or unconditional in case the effective 
date is not available in SDC. For failed bids, the resolution date is the date on which the 
bid is withdrawn. Under Rule 31.1 of the City Code, an offer must remain open for a 
minimum of 21 days following the date on which the offer document is posted. This 
justifies the requirement. In line with this criterion, 56 takeover bids are excluded. 
Data about the total return index on the target stocks are available in Datastream 
for the period starting 160 days prior to the bid announcement and ending at the bid 
resolution date defined above. This criterion reduces the sample by 49 bids. 
Finally, data about the target firm must be available in Perfect Filings. This 
criterion ensures that additional data about the target can be taken from the database. 
Under this criterion, 43 bids are discarded. 
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The final sample for the limited arbitrage hypothesis and the arbitrageurs' role 
hypothesis include 653 takeover bids from 0110111997 to 31112/2007. The sample 
selection process is summarised in Table 3.1 
[Insert Table 3.1, page 82 here] 
3.3 Arbitrage return calculation 
The return to the arbitrage position in a single bid on day t (day 0 is the announcement 
date) is the ratio of the change in the position value on day t to the position value on 
day t - 1. As the particular investment tactics are dependent on the bid's form of 
payment, the return calculation differs between cash and stock bids. 
For cash bids, because the arbitrage position includes only a long position in the target 
stock, the position value per one stock is the market price of the target stock. The 
change of the position value at day t is computed based on the changes in the target 
stock price and the dividend paid by the target firm. The equation to calculate the daily 
return to a position in a cash bid on day tis: 
prt + DTt - prt R - L L L it - Pit- 1 
(8) 
Where Rit is the return to the investment in bid i on day t , Pi~ and Pi~-l are the target 
stock price at the close of the market on day t and t - 1 respectively (superscript T 
refers to "target") , D~ is the dividend paid by the target firm of bid i on day t. In case 
the cash bid is revised, equation (8) is still applicable. As the arbitrageurs only hold a 
long position in the target stocks, the revision does not affect the structure of the 
investment in a cash bid. 
The merger arbitrage position in a stock merger includes a long position in the target 
stock and a short position in the bidder stock. To capture the arbitrage spread, for every 
long position in one target stock, the arbitrageurs short 0 bidder stocks, where 0 is the 
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exchange ratio i.e. the number of bidder stocks in exchange for one target stock. As the 
arbitrage position is created in day 1, for every long position in the target stock, the 
arbitrageurs receive the proceeds from the short position in the bidder stock equivalent 
to 0 Pi~' where Pi~ is the price of the bidder stock of bid i on day 1 (superscript B refers 
to "bidder"). In practice, the arbitrageurs have to put the proceeds from the short 
position as the cash collateral and may earn interest on the cash collateral (D'A volio, 
2002). Assuming that the rate of return on the cash collateral is the risk-free rate, cash 
collateral plus cumulative interests on day t - 1 per one bidder stock being shorted is 
Pi~ (1 + rf )t-z, where rf is the daily risk-free rate for the period from day 1 to day 
t - 1, and pf-l is the bidder stock price at the close of the market on day t - 1. 
The value of the arbitrage position on day t - 1 is the amount that arbitrageurs receive 
if they choose to close the position. In particular, for every long position in one target 
stock, the arbitrageurs receive the cash from selling the target stock (Pi~-l)' the cash 
collateral plus the cumulative interests from day 1 (OPi~ (1 + rf )t-z) ; the arbitrageurs 
have to pay to buy back the bidder stocks (Ope-l)' The change in the value of the 
arbitrage position is computed based on the movement of the bidder and target stock 
price, the dividend paid by the bidder firm and the target firm and the interest on the 
cash collateral. The final equation to calculate the daily return to the arbitrage position 
in a stock bid is: 
(9) 
In case the stock bid is revised, the exchange ratio 0 and hence the proceeds from 
shorting the bidder stock change. Thus, for stock bids that subject to revision, equation 
(9) cannot be used to compute the arbitrage return throughout the bid period. Following 
Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), when a stock bid is revised, we consider the revised bid as 
a new bid and apply equation (9) to calculate the return to the arbitrage position starting 
from the revised date to the next revised date or to the resolution date. 
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Due to the complexity pertaining to the calculation of the return to the arbitrage position 
in a stock bid, we will illustrate the calculation procedure with an example. 
Example: 
On 05 March 2007, Mears Group PLC made a stock offer for Careforce Group PLC. 
The exchange ratio is 0.455 i.e. each target stock is exchanged for 0.455 bidder stocks. 
Suppose the arbitrage investment started on 06 March 2007, the position would generate 
daily return from 07 March 2007. We will calculate the arbitrage return on two days: 07 
March 2007 and 08 March 2007. In line with equation (9), the inputs required for 
calculating the arbitrage return include target and bidder stock price, daily risk-free rate 
and dividends paid by target and bidder firm. The inputs are as followings: 
Date Target stock price Bidder Stock price 
06103/2007 £1.535 £3.520 
07/03/2007 £1.565 £3.505 
08/03/2007 £1.565 £3.505 
The daily risk-free rate is 0.02% (per day), and there is no dividend for both bidder and 
target 
Arbitrage return on 07 March 2007 
On 06 March 2007, the arbitrage position is established. For every long position in one 
target stock, the arbitrageur needs to short 0.455 bidder stocks. Based on the stock price 
of the target and bidder firm on 06 March 2007, for each target stock: 
The arbitrageur receives 3.52x0.455 = £1.602 as the short proceeds 
The arbitrageurs need to pay £1.535 to buy the target stock. 
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In reality, the arbitrageur does not get access to the short proceeds but use it as the cash 
collateral. The arbitrageurs earn risk-free rate of return on the proceeds. 
The daily arbitrage return on 07 March 07 is the ratio of the change in the arbitrage 
position value from the previous day to the position value of the previous day. Thus, we 
need to calculate the position value on 06 March 2007 and 07 March 2007. 
The value of the arbitrage position on 06 March 2007 is the amount that the arbitrageur 
receives if he decides to unwind the position. In particular, the arbitrageur will receive 
the short proceeds (as this is the first day, hence no interest), need to pay to buy back 
the bidder stock and receive the proceeds from selling the target stock. 
Thus, the position value on 06 March 2007 per one target stock is: 
1.535 + 0.455*3.520-0.455*3.520= £1.535 
On 07 March 2007, if the arbitrageur decides to close the arbitrage position, he will 
receive the short proceeds plus one-day interest; he needs to buy back the bidder stocks 
and receive the proceeds from selling the target stocks. The breakdown of the position 
value per one target stock on 07 March 2007 is: 
Short proceeds plus interest: 0.455x3.520x(1 +0.02%) = £1.6019 
Buy back the bidder stock: -0.455x3.505=-£1.5948 
Sell the target stock: £ 1.565 
, 
The position value on 07 March 2007: 1.6019-1.5948+1.565 = £1.5721 
Return on 07 March 2007: (1.5721-1.535)11.535 = 2.42% 
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Arbitrage return on 08 March 2007 
As we already know the position value on the previous day (07 March 2007), we only 
need to calculate the position value on OS March 2007 to obtain the daily return for OS 
March 2007. Similar to calculation for 07 March 2007, the breakdown of the arbitrage 
position value per one target stock on OS March 2007 is: 
Short proceeds plus interest: 0.455x3.520x(l +0.02%)"2 = £1.6022 
Buy back the bidder stock: -0.455x3.505=-£1.594S 
Sell the target stock: £ 1.565 
The position value on OS March 2007: 1.6022-1.5948+1.565=£1.5725 
Return on 08 March 2007: (1.5725-1.5721)/1.5721 = 0.025% 
As can been seen from the input table, there is no change in the price of target stock and 
bidder stock from 07 March 2007 to OS March 2007. The return to the arbitrage position 
is equal the risk-free return. The rate of return to the arbitrage position is a bit higher 
because the position value on 07 March 2007, the base to compute the arbitrage return, 
is smaller than the short proceeds, the base to compute the risk-free return. 
3.4 Bid outcome prediction model 
3.4.1 Model description 
We estimate the probability of bid success via: logistic regression. The dependent 
Variable is the bid outcome indicator, which is equal to 1 if the bid is successful and 0 
otherwise. In the takeover bid, which has only one bidder, defining whether a bid is 
sUccessful is straightforward. The bid succeeds if the bidder can acquire the target. The 
complexity arises when more than one bidder bidding for the same target. Whether the 
bid is successful depends on each party's perspective. From the bidder's view, the bid 
Succeeds only when it wins the bidding competition. From the target' view, the bid is 
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successful when any of the bidders wins the competition. As this study purports to 
identify and test the determinants of the return to the merger arbitrage strategy, we take 
the view of the arbitrageurs. 
As described in Section 2.1 and 3.3, the arbitrage investment in a cash bid includes only 
a long position in the target stock. Because the investment in cash bid is unrelated to the 
bidder stock price, it does not matter which bidder wins the bidding war. The 
investment in cash bid is essentially a bet on whether the target is acquired. Thus, from 
the arbitrageurs' perspectives, a cash bid is successful when the target is acquired by 
any of the bidders. 
The situation is completely different for stock bids. The arbitrage position in a stock bid 
involves a long position in the target stock and a short position in the bidder stock. 
Because the arbitrage investment depends on the price of the bidder stock, which bidder 
wins the bidding war matters dearly to the arbitrageurs. The nature of the short position 
in the bidder stock is to hedge against market risk. The hedge works only if that specific 
bidder wins the bidding war. If the bidder other than the one whose stocks are shorted 
by the arbitrageurs wins the bidding competition, the hedge breaks down and the 
arbitrageurs might suffer severe losses due to adverse market movement. Thus, from the 
arbitrageurs' perspective, a stock bid is successful if the target is acquired by the bidder 
Whose stocks are shorted by the arbitrageurs. 
To sum up, the dependent variable in the logistic regression to estimate the probability 
of bid success is the bid outcome indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the bid 
succeeds and 0 otherwise. A cash bid is successful when the target is acquired. A stock 
bid is successful when the target is acquired by the bidder whose stocks are shorted by 
the arbitrageurs. 
The independent variables are generally the characteristics of the bid, the bidder and the 
target that can be observed when the bid is announced. These variables include: 
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Mood of the offer (Hostile) 
Hostile is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the bid is hostile and 0 otherwise. In 
a hostile offer, the target management opposes the offer, whereas in a friendly one, the 
target management usually recommends the offer to the target shareholders. The mood 
of the offer is found to be the most important determinant of the bid outcome (Schwert, 
2000). Walkling (1985) reports that hostile bids have about 33% lower chance to go 
through than friendly bids. 
Multi-bidders (MultiBidders) 
This is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if two or more bidders are competing to 
acquire the target and 0 otherwise. As discussed at the beginning of this section, the 
arbitrageurs' perspective on the emergence of the new rival bidders differs between cash 
bids and stock bids. 
For cash bids, the multi-bidder situation is like a boon to the arbitrageurs. As there are 
more players in the bidding game, the chance that the target is acquired by one of the 
players will be higher. It is noted that the arbitrage position in cash bid yields a positive 
profit as long as the target is acquired. As a result, the multi-bidder situation reduces the 
riskiness of the arbitrage investment. What is more, as the new bidder typically offers a 
higher premium in order to win the bidding game (Betton and Eckbo, 2000; Eckbo, 
2009), the expected payoff to the arbitrageurs is greater in takeover bids with multiple 
bidders. Thus, from the arbitrageurs' perspective, the multi-bidder situation in cash bid 
Increases the chance of bid success and the expected profits from the arbitrage 
investment. 
For stock bids, the multi-bidder situation, by contrast, adds more uncertainty to the bid 
outcome from the arbitrageurs' perspective. Walkling (1985) and Jennings and Mazzeo 
(1993) document that the emergence of new bidders in the bidding process decreases 
the probability that the initial bidder can successfully consummate the bid. As discussed 
earlier, for arbitrageurs, a stock bid is successful only when the initial bidder, whose 
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stocks are shorted by the arbitrageurs, wins the bid. Thus, from the arbitrageurs' 
perspectives, the multi-bidder situation reduces the chance that a stock bid is successful. 
Managerial ownership (ManOwn) 
We measure managerial ownership as the percentage of target share directly owned by 
the target managers and their family. We obtain the data on managerial ownership from 
the target firm's most recent annual report prior to the bid announcement. Under the 
Companies Act 1985, companies are required to disclose in their annual reports the 
managerial ownership. 
Given that the target management's attitude toward the bid has such a powerful 
influence on the bid outcome, it is logical that the managerial ownership should also 
affect the bid outcome. Significant share ownership gives managers more room to deter 
or facilitate the bid. The direction of the impact of the managerial ownership on the 
outcome of the bid depends on the mood of the offer. In hostile bids, the impact is 
negative as large managerial ownership helps target managers block the bid more 
effectively. The impact, by contrast, is positive in friendly bids because managers 
favour the bid in those situations. The existing empirical evidence on the impact on 
managerial ownership on bid outcome is inconclusive. Song and Walkling (1993) find 
that the level of managerial ownership is significantly related to the outcome of hostile 
bids but not to the outcome of friendly bids. Sudarsanam (1995) reports that although 
the managerial ownership is inversely related to the probability that a hostile bid will go 
through, the relationship is statistically insignificant. 
Large shareholders' ownership (LargeOwn) 
We measure the large shareholders' ownership as the percentage of target shares owned 
by the parties who have interest in 3% or more of the target shares. Under the UK 
Companies Act 1985, companies are required to disclose in their annual reports the 
ownership of anyone who has interest in 3% or more of equity shares. Thus, we obtain 
the data on large shareholders' ownership from the target firm's most recent annual 
report prior to the bid announcement. 
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The roles of large shareholders in takeover contests are widely documented but the 
direction of this variable on the merger outcome is indeterminate (Sudarsanam, 1995). 
In Shleifer and Vishny's (1986) model, the presence of the large shareholders in the 
target firms will increase the firm value and facilitate the takeovers. According to 
Gaspar et al. (2005), whether the large shareholders facilitate or deter takeovers is 
conditional on their investment horizon. In particular, short-term investors tend to sell 
their holdings and walk away, thereby speeding up the takeover; long-term investors, on 
the other hand, tend to exert their power on the negotiating table and contingent on the 
offer terms can hold out or facilitate the deal. A real-life example about the roles of 
larger shareholders relates to the bid for London Stock Exchange by Deutsche Borse. 
The bid failed because of the resistance from hedge funds and other funds, which at that 
time are large shareholders ofLSEI9• 
Method of payment (Stock) 
This is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the offer is an equity offer and 0 
otherwise. An equity offer may give rise to the problem of information asymmetry 
between the target and the bidder shareholders (Hansen, 1987). The target shareholders 
may assume that the bidder chooses to use equity offer only when the bidder's stock is 
overvalued. Therefore, an equity offer is more likely to trigger resistance or hard 
bargaining from target shareholders. The problem of information asymmetry associated 
with cash offers may be less serious. Furthermore, in the case of equity offers, the 
process of issuing equity often requires the approval of the bidder' shareholders. As a 
result, in stock mergers, approvals from both the bidder's and target's shareholders are 
required, whereas in cash mergers only approval from the target's shareholders is 
needed. In stock mergers, new stock issues may also require compliance with the stock 
exchange listing requirements and this may take time (Sudarsanam, 2010, chI8). Thus, 
cash offers might have higher chance of success than equity offers. 
19"D 
eutsche Borse ponders bid for LSE" by Tony Major and Alex Skorecki, Financial Times, 17 Jan 
2003. 
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Toehold (I'oehold) 
Toehold is another name for the bidder's pre-bid share ownership in the target. We 
measure toehold as the percentage of the target equity shares owned by the bidder at the 
bid announcement date. Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) argue that acquiring toehold can 
help solve the free-rider problem in a value enhancing takeover bid and increase the 
chance the bid will go through. Furthermore, toehold reduces the number of shares that 
the bidder needs to acquire in order to gain control of the target. Given the toehold, the 
bidder can bid more aggressively by raising the bid premium as the additional premium 
is only paid for the shares acquired during the bid not on the toehold (Betton et at, 
2009; Singh, 1998). In a multi-bidder contest, such aggressiveness would frustrate other 
rival bidders, thereby enhancing the probability of success for the initial bidder. Thus, it 
is expected that toehold has positive impact on the probability of bid success. 
Sudarsanam (1996) notes that the benefits of toehold can be realized only when the 
bidder is able to accumulate sufficiently large toehold in anonymity. However, in the 
UK, it is not easy for the bidder to do so. Under the UK Companies Act 1989, 
acquisition of 3% or more of target shares must be notified within 2 business days. The 
Substantial Acquisition Rules of the City Code require acquisition of shares carrying 
voting rights of more than 15% and purchases of 1% or more of the shares above 15% 
but below 30% to be disclosed. Furthermore, under the City Code, acquisition of 
toehold that represents 30% or more of the target shares triggers a mandatory bid. 
Compared to a voluntary bid, a mandatory bid has a number of disadvantages. For 
example, in a mandatory bid, the offer must be cash or with cash alternatives at the 
highest price in the previous month and the offer cannot be subject to ' no material 
adverse change' (MAC) (see Sudarsanam (2010, chl8) for a thorough review of the 
mandatory bid's disadvantages). 
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Due to several disadvantages20 of acquiring toehold in the UK context outlined above, 
toehold may have little impact on the probability that the bid goes through. Sudarsanam 
(1995; 1996) report only a weak association between the size of toehold and the 
takeover bids' success rates and the probability of bid success. 
Irrevocable Undertaking (Irrevocable) 
Irrevocable Undertaking is the percentage of the target equity shares that a shareholder 
or a group of shareholders of the target firm commit to tender to the bidder. The 
information about the irrevocable undertaking is disclosed in the offer document. For 
example, in its bid for Seet PIc on 21 March 2001, Co salt PIc discloses in the offer 
document that it has received written irrevocable undertaking to accept the bid from the 
directors of Seet PIc and other shareholders in respect of 9.03 million shares 
representing 50.3% of the issued share capital of Seet PIc. The irrevocable commitment 
can offer benefits similar to toehold, that is, reduce the number of shares that the bidder 
needs to acquire and deter the entrance of rival bidders. And it can offer more. Wright et 
al (2007) argue that the irrevocable commitment is the result of the private negotiation 
process between the bidder and the management and the large shareholders of the target 
firm. As a result, irrevocable commitment sends a clear signal to the market that these 
informed investors approve the logic of the bid. 
The irrevocable commitment not only can offer more benefits than toehold, but also 
can avoid the disadvantages associated with toehold. Obtaining irrevocable commitment 
triggers neither disclosure obligation nor a mandatory bid. As a result, it is expected that 
the larger the number of shares included in the irrevocable undertaking, the higher the 
chance that the bid is successful. To our best knowledge, this variable has not been used 
in any empirical tests about the factors influencing the bid outcome. 
20 A discussion about the disadvantages of acquiring large toeholds in the US context is provided by Bris 
(2002) and Ravid and Spiegel (1999). 
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Scheme of Arrangement (Scheme) 
This is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the bid is conducted via a scheme of 
arrangement and 0 otherwise. In the UK, the bidder can acquire the target via a general 
offer or a scheme of arrangement (Kenyon-Slade, 2004). In a general offer, the bidder 
makes a cash or stock offer to the target shareholders. This is the most popular form of 
conducting a takeover. In a scheme of arrangement, under Section 425-27 of the 
Companies Act 1985, an application is made to the court by the target firm in order for 
the court to direct meetings of relevant classes of shareholders. There are two reasons 
why a takeover conducted via a scheme of arrangement has higher chance of success. 
First, as the application for the scheme must be made by the target, the deal is always a 
friendly one. Second, in the scheme, the bidder can secure 100% ownership of target's 
shares if it obtains the approval for the scheme from the target shareholders representing 
75% of the total share ownership of those shareholders who are present and vote at the 
meeting. In case of a general offer, the bidder can be sure that it can own all the target's 
shares only when it acquires 90% of the share ownership of all target's shareholders not 
just the ones present at the meeting. Thus, the freeze-out threshold is considerably lower 
with a scheme of arrangement. Takeovers conducted via a scheme of arrangement have 
become increasingly popular in recent years in the UK (Sudarsanam, 2010, ch 18). 
Termination fee (Termination) 
This is dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the target agrees to pay the bidder a 
termination fee and 0 otherwise. A target termination fee, or inducement fee21 , clause 
requires the target firm to pay a fixed cash sum to the bidder if specified events occur 
Which have the effects of preventing the bid from proceeding or causing it to fail. As a 
typical example of such specified events, the target management recommend a higher 
competing bid. With a US sample of 2511 takeover bids from 1988 to 2000, Officer 
(2003) find that the inclusion of the termination fee term is associated with 
2\ 
The tenn 'inducement fee' is used in the UK Takeover Code but it has the same meaning as the tenn 
'termination fee' or 'breakup fee' used in the US context. See Kenyon-Slade (2004, p63J) for more detail. 
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approximately 4% higher bid premium and increases the likelihood that the bid is 
successfully completed by almost 20%. In the UK, under Rule 21.2 of the City Code, 
the termination fee is capped at I % of the offer value, while in Officer (2003) study, the 
average termination fee is equal 3.8% of the offer value. Thus, in the UK context, the 
impact of termination fee clause on the bid outcome is expected to be less pronounced 
than in the US context. 
Target size (TargetSize) 
We measure the target size as the market value of the target equity at the . bid 
announcement in GBP 2007. The probability of a successful bid may decrease with 
target size for two reasons. First, bidder may find it more difficult to obtain sufficient 
funds to finance a large takeover bid. Consequently, the bidder is forced to offer a small 
premium, thereby lowering the chance that the bid can go through. Second, in a 
horizontal merger, a large deal is more likely to trigger regulatory concern about anti-
trust issue. Next, we discuss the anti-trust risk in more detail. 
Anti-trust risk proxies 
Anti-trust risk refers to the risk that the bid is blocked by the regulatory authority due to 
the concern that the merger may lead to a 'substantial lessening of competition '(SLC) 
(Sudarsanam, 2010, chI7). In the UK, the merger investigation is a two-stage process22• 
The first stage is the preliminary screening by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT). If the 
OFT identifies the merger might lead to SLC, it refers this qualifying merger to the 
Competition Commission (CC) for more detailed investigation. Once the OFT makes a 
reference to the CC, the bid lapses. Hence, the regulatory risk is the uncertainty about 
the OFT referral. 
22 
See Kryda (2002), Arnold and Parker (2007; 2009) and Sudarsanam (2010, ch 17) for a thorough review 
of the investigation process. 
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Whether the mergers are qualified to be investigated by the OFT is defined under the 
UK competition laws. In general, the mergers are qualified when one of the two tests is 
satisfied (Arnold and Parker, 2007). First, the target's total asset is greater than £70 
million. Second, the combined market share of the bidder and the target is more than 
25%. The second test is more likely to be satisfied if the merging firm are related, i.e. 
they are in the same industry, than if they are unrelated. 
Thus, if a takeover bid involves a target, whose total asset is greater than £70 million, or 
the bidder and the target are related, the chance that it will be referred by the OFT to the 
CC is higher than other bids. Based on this argument, we construct the two variables 
namely SizeTest and Relatedness as the proxy for anti-trust risk. Size Test is a 
dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the target' total asset at the bid announcement 
date is greater than £70 million and 0 otherwise. Relatedness is a dummy variable 
which is equal to 1 if the bidder and the target share the same 3-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code. The SIC code is obtained from Thomson online SDC. Since 
market definitions used by the OFT and the CC are generally narrow, a 3-digit SIC code 
is a better classification than a 2-digit SIC code (Sudarsanam, 2010, chI7). These two 
variables represent the two tests for qualifying mergers discussed in the previous 
paragraph. 
Although it is important to control for anti-trust risk in the bid outcome model, the risk 
may be quite low in the UK. According to Sudarsanam (2010, ch 17), the UK antitrust 
regime is more predictable and more time bound than the US regime. The referral rates 
and the rejection rates are quite low. In Arnold and Parker's (2007) study, out of 9872 
UK mergers from 1989 to 2002, only 156 cases are referred to the CC (around 1.6%). 
Among these 156 referral cases, 61 cases proceed without any remedy_ Furthermore, the 
UK anti-trust regime does not generally involve the courts although after the Enterprise 
Act 2002, the parties can appeal the CC decision to the Competition Appeal Tribunal 
(CAT). All of these characteristics of the antitrust regime in the UK indicate that anti-
trust risk might have only a small impact on the probability of bid success. 
AU variables in the model to predict the probability of bid success are summarized in 
Table 3.2. 
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[Insert Table 3.2, page 84 here] 
3.4.2 Model result 
As the bid outcome model plays an important role in both second and third empirical 
project testing the limited arbitrage hypothesis and the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis, to 
avoid repetition, we discuss the result of the model estimation in this chapter. We use 
the same sample of takeover bids as the second and the third project. The sample 
selection process is described in section 3.2.2. The sample includes 653 UK cash and 
stock takeover bids from 1997 to 2007. 
Data on almost all of the variables used in the bid outcome model are obtained from 
Thomson on-line SDC. Data on the market value of the target equity are downloaded 
from Datastream. Data on managerial ownership and large shareholders' ownership are 
manually collected from the target's most recent annual report prior to the bid 
announcement date. The annual reports are obtained from Perfect Filings. 
Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 present the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the bid 
outcome model for the whole sample, for the subsamples of successful bids versus 
unsuccessful bid (Table 3.3) and for the sub samples of cash bids versus stock bids 
(Table 3.4). 
[Insert Table 3.3, page 86 here] 
[Insert Table 3.4, page 87 here] 
Based on the statistical tests of the difference in mean and median of the variables 
between the subsamples, several interesting patterns can be observed. The mood of the 
offer appears to be one of the most important determinants of the bid outcome. Nearly 
of30% of the failed bids are hostile whereas the figure is only 3.6% for successful bids. 
The Proportion of hostile bids in the subsample of cash bids is significantly lower than 
in the subsample of stock bids. This explains the lower success rate of stock bids versus 
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cash bids as well as the lower proportion of stock bids in the subsample of successful 
bids versus the subsample of failed bids. 
As target management attitude toward the bid seems to have such a powerful influence 
on the bid outcome, the target's managerial ownership is expected to have a similar 
impact. The result in Table 3.3 validates this expectation. Managerial ownership of the 
successful bids (11.73% of target shares) is significantly greater than that of failed bids 
(5.57%). There is no sizable difference in managerial ownership between cash bids and 
stock bids. 
While managerial ownership has significant impact on the bid outcome, there is little 
evidence about the impact of large shareholders' ownership. The average large 
shareholders' ownership is around 38% of target shares for the whole sample and is 
about the same for the subsample of successful bids and the subsample of failed bids. 
There is no sizable difference in large shareholders' ownership between the subsample 
of cash bids and the subsample of stock bids. 
Whether the bid has multiple bidders does not seem to affect the outcome of the bid. 
There is no discemable difference in the proportion of bids with multiple bidders 
between the subsamples of unsuccessful bids and failed bids. This result, however, 
should be subject to doubt. As we argued in the previous section, from the arbitrageurs' 
perspective, the multi-bidder situation affects the outcome of cash bids and the outcome 
of stock bids in opposite ways. While the multi-bidder situation increases the likelihood 
of a successful cash bid, it decreases the chance that a stock is consummated 
successfully. Thus, the insignificant result may stem from the lack of controlling for the 
bid's method of payment. The proportion of cash bids with multiple bidders (16.89%) is 
lUore than double the proportion of stock bids with multiple bidders (7.94%) and the 
difference is statistical significant at 1 % level. Thus, cash appears to be the bidders' 
preferred method of payment to win a bidding war. 
As for toehold and irrevocable undertaking, the size of the former (4.57% of the target 
shares) is too modest compare to the size of the latter (16.55%) of the target shares. 
While toehold does not have any influence on the bid outcome, the irrevocable 
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undertaking does. There is no difference in the level of toehold between successful bids 
and failed bids, whereas the percentage of target shares that are irrevocably committed 
in successful bids is about 6 times larger than the figure in failed bids (18.17% versus 
3.21 %). This result is consistent with the argument in section 3.4.1 about the 
disadvantages of large toeholds and the advantages of irrevocable undertaking 
compared to toehold. Large toeholds trigger disclosure obligation and a mandatory bid 
with its disadvantages compared to a voluntary bids. Irrevocable commitment has no 
such disadvantages. Furthermore, as irrevocable commitment is often made by informed 
investors after a private negotiation process (Wright et aI., 2007) and it make sense for 
the bidder to negotiate mainly with the large shareholders, the size of irrevocable 
commitment should be much larger than the size of toehold. And this is actually the 
case in our sample. As far as the method of payment is concerned, the level of both 
toehold and irrevocable undertaking is both greater in cash bids than in stock bids. 
The statistics show that if the bid is conducted via a scheme of arrangement or the target 
agrees to pay the bidder a termination fee, the likelihood that the bid succeeds is higher. 
The proportion of bids conducted via a scheme of arrangement (10.82%) or having 
termination fee clause (11.34%) is significantly larger in the subsample of successful 
bids than in the subsample of failed bids (5.63% and 4.23% respectively). This result is 
consistent with the argument in section 3.4.1. The proportion of cash bids with 
termination fee is greater than the proportion of stock bids. There is no difference 
between the proportion of cash bids conducted via a scheme of arrangement and the 
proportion of stock bids conducted via a scheme of arrangement. 
Finally, in contrast to our argument in section 3.4.1, anti-trust risk appears to be a 
Powerful hindrance to bid success. The average size of the target equity market value 
and the proportion of bids, in which either the target's total asset is more than £70 
million or both the bidder and the target share the same 3-digit SIC code, are 
Significantly higher in the subsample of failed bids than in the subsample of successful 
bids. No discernable difference in average size of the target equity market value and in 
the proportions of bids, in which the target's total asset is greater than £70 million 
between the subsample of cash bids and the subsample of stock bids is observed. The 
proportion of bids, in which both the bidder and target share the same 3-digit SIC code, 
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is significantly lower in the subsample of cash bids than in the subsample of stock bids. 
Thus, stock bids are more likely to face anti-trust risk, which explains why stock bids 
have lower success rates. 
To sum up, when each variable in the bid outcome model is considered independently, 
the following variable appears to have no impact on the outcome of a takeover bid: 
whether the bid has multiple bidders, large shareholders ownership, and toehold. The 
probability of bid success is significantly reduced when the bid is hostile or due to anti-
trust investigation i.e. bids with large target and bids where the bidder and the target are 
related. The chance that the bid is consummated increases when the bid is conducted via 
a scheme of arrangement, has higher level of irrevocable undertaking, has a termination 
fee clause, and has higher level of managerial ownership. In the next section, we 
examine the result in the multivariate context when the impacts of all these variables are 
considered together. 
Logistic regression result 
Table 3.5 presents the result of the logistic regression that estiamtes the probability of 
bid success. Since we define bid outcome differently for cash bids and stock bids, we 
also re-estimate the logit model for the subsamples of cash bids and stock bids. The 
results for these subsamples are reported in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7. Alongside the 
coefficient estimates and their standard errors, we also report the odds ratio associated 
with each vaiable. 
[Insert Table 3.5, page 88 here] 
[Insert Table 3.6, page 90 here] 
[Insert Table 3.7, page 91 here] 
The result of the logistic regression is generally consistent with the univariate result 
discussed earlier in this section and the extant literature discussed in Section 3.4.1. The 
l1100d of the offer continues to be one of the most important determinants of the bid 
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outcome. The chance that the bid is consummated is significantly reduced when the 
target managment resists the offer. The odd that a hostile bid is successful is 0.14 
(model (1) in Table 3.5) indicating that the probablity of sucess for hostile bids is equal 
to 0.14 multiplied by the probability of success for friendly bids. In other words, the 
probablity that a hostile bid succeeds is 7 times lower than probabiliy of success of a 
friendly bid. The impact of the mood of the offer on bid outcome also holds for the 
sUbsamples of cash bids and stock bids. 
The presence of rival bidders first appears to have no impact on the probability of bid 
success (model (1) Table 3.5). As we noted in the univariate analysis, this result may 
stem from the fact that the multi-bidder situation affects the outcome of stock bids and 
cash bids in opposite ways. To take into account the difference between cash bids and 
stock bids, we replace the variables MultiBidders with two interaction terms 
MultiBidders X Stock and Multibidders x Cash, where Stock (Cash) is a dummy 
variables which are equal to 1 if the bidder offers stock (cash) in exchange for the target 
shares and 0 otherwise. The first interaction term represents the impact of the multi-
bidder sistuation on the probability of bid success when the bid is a stock bid and the 
second term represents the impact when the bid is a cash bid. 
The coefficient estimates of these two interaction terms are statistically signficant at 1 % 
in model (2) -(5) of Table 3.5. As expected, for stock bids, the presence of rival bidders 
reduces the chance that the bid is successful. From the odds ratio, it can be inferred that 
the probability of success is, on average, around 14 times lower for a stock bid with two 
Or more bidders than for a stock bid with a single bidder. From the arbitrageurs' 
perspective, a stock bid is successful only when the initial bidder win the competition. 
This result remains the same for the subsample of stock bids (Table 3.7). For cash bids, 
the impact of mult-bidder situation is opposite.' As the emergence of rival bidders 
increases the chance that the target will eventually be acquired by one of the 
Competitors, from the arbitrageurs' perspective, the likelihood that a cash bid is 
consummated improves with multi-bidder situation. The odd that a cash bid with two or 
more bidders succeeds is 4.5 times greater than the odd for cash bid with only one 
bidder. This result is similar for the subsample of cash bids (Table 3.6). 
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Toehold and the percentage of target shares irrecovably committed both contribute 
positively to the probability of success. The finding is similar to Betton et al. (2009). In 
this sample, the impact of irrevocable commitment on the probability of bid success 
dominates the impact of toehold as only the former is statistically significant. This result 
is consistent with the argument in Section 3.4.1 about the advantages of irrevocable 
commitment over toehold and with the result of the univariate analysis. 
Similar to the result of the univariate analysis, whether the bid is conducted via a 
scheme of arrangement significantly increases the chance that the bid will go through. 
The probability of success is around 2.8 times higher for bids conducted via a scheme of 
arrange than for other bids. This may help explain why scheme of arrangement has 
become increasingly popular in the UK over the last couple of years (Sudarsanam, 
2010, chI8). 
Managerial ownership, large shareholders' ownership and whether the bid has a 
tennination fee clause do not appear to have any impact on the probability of bid 
success. For large shareholders' ownership, this result is similar to the univariate 
analysis, in which there is no difference in the level of large shareholders' ownership 
between successful bids and failed bids. For the other two variables, although both can 
Significantly affect the bid outcome when considered independently, their impact on bid 
Outcome disappears when considered concurrently with other variables. This is because 
these variables are correlated with other variables in the model and when considered 
with other variables they have n~ incremental explanatory power. In our sample, 
managerial ownership is negatively correlated to the size of the target. When we remove 
the two variables that proxy for size, i.e. the target equity market value (TargetSize) 
and Whether the target's total asset is greater than £70 million (SizeTest), managerial 
OWnership becomes significant at 10% level (model (6) of Table 3.5). As for 
termination fee, the variable is also become significant at 10% level when the mood of 
the offer, method of payment, scheme of arrangement and irrevocable undertaking are 
removed from the logistic regression (model (7) of Table 3.5). 
Finally, consistent with the univariate result, the probability of bid success decreases 
Significantly for bids which are more likely to be subject to anti-trust regulation. The 
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target equity market value is negatively related to the probability of bid success and the 
relationship is statistically significant at 5% level. The variable SizeTest, which is an 
indicator of whether the target's total asset is greater than £70 million, is not significant 
when the target equity market value is included in the logistic regression because both 
variables proxy for the size of the target. When the target equity market value is 
removed, SizeTest becomes statistically significant (model (4) of Table 3.5). From the 
odds ratio, it can be inferred that the probability of success of bids with the target's total 
assets greater than £70 million is around 2 times lower than the probability of success of 
the other bids. When the bidder and the target are related (share the same 3-digit SIC 
code), the chance the bid goes through is significantly tampered . 
. In summary, in the multivariate analysis, we find that when other variables are taken 
into account, toehold, managerial ownership, large shareholders' ownership and 
Whether the bid has termination fee clause have no impact on the probability of bid 
success. The probability of bid success is significantly reduced when the bid is hostile 
or is more likely to face anti-trust investigation. From the arbitrageurs' perspective, a 
cash bid is more likely to go through if more than one bidder are competing to acquire 
the target. The opposite is true for stock bids. The chance of success improves if the 
bidders can obtain high level of irrevocable commitment, or the bid is conducted via a 
. scheme of arrangement. 
3.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter outlines the data and the methodology issues that are common to three 
empirical projects designed to tackle the research question of this doctoral study. Three 
data sources are employed: Thomson online SDC, Datastream, and Perfect Filings. Two 
samples of takeover bids are used for the empirical analysis. The first empirical project 
testing the risk-based hypothesis employs the first sample of 1105 UK cash and stock 
takeover bids from 1987 to 2007. The second sample is for the second and third project 
testing the limited arbitrage hypothesis and the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis 
respectively. Due to additional data requirements in the second and third project, the 
seCond sample is indeed a subsample of the first sample. The second sample includes 
653 UK cash and stock takeover bids from 1997 to 2007 
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As each empirical project employs different methodology, it is better to discuss the 
methodology in detail when the empirical projects are conducted. In this chapter, only 
two common methodological issues are discussed. As the aim of this study is to identify 
and test the factors that contribute to the source of the return to the merger arbitrage 
strategy, the first common issue is the method to calculate arbitrage return. Since one of 
the key tasks for arbitrageurs is to estimate the probability that the bid can go through, 
~he second common issue is to develop a model predicting the outcome of the bid. 
Because the model plays an important role in the second and third project, to avoid 
repetition, we not only describe the model but also use the second sample of takeover 
bids to estimate the model and discuss the result. 
To estimate the probability of bid success, we employ the logistic regression model, in 
which the dependent variable is the bid outcome indicator variable which is equal to 1 if 
the bid is successful and 0 otherwise. From the arbitrageurs' perspective, a cash bid 
succeeds when the target is acquired [by one of the bidders]; a stock bid is successful 
When the bidder, whose stocks are shorted by the arbitrageurs, acquires the target. The 
independent variables are the characteristics of the bid, the bidder and the target that can 
be observed at the bid announcement date. Among these variables, toehold, managerial 
ownership, large shareholders' ownership are found to have no impact on the bid 
Outcome. Hostile bids, bids that are likely to be investigated by anti-trust authority i.e. 
bids with large target or bidder and target are related, and stock bids with more than one 
bidder have lower probability of success. The likelihood that a bid is consummated 
Increases when the bidder obtains high level of irrevocable commitment or the bid is 
conducted via a scheme of arrangement or a cash bid has more than one bidder. 
In the next chapter, we perform the first empirical project in the journey to answer the 
research question:' , What is the magnitude oj, merger arbitrage return in the UK 
market and what are the jactors that determine the return? '. The project tests the risk-
based hypothesis in the UK context. 
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TABLES 
Table 3.1: Summary of the takeover bid sample selection process 
Sample Selection Process 
Initial sample of takeover bids 
- The bidder is seeking to control more than 50% of the target shares. 
- The bid announcement date is from 0110111997 to 31112/2007 
- The bid's consideration structure is either pure cash or pure stock 
- For cash bids, the target must be a public company listed on a UK 
stock exchange; for stock bids, both bidder and target are required to be 
publicly traded companies 
Rumours or bidder's intention 
Missing announcement or resolution date 
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Database 
Thomson online 
SDC 
Thomson online 
SDC 
Thomson online 
SDC 
Number of 
observations 
discarded 
38 
97 
Sample size 
1392 
1354 
1257 
Sample Selection Process Database Number of Sample size 
observations 
discarded 
Announcement date are the same as resolution date Thomson online 89 1168 SDC 
Data about share price and market value over the offer period are available Datastream 63 1105 
from Datastream for the target firm in case of cash bids and for both target 
and bidder firm in case of stock bids 
Sample for risk-based hypothesis 1105 
The bid announcement date is from 01/0111997 to 31112/2007 Thomson online 304 801 SDC 
The bid duration, which is the number of days between the announcement Thomson online 56 745 
date and the resolution date, is at least 21 days SDC 
Data about the total return index on the target stocks are available in Datastream 49 696 
Datastream for the period starting 160 days prior to the bid announcement 
date and ending at the bid resolution date 
Data about the target firm are available in Perfect Filings Perfect Filings 43 653 
Sample for limited arbitrage hypothesis and arbitrageurs' role 653 
hypothesis 
83 
Table 3.2: Description of the variables in the bid outcome model 
Variable name 
Outcome 
Hostile 
MultiBidders 
ManOwn 
LargeOwn 
Stock 
Toehold 
Irrevocable 
Description 
Outcome is the bid outcome indicator variable, which is equal to 1 if the bid is successful and 0 
otherwise. A cash bid is considered to be successful when the target is acquired. A stock bid is 
considered to be successful when the bidder, whose stocks are shorted by the arbitrageurs, acquires 
the target. 
Hostile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the bid is hostile and 0 otherwise. Hostile 
measures the mood ofthe offer. 
MultiBidders is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if two or more bidders are competing to 
takeover one target and 0 otherwise. 
M anOwn is the managerial ownership measured as the percentage of target share directly owned by 
t~e target managers and their family. Managerial ownership is obtained from the target firm's most 
recent annual report prior to the bid announcement. 
LargeOwn is the large shareholders' ownership measured as the percentage of target shares owned 
by the parties who have interest in 3% or more of the target shares. Large shareholders' ownership is 
obtained from the target firm's most recent annual report prior to the bid announcement. 
Stock is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the bidder stocks are used to pay for the target 
stocks and 0 otherwise. This variable represents the bid's method of payment 
Toehold is the percentage of target shares owned by the bidder at the bid announcement date 
Irrevocable is the percentage of target shares that a shareholder or a group of shareholders of the 
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Data source 
soc 
soc 
soc 
Perfect Filings 
(Annual reports) 
Perfect Filings 
(Annual reports) 
SDC 
soc 
soc 
Variable name 
Scheme 
Termination 
TargetSize 
SizeTest 
Relatedness 
Description 
target finn commit to tender to the bidder 
Scheme is a dummy variable which is equal to I if the bid is conducted via a scheme of arrangement 
and 0 otherwise. 
Termination is a dummy variable which is equal to I if the target agrees to pay the bidder the 
tennination fee and 0 otherwise 
Data source 
SDC 
SDC 
TargetSize is the market value of target equity at the bid announcement date in 2007 GBP. The UK D 
Consumer Price Index - All Urban: All items is used to convert target size to 2007 value. atastream 
SizeTest is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the target's total asset at the bid announcement 
date is more than £70 million and 0 otherwise. 
Relatedness is a dummy variable which is equal to I if the bidder and the target share the same 3-
digit SIC code and 0 otherwise. 
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SDC 
SDC 
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of the bid outcome model variables categorized by bid 
outcome 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the bid outcome model variables for the whole 
sample and for the subsamples of successful and unsuccessful bids. All variables are defined in 
Table 3.2. The result of the tests for the difference in mean and median between these two 
subsamples is also reported 
All Success Failure Difference 
Variable (N= 582) (N=71) 
Mean Mean Mean Mean 
[Median] [Median) [Median) [Median] 
Managerial Ownership 11.06% 11.73% 5.57% 6.16%··· 
[3.23%] [3.84%] [0.54%] [3.3%]**· 
Large shareholders' ownership 38.5% 38.75% 36.49% 2.25% 
[39.65%] [39.81%] [35.55%] [4.26%] 
% of stock bids 19.3% 17.18% 36.62% -19.44%**· 
% ha~ng termination fee 10.57% 11.34% 4.23% 7.11%*** 
% with multiple bidders 15.16% 14.95% 16.9% -1.95% 
% of hostile bids 6.43% 3.61% 29.58% -25.97%*** 
% with scheme of arrangement 10.26% 10.82% 5.63% 5.19%** 
% with target's total asset> £70 47.63% 44.85% 70.42% -25.58%*-
% with the same 3-digit SIC code 27.72% 26.29% 39.44% -13.15%*** 
Toehold 4.57% 4.56% 4.6% -0.03% 
[0%] [0%] [0%] [0%] 
Irre~cable Undertaking 16.55% 18.17% 3.21% 14.96%"-
(0%] [0.34%] [0%] [0.34%]*** 
Target size (£2007) 377.6529 330.5816 763.5051 -432.9235 
-
[59.1347] [52.9689] [168.8929] [-115.9241] 
*, "'*. *** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1% levels, respectively 
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics of the bid outcome model variables categorized by method 
of payment 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the bid outcome model variables for the whole 
sample and for the subsamples of cash and stock bids. All variables are defined in Table 3.2. 
The result of the tests for the difference in mean and median between these two subsamples is 
also reported 
All Cash Bids Stock Bids Difference 
Variable (N= 527) (N=126) 
Mean Mean Mean Mean 
[Median] [Median] [Median] [Median) 
Managerial Ownership 11.06% 11.28% 10.13% 1.15% 
[3.23%] [3.13%] [3.86%) [-0.73%] 
large shareholders' ownership 38.5% 38.53% 38.4% 0.13% 
[39.65%1 [39.7%] [37.62%] [2.08%1 
% of successful bids 19.3% 91.46% 79.37% 12.1%**" 
% ha-.1ng tennination fee 10.57% 12.33% 3.17% 9.16%**" 
% With multiple bidders 15.16% 16.89% 7.94% 8.95%**" 
% of hostile bids 6.43% 5.5% 10.32% -4.81%**" 
% With scheme of arrangement 10.26% 10.06% 11.11% -1.05% 
% with target's total asset > £70 47.63% 47.82% 46.83% 0.99% 
% With the same 3-digit SIC code 27.72% 24.29% 42.06% -17.78%-
Toehold 4.57% 4.85% 3.38% 1.47%" 
[0%] [0%] [0%1 [0%1 
Irre\Qcable Undertaking 16.55% 17.26% 13.56% 3.7%"" 
[0%] [0%] [0%] [O%}* 
Target size (£2007) 377.6529 373.1808 396.3579 -23.1771 
-
[59.1347] [62.4100] [47.5876] [14.8224} 
"', **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
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Table 3.5: Logistic regression result of the bid outcome model- Full sample 
This table presents the result of the logistic regression employed to estimate the probability of 
bid success on the full sample of 653 UK takeover bids from 1997 to 2007. All variables except 
for Cash are described in Table 3.2. Cash is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the bidder 
offers cash to pay for the target stock and 0 otherwise. For each variable, the first row shows the 
coefficient estimate; the second row shows the odd ratio; the third row shows the 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of the coefficient estimates. 
Model 
Intercept 
largeOwn 
ManOwn 
Hostile 
MUltiBidders 
MUltiBidders x Cash 
MUltibiddersx Stock 
ioehold 
IrreloQcable 
SCheme 
StOCk 
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
3.9817*"* 3.5981 *** 3.6397*** 2.1070*** 1.3949*** 1.3939*** 3.0947*** 
na na na na na na na 
(0.8444) (0.8529) (0.8457) (0.5359) (0.4245) (0.4242) (0.7327) 
-0.6913 -0.3109 -0.3246 0.5171 0.8702 0.9577 0.7033 
0.5009 
(0.8657) 
0.1590 
1.1530 
(1.4343) 
-1.9845*'" 
0.1375 
(0.3870) 
0.4250 
1.5296 
(0.3968) 
0.7328 
(0.8874) 
0.2389 
1.2698 
(1.4551) 
-1.8533*·· 
0.1567 
(0.4088) 
0.7228 
(0.8854) 
0.2929 
1.3404 
(1.4478) 
-1.8573*** 
0.1561 
(0.4088) 
1.6771 
(0.7957) 
1.4231 
4.1498 
(1.4133) 
-1.8175*** 
0.1624 
(0.4013) 
2.3875 
(0.7680) 
2.1925 
8.9580 
(1.3592) 
2.6058 
(0.7597) 
2.5373* 
12.6461 
(1.3599) 
-1.7896*** -1.8306*'" 
0.1670 0.1603 
(0.3946) (0.3985) 
2.0204 
(0.7835) 
2.4287* 
11.3447 
(1.3652) 
1.5102*** 1.5259*** 1.3210** 1.2602** 1.2593** 1.5517*** 
4.5276 4.5991 3,7472 3.5261 3.5228 4.7193 
(0.5831) (0.5826) (0.5708) (0.5659) (0.5657) (0.5574) 
-2.6933**· -2.6916*** -2.8438*** -2.9154*** -2.8992 .... • -3.1472**-
0.0677 0.0678 0.0582 0.0542 0.0551 0.0430 
(1.0416) (1.0429) (1.0308) (1.0235) (1.0353) (0.8270) 
0.6409 1.2011 1.1694 1.7118 1.7810 1.8529 0.0320 
1.8981 3.3237 3.2200 5.5390 5.9358 6.3783 1.0325 
(1.3547) (1.3935) (1.3906) (1.3663) (1.3406) (1.3508) (1.2763) 
4.4657*** 4.5045"** 4.4999*** 4.6555-* 4.6641*** 4.7054*** 
86.9797 90.4224 90.0086 105.1630 106.0706 110.5426 
(1.3118) (1.2704) (1.2677) (1.2894) (1.2831) (1.2827) 
1.0426* 1.0012* 1.0026* 0.8781 0.8165 0.8029 
2.8367 2.7216 2.7254 2.4063 2.2626 2.2321 
(0.5841) (0.5888) (0.5902) (0.5753) (0.5720) (0.5748) 
-0.8605*** -0.3855 -0.3764 -0.3266 -0.2520 -0.2457 
0.4229 0.6801 0.6863 0.7214 0.7773 0.7821 
----_______________________ ~W~.3~18~5~)~(~0.~35~1~3)~_(~0~.3~50~1~>~(~0.~34~7~9)~~(0~.34~34~)~(~O.~34~2~9)~ ____ ___ 
... "'''' .......... . 
" mdlcate significance at 10%, 5% and 1 % levels, respectively 
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Table 3.5: Continued ••• 
Madel (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Termination 0.2217 0.2092 0.2163 0.2107 0.2594 0.2252 1.1051* 
1.2482 1.2327 1.2414 1.2345 1.2962 1.2525 3.0194 
(0.6527) (0.6546) (0.6536) (0.6551) (0.6504) (0.6479) (0.6219) 
In(TargetSize) -0.2931** -0.3065** -0.3374*** -0.2837** 
0.7460 0.7360 0.7136 0.7530 
(0.1232) (0.1276) (0.1038) (0.1166) 
SizeTest 
-0.2393 -0.1732 -0.7709** -0.2728 
0.7872 0.8410 0.4626 0.7612 
(0.4003) (0.4167) (0.3309) (0.3817) 
Relatedness 
-0.6056** -0.5162 -0.5229 -0.5402* -0.5814* -0.3765 
0.5457 0.5968 0.5928 0.5826 0.5591 0.6862 
(0.3076) (0.3195) (0.3186) (0.3172) (0.3121) (0.2878) 
SizeTest x Relatedness -0.6890* , 
0.5021 
(0.3575) 
~eUdo) R2 0.2292 0.2656 0.2652 0.2524 0.2401 0.2398 0.1543 
lie, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
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Table 3.6: Logistic regression result of the bid outcome model- Cash sample 
This table presents the result of the logistic regression employed to estimate the probability of 
bid success on the sample of 527 UK cash bids from 1997 to 2007. All variables are described 
in Table 3.2. For each variable, the first row shows the coefficient estimate; the second row 
shows the odd ratio; the third row shows the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of the 
coefficient estimates. 
Model (1 ) (2) (3) (4) 
~ Intercept 3.7352*·* 3.6671*** 1.6153··· 0.9856*· 
na na na na 
(1.0204) (1.0181) (0.6211) (0.4740) 
largeOwn 
-0.4602 -0.4402 0.7623 1.0715 
0.6311 0.6439 2.1432 2.9198 
(1.0673) (1.0707) (0.9391) (0.9079) 
ManOwn 1.9333 1.8376 3.9046· 4.6417 .... 
6.9123 6.2813 49.6289 103.7230 
(2.0706) (2.0652) (2.0806) (1.9976) 
Hostile 
-1.3083··· -1.3085*·· -1.3421*** -1.3484*** 
0.2703 0.2702 0.2613 0.2597 
MultiBidders 
(0.4915) (0.4895) (0.4699) (0.4643) 
1.7486*** 1.7166*** 1.4574·* 1.4154** 
5.7466 5.5654 4.2948 4.1183 
ioehold 
(0.5952) (0.5904) (0.5715) (0.5674) 
0.8267 0.8898 1.4232 1.4420 
2.2857 2.4346 4.1503 4.2293 
Irrevocable 
(1.4787) (1.4757) (1.4249) (1.4014) 
7.3379 .. • .. 7.3096·** 7.4600*** 7.4879**" 
153.7459 149.4598 173.7172 178.6244 
Scheme 
(2.4320) (2.4509) (2.5125) (2.4931) 
0.8349 0.8315 0.6253 0.5685 
2.3046 2.2967 1.8688 1.7657 
iermination 
(0.6719) (0.6703) (0.6621) (0.6595) 
1.3030 1.2847 1.2808 1.3114 
3.6801 3.6137 3.5997 3.7112 
In(iargetSize) (1.0669) (1.0672) 
(1.0684) (1.0657) 
-0.4455"** -0.3908*·* 
0.6405 0.6765 
Sizeiest 
(0.1575) (0.1255) 
0.3069 -0.6405 
1.3592 0.5270 
Relatedness 
(0.5310) (0.4043) 
-0.5980 -0.6057 -0.6338* 
0.5499 0.5457 0.5306 
Sizei t (0.3879) (0.3880) (0.3832) es x Relatedness 
-0.6655 
0.5140 
~O)RZ (0.4539) 0.2570 0.2560 0.2297 0.2199 
'" "'* , , *** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1% levels, respectively 
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Table 3.7: Logistic regression result of the bid outcome model- Stock Sample 
This table presents the result of the logistic regression employed to estimate the probability of 
bid success on the sample of 126 UK stock bids from 1997 to 2007. Al1 variables are described 
in Table 3.2. For each variable, the first row shows the coefficient estimate; the second row 
shows the odd ratio; the third row shows the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of the 
coefficient estimates. 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 2.4615 2.6507 2.4872·· 1.8051** 
na na na na 
(1.6597) (1.6535) (1.0846) (0.9069) 
LargeOwn 0.4099 0.4308 0.3971 0.7663 
1.5067 1.5384 1.4874 2.1518 
(1.8155) (1.8215) (1.7041) (1.6443) 
ManOwn -1.7252 -1.4638 -1.7453 -1.3703 
0.1781 0.2313 0.1746 0.2540 
(2.4538) (2.3987) (2.2485) (2.1714) 
Hostile -3.1874*** -3.2231**· -3.1906*** -2.9623**· 
0.0413 0.0398 0.0411 0.0517 
(0.9415) (0.9322) (0.9285) (0.8631) 
MultiBidders -3.1553**· -3.1011*** -3.1510**· -3.2408*** 
0.0426 0.0450 0.0428 0.0391 
(1.0813) (1.0555) (1.0602) (1.0550) 
Toehold 4.3097 4.9323 4.2881 5.0134 
74.4163 138.6932 72.8267 150.4202 
(4.6378) (4.7250) (4.5147) (4.3858) 
Irre\Ocable 2.7638 2.3760 2.7577 2.7651 
15.8591 10.7617 15.7634 15.8S08 
(1.7555) (1.6574) (1.7288) (1.6929) 
Scheme 2.0264 1.9832 2.0297 1.8882 
7.5866 7.2659 7.6114 6.6077 
(1.6290) (1.5912) (1.6226) (1.5248) 
Termination 
-3.2663** -3.1076*· -3.2608"* -3.1231*· 
0.0381 0.0447 0.0384 0.0440 
(1.5716) (1.4848) (1.5475) (1.4761) 
In(TargetSize) 0.0052 -0.1225 
1.0052 0.8847 
(0.2560) (0.2182) 
SizeTest 
-0.7962 -0.7884 
0.4510 0.4546 
(0.7864) (0.6880) 
Relatedness 
-0.5908 -0.7340 -0.5901 
0.5539 0.4800 0.5543 
SizeTest x Relatedness 
(0.6389) (0. 6243} (0.6382) 
-0.7599 
0.4677 
(0.6408) 
~seUdo) R2 0.3717 0.3636 0.3717 0.3589 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1 % levels, respectively 
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Chapter 4: RISK-BASED HYPOTHESIS 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we examine how the risk-based hypothesis helps explain the source of 
the merger arbitrage return. Under the setting of a perfect capital market, the theoretical 
argument in Chapter 2 has shown that the systematic risk specified in a correct asset 
pricing model is the sole determinant of the return to the strategy. The risk-based 
hypothesis is the logical starting point to tackle the research question: "What is the 
magnitude of merger arbitrage return in the UK market and what are the factors that 
determine the return?" for two reasons. 
First, to address the part of the research question about the profitability of the merger 
arbitrage strategy, we cannot ignore risk. One of the factors that make the research 
about merger arbitrage particularly interesting is that the strategy can generate 
substantial positive return on a risk-adjusted basis not just the raw return. Risk plays an 
Important role in evaluating the profitability of any investment strategy. Though an 
investment strategy can generate a huge return, it is not necessarily profitable if it bears 
too much risk. 
Second, though there is ample evidence about the magnitude of the risk-adjusted return 
in the US market, the evidence outside the US is relatively scant. To our best 
knowledge, there is no evidence for the UK market, the one in which this project 
focuses on. Thus, it is interesting to see whether the strategy can generate positive risk-
adjusted return in the UK market. Further, as the discussion in Chapter 2 shows, the 
other two hypotheses namely the limited arbitrage hypothesis and the arbitrageurs' role 
hypothesis, are proposed to explore what lie behind the existence of the abnormal 
return, the part of the merger arbitrage return that is unexplained by sytematic risk. 
Thus, it is futile to pursue the other two hypotheses without the knowledge of about 
Whether the strategy can generate abnormal return in the UK market. 
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In addition to examining the extent to which risk can help shed light on the source of the 
return to the strategy, this chapter is also aimed at exploring the impact of the UK 
takeover regulations on the risk-return characteristics of the strategy. For the US market, 
Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) find that the return to the strategy is related to the market 
risk in a non-linear way. However, Maheswaran and Yeoh (2005) do not find such 
pattern in the Australian market. Although these studies report the different empirical 
results, they do not go far enough to uncover the reasons underlying the difference. In 
this chapter, we make an inquiry into the difference and postulate that the difference in 
the risk-return pattern of the strategy in different markets may be attributable to the 
difference in the takeover regulations. We establish the hypothesis based on such 
inquiry and perform empirical tests. 
The chapter is structured as following. Section 4.2 develops the hypotheses for the 
empirical tests. Section 4.3 discusses the data, the sample selection process and the 
methodology for the empirical tests. Section 4.4 presents the empirical findings about 
the size of the risk-adjusted return to the strategy and the risk-return characteristics of 
the strategy. Section 4.5 summarizes the findings and concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Hypotheses development 
4.2.1 The profitability of the UK merger arbitrage portfolios 
The extant evidence shows that the merger arbitrage strategy is highly profitable 
(Section 2.3.l, Chapter 2). The result is robust not only to the choice of market where 
the strategy is conducted, i.e. the US, Australia and Canada, but also to different 
methods of controlling for risk. Thus, we expect a similar result for the UK market. 
Hence our first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 4.1: Merge arbitrage strategy is profitable in the UK market and generates 
a significant positive risk-adjusted return. 
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4.2.2 Risk-return characteristics of the strategy- regulation impact 
As far as the risk to the strategy is concerned, Michell and Pulvino (2001) report that for 
the US market, the strategy has close-to-zero systematic risk or is market neutral in 
most market conditions but has significant positive systematic risk during market 
downturn. Maheswaran and Yeoh (2005) also investigate such non-linear risk-return 
pattern for the Australian market but find no supporting evidence. The merger arbitrage 
portfolio consisting of 193 Australian cash mergers from 1991-2000 is close to market 
neutral in all market conditions. Thus, the non-linear risk-return pattern appears to be 
unique to the US market. 
While the two studies document different empirical results about the risk-return 
characteristic of merger arbitrage strategy, little is known about why such a difference 
exists. Maheswaran and Yeoh (2005) offer no explanation about the absence of the non-
linearity compared to the study by Michell and Pulvino (2001). To make an inquiry into 
the source of the difference, the first step is to examine the economic rationale behind 
the non-linear risk-return pattern of the merger arbitrage strategy. 
As the main risk associated with the strategy is the possibility of bid failure, which is 
generally idiosyncratic, it should be expected that the strategy has little systematic risk 
under most circumstances. The non-linear risk-return pattern arises when the risk of bid 
failure increases substantially during severe market downturn. Because the target stock 
price often correlates with the market movements, when the market is falling it is likely 
that the target stock price follows suit. Under that circumstance, the bid may fail in two 
scenarios. First, the bidder may feel that he overpays for a depreciating asset and 
therefore may abandon the bid (if allowed by the regulatory regime). This scenario is 
true, nevertheless, mainly for those bids, in which the bidder pays cash in exchange for 
target stock. In case the bidder uses his own stock in exchange for target stock, because 
the price of the bidder's stock also falls during market downturn, he may not feel that he 
overpays for the depreciating target stock. 
Second, if the bid is paid for in cash and the bidder finances the bid mainly with debt 
like a typical leverage buy-out deal, the bid may fail because the bidder may lose the 
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sources of financing. In a severe market downturn, the liquidity in the market dries up 
due to the so-called 'flight-to-quality' race. As the whole market is in a panic mood, no 
one wants to hold anything other than risk-free assets e.g. government securities. Under 
such circumstance, the spreads between risky corporate bonds and Government bonds 
widen dramatically. This is typically what happened to Long-term Capital Management 
in 199823• Thus, if the bidder relies on debt to finance the bid, during severe market 
downturns, it might not be able to obtain the cash at the right cost of debt to pay for the 
target stock at the initial offer price. Consequently, the bidder may be forced to 
terminate the bid24• 
The recent case of Dow Chemical's bid for Rohm & Haas on 07/10/2008 clearly 
illustrates the second scenario. Dow Chemical planned to obtain the cash for the bid via 
issuing bonds. It is supposed to close the bid on 27/0112009. However due to the market 
tunnoil at the end of 2008 and early 2009, Dow Chemical was unable to obtain 
Sufficient funding to pay for Rohm & Haas stocks at the initial offer price and decided 
to back off. On February 2009, Rohm & Haas sued Dow Chemical to Delaware Court 
for the failure to complete the bid. Even though after 4 months of trial and negotiation, 
the bid was finally consummated on April 2009, the severe market downturn during the 
bid period increased the uncertainty about the final outcome of the bid. 
Two points can be drawn from the economic rationale behind the non-linear risk-return 
pattern. First, the pattern, if it exists, is mainly true for the merger arbitrage portfolio 
containing cash bids. Michell and Pulvino (2001) test this implication and report 
Supporting evidence. The non-linear risk-return pattern is stronger when the portfolio is 
restricted to cash bids. The portfolio of stock bids is, however, market neutral in all 
market conditions. Second, the existence of the non-linear pattern crucially depends on 
the bidder's ability to withdraw from the bid during market downturn. One corollary of 
this implication is that the pattern should be stronger in jurisdictions that are more 
;--------------------
24 See Lowenstein (2001) and Dunbar (2000) for a detailed description of the case. it depends on whether the bidder can use the 'market fall' excuse to get out of the bid. There have been 
~ ew cases of litigation by targets against bidders and their bankers in the US in recent years. So bidders 
ave to factor in such potential costs. .. 
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lenient toward the bidder's tendency to renege on the bid. Thus, takeover regulations 
may play an important role in explaining why the non-linear pattern exists in the US 
market but not in Australian market. A closer look at the US and Australian takeover 
regulation appears to prove this conjecture. 
According to Kenyon-Slade (2004, p36), under the US takeover law, the bidder has the 
flexibility to include conditions in the offer, the fulfilment of which is solely within the 
hands of the bidder. Regarding the case of market downturn, the US bidder is allowed to 
specify the so-called 'Market Out Condition' in the offer, which then allow it to 
terminate the bid in the event of material adverse movements in the bidder's share price, 
the target's share price or in general share price, say, a market index. Hence, in the US 
market the risk of bid failure might increase substantially during severe market 
downturn as the bidder has the economic incentive and is allowed to abandon the bid as 
long as the bidder can put the' Market Out Condition' in the offer. 
In Australia, the ability of the bidder to terminate the bid at its discretion is more 
restrictive. Section 662, chapter 6 of the Corporations Act 1989 clearly states that "an 
offeror shall not make a takeover offer subject to a defeating condition the fulfilment of 
which depend on (a) an opinion, belief or other state of mind of the offeror or of an 
aSsociate of the offeror; or (b) whether or not a particular event happens, being an event 
that is within the sole control of offeror or of an associate of the offeror; and, if a 
takeover offer is made subject to a condition in contravention of this subsection, the 
condition is void". It can be seen that the Australian takeover regulation is ambiguous as 
to Whether bidder can abandon the bid citing market downturn as the reason because the 
'Market Out' -type condition is not within the bidder's control. It is nevertheless quite 
obvious that the Australian regulation is less lenient toward the bidder's choice of 
Withdrawing from the bid than the US counterpart. To the extent that the Australian 
takeover regulation is modelled upon the UK City Takeover Code (Hutson, 2000), 
Which provides a strong case against the leniency toward the bidder's ability to renege 
on the bid, takeover regulation might help explain why the non-linear risk-return pattern 
of the merger arbitrage strategy are not present in the Australian market. 
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Turning to the UK market, its takeover regulation, the City Takeover Code, shows even 
a stronger case to expect that the non-linear risk-return pattern of the merger arbitrage 
strategy may not exist here. In light of the General Principle 3 and Rule 2.5 (a) of the 
City Takeover Code, the bidder, in general, is not allowed to incorporate conditions, 
subject to which the bidder has the discretion to withdraw from the bid (Kenyon-Slade, 
2004 - p496). A bid should only be made when the bidder has very reason to believe 
that it can and will continue to be able to implement the offer. In contrast to the 
ambiguity of the Australian takeover regulation over whether bidder can abandon the 
bid citing market downturn as the reason, the UK City Code explicitly prohibit the 
bidder from doing so. Note 1, Rule 2.7 of the UK City Code stipulates that "a change in 
general economic, industrial or political circumstances will not justify failure to proceed 
with an announced offer,,25 
Thus, in the UK, it is almost impossible for the bidder to abandon the bid during market 
downturn. Hence the only scenario where the risk of bid failure may increase when the 
market is falling is when the bidder cannot obtain sufficient financing. Under the UK 
Takeover Code, this scenario is, however, difficult to be realized. General Principle 3 of 
the Code clearly states that the bidder must prove that it has sufficient financing to 
implement the bid before the bid is publicly announced. 
Given that it is difficult for either of the two scenarios that increase the risk of bid 
failure during market downturn to be realized under the UK Takeover Code, we should 
expect that the non-linear risk-return pattern of the merger arbitrage strategy may not 
exist in the UK market. The strategy will have zero systematic risk or is market neutral 
in all market conditions. Hence, our second hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 4.2: Due to the restriction on the bidder's ability to withdraw from the bid 
during market downturn under the UK takeover regulations, the return to the merger 
--------------------------
25 
Please see the case study about the merger between WPP PLC and Tempus PLC in Sudarsanam (2003, 
PP.457-8) for an illustration of this restriction under the UK Takeover Code. . 
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arbitrage strategy is related to the market in a linear way and the strategy is market 
neutral in all market conditions. 
4.3 Data and methodology 
4.3.1 Data and sample of takeover bids 
. To test the two hypotheses 4.1 and 4.2 specified in the previous section, we fonn a 
merger arbitrage portfolio on the sample of takeover bids described in section 3.2. The 
sample contains 1105 UK takeover bids from 01 February 1987 to 31 December 2007. 
Table 4.1 presents some descriptive statistics for this sample. More than 74% of the bids 
in the sample are paid for in cash. The percentage of cash mergers is similar to the 
typical US samples (Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001; and Baker and Savasoglu, 2002). 
While stock mergers only account for 26% of the sample, the average value of a stock 
merger (£434 millions26) is larger than that of a cash merger (£365 millions). For both 
stock and cash mergers, the mean of transaction value is much larger than the median 
implying that there are a few very large deals in the sample that skew the distribution of 
the variable. On average, it takes 78 days for a merger to be completed or tenninated. 
The success rate, the percentage of the mergers that finally go thr~ugh, is 82% and 
varies considerably throughout the sample period. The success rate of cash mergers is 
not distinguishable from that of stock mergers. A paired comparison test, which is not 
reported for brevity, confirms this fact. 
[Insert Table 4.1 here, page 118] 
4.3.2 Portfolio construction 
There are two approaches to calculating the return to the merger arbitrage portfolio: the 
event-time portfolio approach and the calendar-time portfolio approach. In the event-
time approach, the return from investing in a single bid is first calculated for the period 
----------------------
26 
1 The transaction values in different years are converted to 2007 value using the UK Consumer Price 
ndex - All Urban: All items. . 
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starting one day after the bid announcement date and ending at the resolution date 
defined as the date in which the bid is officially consummated or terminated. The return 
from a single bid is then annualized and the return of the event-time merger arbitrage 
portfolio is simply the average of the annualized returns from all bids in the sample. The 
event-time approach faces two serious problems. First, the process of annualizing 
returns overestimates the actual return on the merger arbitrage portfolio because it 
implicitly assumes that the return from a single bid can be earned on a continual basis 
(Dukes et aI., 1992). Second, as pointed out by Mitchell and Stafford (2000), since 
merger events cluster through time and by industry, the cross-sectional dependence 
among the returns to different arbitrage positions results in incorrect inferences about 
the statistical significance of the portfolio's risk-adjusted return. 
Because of the two problems associated with the event-time approach, this study like 
the recent studies in the literature employs the calendar-time portfolio approach to 
calculate merger arbitrage portfolio return. In the calendar-time approach, a takeover 
bid is included in the portfolio starting one day after the bid announcement and held in 
the portfolio until the resolution date. For successful bids, the resolution date is the date 
on which the bid is declared to be effective or unconditional in case the effective date is 
not available in SDC. For failed bids, the resolution date is the day after the date on 
Which the bid is withdrawn. Using the day after the announcement date as the beginning 
date for the investment in a bid is consistent with the view that the merger arbitrageurs 
only trade on public information (Moore, 1999; and Moore et al., 2006). Similarly, 
Using the day after the withdrawn date as the resolution date for merger arbitrage 
Investment in failed bids insured that the arbitrageurs do not exit the bid before the 
bidder's decision to withdraw from the bid is publicly announced. The portfolio return 
at each point in time is the weighted average of the returns from the investments in all 
active bids in the portfolio at that time. Depending on how the returns from individual 
. 
Investment are weighted, different merger arbitrage return series can be generated. As 
Shown below, in this study, we will consider 3 return series. 
The methodology to calculate the daily return to the arbitrage position in a single bid is 
discussed in Section 3.3. The daily return of the merger arbitrage portfolio is the 
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weighted average of the daily returns from all active bids in the merger arbitrage 
portfolio. The formula to calculate the daily portfolio return is: 
Nt 
Rpt ::: I WitRit 
i=l 
(10) 
where Rpt is the daily portfolio return on day t, Rit is the daily return to the arbitrage 
position in bid i, wit is the weight of the arbitrage position in bid i and Nt is the number 
of active bids in the portfolio on day t. 
In this study, we employ three weighting schemes to generate three series of merger 
arbitrage return. The first series is produced when the portfolio is equally weighted. For 
the second series, the portfolio is weighted by the market value of the target firms at the 
bid announcement date. The third series is created directly from the second series by 
imposing the restriction that the weight of the investment in each bid does not exceed 
10% of the portfolio value. In a survey of 21 merger arbitrage funds, Moore et al. 
(2006) find that the 10% limit on each position in the portfolio is the standard rule of 
thumb employed by most arbitrageurs. The limit ensures that the portfolio is insulated 
from the catastrophic losses caused by the failure of a single bid. In setting up the third 
series, due to the 10% limit, if there are only a few active bids in the portfolio, some 
portion of the portfolio will not be invested and remain in cash. For example, if there 
are 7 active bids in the portfolio on day t, under the 10% limit rule, the arbitrageurs can 
only invest in the takeover bids up to 70% of the portfolio value, the remaining 30% 
will be held in cash. We assume that the cash portion of the portfolio is invested in the 
risk-free bond. In the event that there is no active ~id in the portfolio in a particular day, 
the whole portfolio is invested in the risk-free bond. 
Because among the three series, the third one most closely resembles the practical 
arbitrage portfolio, we call the third series the Practitioner Arbitrage (P A) portfolio 
return series. The first two series are named after the way they are weighted as the 
equally weighted portfolio return series and the value weighted portfolio return series. 
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Finally, due to the econometric problems in the estimation of the asset pricing model 
using daily return pointed out by Scholes and Williams (1977), like most research in 
merger arbitrage literature, this project employs the monthly return series. The portfolio 
monthly return is calculated directly from the daily returns as followings: 
Kj 
Rpj = nC1 + Rpt) (11) 
t=l 
where Rpj is the return to the merger arbitrage portfolio in monthj and Kj is the number 
of trading days in month j. 
Figure 4.1 plots the number of active bids in a month for the merger arbitrage portfolios 
over the sample period. The number of bids in each month varies considerably and 
exhibits a clustering pattern through time. The number of active bids is high for some 
periods, for instance 1998- 2001, and is low for the others, for example 1993-1997. 
This pattern is consistent with the fact that mergers tend to occur in waves (Sudarsanam, 
2003). 
{Insert Figure 4.1 here, page 126] 
Table 4.2 presents some descriptive statistics for the annualized time series of monthly 
returns for the three arbitrage portfolios, the FTSE All Shares index as the proxy for the 
market portfolio and the risk-free bond. As shown, the annual compounded return to the 
arbitrage portfolios, ranging from 13.23% to 15.27%, is greater than the return to the 
market portfolio which is 10.33%. For all three arbitrage portfolios and the market 
portfolio, we calculate Sharpe ratio, which is the ratio of the annual return in excess of 
risk-free return to the annual standard deviation of return. Sharpe ratio shows how much 
excess returns given one unit of risk a portfolio can generate and it is a measure of how 
Well the portfolio performs. As can be seen in Table 4.2, all three arbitrage portfolios 
have Sharpe ratios greater than that of the market portfolio indicating that these 
arbitrage portfolios seem to out-perform the market portfolio. 
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[Insert Table 4.2 here, page 119J 
Figure 4.2 depicts the value over the sample period of £1 investment in the three 
arbitrage portfolios, the market portfolio, and the risk-free bond starting from 
01/02/1987. On 31112/2007, the investment in the P A portfolio grows into £ 13 .60 but 
the investment in the market portfolio only translates into £7.86. These initial 
descriptive statistics indicate that the merger arbitrage strategy appears to perform well 
in the UK market. 
[Insert Figure 4.2 here, page 127J 
4.3.3 Empirical tests 
To test Hypothesis 4.1 about the performance of the UK merger arbitrage portfolio, we 
employ the standard linear asset pricing models to estimate the portfolio's risk-adjusted 
return over the sample period. In addition to the two models employed by other studies 
namely CAPM and Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model is also used to control for risk. 
CAPM' 
(12) 
Lama and French (1993) three-factor model: 
Qgrhart (997) (our-factor model: 
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where Rt is the monthly return to the merger arbitrage portfolio on month t, R{ is the 
monthly risk-free rate, RP is the monthly return to the market portfolio. In this study, 
we measure risk-free rate using three-month UK Government bond, and use the FTSE 
All Share index as the proxy for the market portfolio. 5MB is the difference in return 
between a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of big stocks, H M L is the difference 
in return between a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and a portfolio oflow book-
to-market stocks. U M D is the difference in return between a portfolio of stocks with 
high past return and a portfolio of stocks with low past return. The construction of HML 
and 5MB factor for the UK market is similar to the approach adopted by Daniel, Titman 
and Wei (2001). The construction of HML, 5MB and UMD for the UK market follows 
Liew and Vassalou (2000). f3 is the systematic risk associated with different risk factors 
and is estimated with the data. €t, {t, and Vt are the error terms of the models. The 
intercept a measures the average monthly risk-adjusted return. If Hypothesis 4.1 is 
true, a is significantly positive. 
One of the challenges in measuring the performance of a calendar-time portfolio is to 
obtain the accurate statistical inference about the size of the abnormal returns. As 
discussed in section 4.3.2, the number of takeover bids in the merger arbitrage 
portfolios varies considerably over the sample period and exhibit clustering pattern. The 
clustering pattern of the portfolios' composition may make the volatility of the portfolio 
return change over time. This in tum leads to the heteroskedasticity problem, which 
biases the estimate of the standard error of the model. The standard solution is to 
employ the estimation methods that are robust to "any form of heteroskedasticity. In this 
paper, as we are dealing with time-series data, we will use the Newey and West (1987) 
procedure to obtain the standard errors that are robust to both heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation problem. In this standard procedure, the specific functional form of 
heteroskedasticity is not modelled. 
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Another approach suggested by Benou and Richie (2003) and Hou et al. (2004) is to use 
the generalized, autoregressive, conditional heteroskedasticity GARCH(1,I) model to 
directly capture the form ofheteroskedasticity. According to Tsay (2005), GARCH(I,l) 
has the ability to capture most of the stylized facts in the volatility of stock return series. 
To check the robustness of the inference about the size of the abnormal return, in 
addition to the Newey and West (1987) procedure, we also estimate the asset pricing 
models specified in equation (12)-(14) with GARCH(l,l) type heteroskedasticity. In 
particular, maximum likelihood method will be employed to estimate the following 
two-equation system: 
Rt - R{ = a + LPkXk + et 
k 
(15) 
(16) 
where Pk measures the systematic risk associated with different risk factors specified in 
equation (12)-(14); Xk represent the risk factors. For example, in CAPM model 
(equation (12», Xk includes only the excess return on the market portfolio; in Fama and 
French (1993) model, two additional risk factors namely 5MB and HML are added to 
Xk. et is the model' residual, (Jl.e is the volatility of the residual of the models. at-l 
and el-t capture the volatility clustering pattern. Nt is the number of active bids in the 
portfolio on month t. The innovative feature of the two-equation system (15)-(16) is 
that changing portfolio composition is directly captured and the impact of the number of 
bids in the portfolio on the conditional heteroskedasticity can be examined. 
To test Hypothesis 4.2 about whether the UK merger arbitrage portfolio has non-linear 
risk-return pattern, we estimate the following piecewise linear model: 
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where y is a dummy variable equal to 1 in severe market downturn and 0 in normal 
market condition. The market is in severe downturn when the market excess return 
(Rtt - R{) is below the threshold (R M* - Rf*). aH and PH are the intercept and the 
coefficient of the model in normal market condition; aL and PL are the intercept and the 
coefficient of the model in severe market downturn. Ut is the error term of the model. 
For continuity, we impose the following restriction on the model: 
(18) 
Substituting restriction (18) to the equation (17), we can transform the piecewise linear 
model into: 
In this study, we will estimate equation (19) to examine the non-linear risk-return 
pattern of the merger arbitrage portfolios instead of estimating equation (17) 
Concurrently with the restriction (18), the approach employed by Mitchell and Pulvino 
(2001) and Maheswaran and Yeoh (2005). Our approach yields several advantages. 
First, it is technically simpler. We only need to estimate one equation, and as a result it 
is easier to obtain the standard errors of the coefficient estimates that are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Second, 'as discussed in Section 4.2.2, the main 
empirical implication of the non-linear risk-returns pattern is that the systematic risk of 
the merger arbitrage portfolio increases substantially in severe market downturn. This 
Would imply thatPL - PH> O. The estimation of equation (19) will provide the direct 
statistical test of this empirical implication. This assures that the observed difference 
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between Ih and PH is not just the product of chance. This issue has not been addressed 
in previous studies. 
If a non-linear pattern similar to the one found in the US by Mitchell and Pulvino 
(2001) is detected, then the payoff pattern of the merger arbitrage portfolio is akin to 
writing an uncovered put option on the market index. In particular, during the normal 
market condition, the intercept aH should be positive reflecting the put premium and the 
systematic risk PH should be close to zero. Nonetheless, during severe market downturn, 
the estimate of PL should be significantly greater than zero. Following Mitchell and 
Pulvino (2001), we depict a graphical presentation of such non-linear pattern in the risk-
return relation of the merger arbitrage portfolio assuming a negative threshold in Figure 
4.3. 
[Insert Figure 4.3 here, page 128] 
When the risk-return relation is non-linear, Glosten and Jagannathan (1994) suggest that 
the risk-adjusted return should be estimated using the contingent claim approach. The 
general idea behind the approach is that the payoffs from £ 1 investment in the merger 
arbitrage portfolio can be replicated by a portfolio of an option on the market index and 
a risk-free bond. The difference between the cost of the replicating portfolio and the £1 
investment represents the risk-adjusted return. More details on the contingent-claim 
approach applied to merger arbitrage portfolio will be presented in Section 4.4.3. 
4.4 Empirical result 
In this section, we present the empirical results about the profitability and the risk-return 
characteristics of the merger arbitrage strategy in the UK market. Since the Practitioner 
Arbitrage portfolio most closely mirrors the real world, our discussion focuses mainly 
on this portfolio. As most of the previous studies have documented results only for 
equally weighted and value weighted arbitrage portfolio, to provide a benchmark for 
comparison we also report the results for these two arbitrage portfolios. 
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4.4.1 Benchmarking merger arbitrage return using linear asset pricing 
models 
To assess the profitability of the merger arbitrage portfolio in the UK, the first step is to 
benchmark the portfolio return against the three linear asset pricing models namely 
CAPM, Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, and Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model. Table 4.3 shows the result for the entire 251 months (21 years) of the sample 
period. When CAPM is used as the benchmark to adjust for risk, all three arbitrage 
portfolios generate significantly positive risk-adjusted returns ranging from 0.5% per 
month or 6.17% per annum for the Practitioner Arbitrage portfolio (P A) to 0.64% per 
month or 7.96% per annum for the value weighted portfolio. This result indicates that 
the strategy is profitable in the UK market on risk-adjusted basis and is consistent with 
the results reported in other markets. 
[Insert Table 4.3 here, page 120] 
As far as risk is concerned, the result under CAPM shows that the merger arbitrage 
portfolios have significant positive market risk. However, the size of the coefficient 
estimates indicates that the magnitude of market risk is quite small. The size of PM 
ranges from 0.11 for the PA portfolio to 0.22 for the value weighted portfolio. This 
means that for the P A portfolio, when the return to the market portfolio changes by 1 %, 
the return to the P A portfolio only changes by 0.11 % in the same direction. Thus, the 
merger arbitrage portfolio is close to market neutral in the UK market. This result is 
similar to the findings reported in other markets. 
The result is similar when the other two multi-factor models are employed to adjust for 
risk. As shown in Panel B and C of Table 4.3, the P A portfolio earns significantly 
Positive risk-adjusted return of 0.46% per month when the Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model serves as the benchmark for risk adjustment and of 0.59% per month 
when the Carhart (1997) four-factor model is used. As for risk, the PA portfolio has 
significant positive exposure to the movement of the market portfolio. The size of such 
exposure, nevertheless, is small, which is analogous to the result under CAPM. Among 
other risk factors, except for 5MB, the coefficient estimates of HML and UMD are not 
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significantly different from zero. The coefficient estimate of SM B is significantly 
positive. The positive correlation between the return to the PA portfolio and 5MB can 
be explained by the fact that around a quarter of the P A portfolio are stock bids. As 
discussed in Section 3.3, the investment in a stock bid involves a long position in the 
target stock and a short position in the bidder stock. Since the size of the bidder firm is 
typically larger than that of the target firm, the investment in stock bid is akin to the 
investment in the 5MB portfolio. 
The result in Table 4.3 is estimated using the traditional OLS regression with Newey 
and West (1987) standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. As a robustness check, we also perform additional analysis in which the 
heteroskedasticity is directly modelled using GARCH(1,I). We report the result in 
Table 4.4. 
[Insert Table 4.4 here, page 122J 
As for the size of the abnormal return, the GARCH(l, 1) result is very similar to the 
result using OLS regression. The abnormal return to the strategy is significantly positive 
When all three asset pricing models are used as the benchmark for risk adjustment. 
Regarding risk, the coefficient estimates of different risk factors are of similar 
magnitudes compared to the estimates under OLS. The estimates of the 
heteroskedasticity model in equation (9) are worth noticing. Except for the equally 
weighted arbitrage return series, both the ARCH and GARCH effects of the model (itl 
and A2) are statistically significant at 1 % level. This indicates volatility clustering 
pattern and hence confirms the value of resolving the heteroskedasticity problem. The 
volatility appears to decrease when the number of active bids in the portfolio increases. 
This negative relationship is consistent the diversification effect. The more diversified 
the portfolio is, i.e. the higher number of securities in the portfolio, the more the 
idiosyncratic risk that can be eliminated, hence the smaller is the total risk. 
In SUmmary, our analysis based on three standard linear pricing models shows that the 
Illerger arbitrage strategy is profitable on a risk-adjusted basis in the UK market. The 
result is not only robust to the choice of the asset pricing model but also to different 
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methods to obtain robust standard errors of the coefficient estimates. In all three models 
- CAPM, Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model -, the relation between merger arbitrage return and the systematic risk factors is 
assumed to be linear. The result may be biased nonetheless if the relationship turns out 
to be non-linear. In the next section, we investigate the non-linear risk-return pattern. 
4.4.2 Piecewise linear model 
In this section, we perform a formal procedure to examine the non-linear risk-return 
pattern of the merger arbitrage portfolios. We estimate the piecewise linear model as 
presented in equation (19). The first issue in estimating the model is to identify the 
threshold RM* - R'* which separates the sample into two groups: the normal market 
condition group and the market downturn group. The normal market condition group 
includes those observations which have the market excess return Rr - R{ above the 
threshold; and the market downturn group includes those observations that have the 
market excess return below the threshold. The empirical implication of the non-linear 
risk-return pattern is that the slope of the fitted line associated with the market downturn 
group is significantly greater than the slope of the fitted line associated with the normal 
market condition group. The threshold represents the kink point as depicted in Figure 
4.3. 
In order to avoid an arbitrary choice of the threshold, we follow the approach suggested 
by Mitchell and Pulvino (2001). In particular, the threshold is defined as the point that 
best fit the model with the data. In other words, the threshold is the value that minimizes 
the sum of squared residuals of the model. Equivalently, it is the value that maximizes 
the model's adjusted R2. To select such threshold, our approach is to estimate the model 
with a wide range of thresholds and the select the value that give the highest adjusted 
R2. As the threshold is supposed to signal a market downturn, we vary the threshold 
RM* - R'* from 0% down to -28%. To go from 0% down to -28%, we use the step 
size of -0.1 %. This· translates into running 280 regressions with· 280 different 
threshOlds. Although the smallest value of the market excess returns is -27.24%, we 
Set the minimum value for the range of the thresholds to be-28% for the following 
reason. If the threshold falls below -27.24%, this would mean that there is no 
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observation in the market downturn group. Therefore, the linear model as presented in 
equation (12) is better fit with the data than the non-linear piecewise model. If that is the 
case, we can conclude that the non-linear pattern does not exist in the UK market. 
Figure 4.4 plots the model's adjusted R2 corresponding to different thresholds. 
{Insert Figure 4.4 here, page 1291 
. Interestingly, all three arbitrage return series show the same pattern. There are a range 
of thresholds from -12.2% down to -27.2% that maximize that the model's 
adjusted R2. One common feature of these thresholds is that it separates the sample into 
exactly the same two groups. The market downturn group includes only one 
observation, which has the smallest market excess return of -27.24%, and the 
remaining observations belong to normal market condition group. Due to this common 
feature, the results for the piecewise linear model using different thresholds in the 
maximizing range are very similar to one another. Thus, we set the threshold to 
-12.2% to estimate the piecewise linear model. The estimation result for the three 
return series is presented in Panel A of Table 4.5. 
{Insert Table 4.5 here, page 1241 
For the PA portfolio and the equally weighted portfolio, in normal market condition the 
portfolio's market risk (PH) is indistinguishable from zero. For all three return series, 
When the market is in severe downturn (R M* - R'* < -12.2%), the portfolios' market 
risk increases remarkably. The increase in market risk during market downturn is 
statistically significant at 1 % level. For the PA portfolio, the market beta rises by more 
than 5.5 times during market downturn (from 0.0789 to 0.4396). The significant 
difference between the portfolios' normal market condition beta and market downturn 
beta indicates a possible non-linear risk-return pattern. The economic rationale behind 
the pattern discussed in section 4.2.2 has shown that if the non-linear pattern exists, 
SUch pattern is mainly true for the portfolio of cash bids. To examine this idea, we also 
perform additional estimation of the piecewise linear model for two separate samples of 
cash and stock bids. Panel B and C of Table 4.5 present the estimates of the piecewise 
linear model when the sample is restricted to either cash or stock bids. As anticipated, 
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the non-linearity pattern is only applicable for the merger arbitrage investment in cash 
bids. For all three return series, the downmarket beta is significantly larger than the 
normal market condition beta when the sample is limited to cash bids. When only stock 
bids are considered, the difference between the downmarket beta and normal market 
condition beta is nil. 
The results so far present striking similarity with the US study by Michell and Pulvino' 
(2001), who find a strong non-linear risk-return pattern for the US merger arbitrage 
portfolio. Is this then evidence against our hypothesis of a link between the takeover 
regulation and the risk-return pattern of the merger arbitrage strategy (Hypothesis 4.2)? 
If this hypothesis were true, we would not expect to see a non-linear pattern in the UK 
market between the merger portfolio return and market risk. 
Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine the strength of the non-linear pattern found in 
this UK sample. Compared to the pattern found in the US, the strength of the non-linear 
pattern in the UK is much smaller. The threshold to separate the severe market 
downturn condition from other market conditions is much lower in absolute value in the 
US market compared to the UK market. As reported by Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), 
the threshold for the US market is -4%. The threshold found in this study for the UK 
market, -12.2%, is more than triple the US threshold in absolute value. The market 
decline has to be substantially steeper in the UK than in the US before the non-linear 
effect seems to come into play. 
To illustrate the magnitude of the difference in the non-linear risk-return relation of the 
merger arbitrage strategy between the two markets, suppose the -4% threshold of the 
DS market is applied to the UK sample utilized in this study. If it is the case, the return 
to the merger arbitrage portfolio will have positive correlation with the market return in 
37 months (out of 251 months of the whole sample period). If the UK threshold of 
-12.2% is applied, the merger arbitrage portfolio is positively correlated with the 
market only in 1 month. Interestingly, that unique month is October 1987, the month 
When one of the biggest crashes in financial market history occurred. 
III 
The occurrence of a market crash like the one in October 1987 is extremely rare. From 
1900s till now, such an event has happened only twice. The other one was in 1929 
preceding the Great Depression27• The fact that the return to UK merger arbitrage 
portfolios has positive market risk due to only one month's market movement and such 
a month coincides with a very rare event in financial market history suggests that the 
observed non-linearity is due to an outlier. 
Figure 4.5 plots the graphical presentation of the result of the piecewise linear model 
estimation. If the non-linear pattern is present, we should see two clusters of 
observations showing two fitted lines with different slopes. The pattern shown in Figure 
4.5 is nowhere near that. It seems that there is only one cluster of observations and one 
outlier, which is the observation corresponding to the October 1987 market crash. If this 
is true, then when we remove the outlier the linear risk-return pattern with one fitted line 
will be best matched with the data. 
[Insert Figure 4.5 here, page 130J 
Figure 4.6 plots the adjusted R2 of the piecewise linear model against different 
thresholds ranging from 0% down to -28% when the observation related to the 
October 1987 market crash is removed from the sample. For all 3 return series there are 
a range of thresholds from -12.2% to -28% that give the highest adjusted R2 for the 
model. The common feature of these thresholds is that there is no observation in the 
market downturn group. This would mean that there is no threshold at which the slope 
of the regression line changes from zero to positive i.e. the slope is flat throughout. As 
We argue earlier, this finding indicates that the linear model is best fit with the data. 
Thus, when we remove the outlier, the non-linear pattern observed in Table 4.5 
disappears. 
Our analysis suggests that the non-linear risk-return pattern in the UK, if it exists, is 
mUch weaker than the pattern reported in the US market. Furthermore, the pattern seems 
27 
The recent crash in the stock market lies outside the sample period. 
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to be driven entirely by one single observation, which is the October 1987 market crash, 
a very rare event in financial market history. When such observation is removed from 
the sample, the non-linear risk-return pattern no longer exists. The weak empirical 
support for the presence of the non-linear risk-return pattern in the UK market is 
consistent with Hypothesis 4.2. Due to the restrictions under the UK Takeover Code on 
the bidder's ability to abandon the bid during severe market downturn, the non-linear 
. pattern may not exist in the UK market. 
4.4.3 Contingent claim approach to estimate risk-adjusted return 
This section serves as a robustness check for estimation of the merger arbitrage risk-
adjusted return. By using the contingent-claim approach, we can control for any 
possible non-linear risk return pattern in the UK. If the non-linearity does not exist, the 
result should be similar to those reported using the linear asset pricing model. The 
general idea of the approach is that the payoffs to £1 investment in the merger arbitrage 
portfolio can be replicated using a portfolio of an option on the market index and a risk-
free bond. If the cost of the replicating portfolio is £(1 + x) then x measures the risk-
adjusted return. 
To set up the replicating portfolio, the first step is to examine the payoff pattern of £1 
investment in the merger arbitrage portfolio. Because of the possible non-linear risk-
return relation, the payoff to the arbitrage portfolio in severe market downturn might 
differ from the payoff in other market conditions. In particular, when the market excess 
return is above a threshold (-12.2%), the payoff to the portfolio depends very little on 
the market movement. As shown in Panel A of Table 4.5, for the Practitioner Arbitrage 
POrtfolio, the market beta, when the market excess return is above the threshold 
(hereafter 'upmarket' beta), is only 0.0789. This upmarket beta is not statistically 
different from zero. Thus in practical terms, we can set the upmarket beta to be zero. 
From equation (17), we can write the average monthly payoff to the £1 investment in 
the merger arbitrage portfolio when the market excess return is above the threshold as: 
1 + R' + QH. where Rlis the sample average monthly risk-free rate and QH is the 
Upmarket intercept reflecting the average monthly rate of return in excess of risk~free 
rate to the arbitrage portfolio in normal market conditions. By substituting equation (18) 
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-into equation (17), the average monthly payoff to £1 investment in the merger arbitrage 
portfolio when the market excess return is below the threshold can be written as 
where fl L is the market beta when the market excess return is below the threshold 
(hereafter 'downmarket' beta), RM is the sample average monthly rate of return to the 
market portfolio and RM* - Rf* is the market excess return threshold (-12.2%). The 
average monthly payoffs to £1 investment in the merger arbitrage portfolio are 
summarized as follows: 
Payoff to the portfolio 
-
-
This payoff pattern can be replicated with a portfolio that is long in a risk-free bond and 
is short in flL number of put options on an index. The return on the index is equal to the 
market excess return. Because we try to replicate the monthly payoff pattern, both the 
risk-free bond and the put option have one month time to maturity. The face value of the 
bond is 
If We assume the current value of the index is 1, the exercise price or the option is 
In all market conditions, the bond will pay 
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Because the return on the index is the market excess return, the realized value of the 
index in 1 month is 1 + (R M - Rf). The payoff to the short position in fh number of 
put options is 0 when the market excess return is above the threshold and is 
when the market return is below the threshold. It is easy to check that the payoff to the 
replicating portfolio is exactly the same as the payoff to the £1 investment in the merger 
arbitrage portfolio. 
The final step in calculating the risk-adjusted return under the contingent claim 
approach is to figure out the cost of the replicating portfolio, which is simply the price 
of a bond less the premium receive from shorting the put option. Assuming that Black-
Scholes option pricing model is applicable, the cost of the replicating portfolio is 
therefore: 
(20) 
Where P(X,S, RJ., a, T - t) is the Black-Scholes price of the put option on the index. 
The current market index level (S) is 1, the exercise price of the option (X) is 
1 + (RM* - Rf*), the annual risk-free rate (Ri) is 6.85% (sample average), the time to 
eXpiration date (T - t) is one month; and finally the volatility of the index (a) 
calculated from the historical data is 15.53%. Plugging in these inputs to the Black-
Scholes formula and the parameter estimates .from the piecewise linear model to 
equation (20), the cost of the replicating portfolio can be easily computed. 
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Table 4.6 presents the result of the estimation of the risk-adjusted return using the 
contingent claim approach for all three merger arbitrage return series. For the PA 
portfolio, the cost of the replicating portfolio is £1.0052, which is £0.0052 more 
expensive than the investment in the merger arbitrage portfolio. This implies that the 
P A portfolio generates 0.52% return in excess of risk per month. Compared to the result 
using linear asset pricing model as the benchmark for risk adjustment in Table 4.3 and 
Table 4.4, the magnitude of the risk adjusted return under the contingent claim approach 
is very similar. This is also true for the value weighted and the equally weighted 
portfolio. 
[Insert Table 4.6, page 125 here] 
The result confirms that merger arbitrage is highly profitable in the UK. Further, the 
similarity between the results using the linear pricing model and those using the 
contingent claim approach suggests that the non-linear risk-return pattern is of little 
economic importance in the UK market. This again illustrates the impacts of the UK 
takeover regulation on the risk-return characteristics ofthe merger arbitrage strategy. 
4.5 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we perform the first empirical project testing the risk-based hypothesis. 
We aim at exploring the magnitude of the risk-adjusted return to the UK merger 
arbitrage portfolio and examining the risk-return characteristics of the strategy and the 
. 
Impact of takeover regulations on the strategy's risk-return characteristics. 
Previous studies, from the US, Canada and Australia, of the return to merger arbitrage 
strategies have generally documented significant positive risk-adjusted return. While the 
Us study by Mitchell and Pulvino report a significant non-linear relation between 
(systematic) risk and return, the Australian study by Maheshwaran and Yeoh does not. 
We argue that this non-linearity is a reflection of the effect of takeover laws and that it 
is less likely to be observed in takeover regimes that prohibit bidders from abandoning 
their bids during severe stock market downturns. In the US where takeover laws allow 
'market out' clauses in merger agreements, bidders can walk away more easily from 
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their bids, thereby causmg merger arbitrageurs to incur heavy losses in market 
downturns. In more stringent regimes like the UK's, this relation between market 
downturns and merger arbitrage losses is less likely. Thus non-linearity in risk-return 
relation in merger arbitrage payoffs is conditional upon the takeover regime. In this 
chapter, we seek to test the hypothesis that in the UK, an exemplar of a tough takeover 
regime, non-linearity is unlikely to be observed. 
With a sample of 1105 UK cash and stock mergers over the period of 1987-2007, this 
empirical project is the first to provide empirical evidence about the profitability and the 
risk-return characteristic of the merger arbitrage strategy in the UK market. Consistent 
with the findings in other markets, the UK merger arbitrage portfolios perform very 
well and generate significant positive risk-adjusted return. The result is robust to a range 
of methods to control for risk. 
The major contribution of the empirical analysis of the chapter is to show how takeover 
regulations can affect the risk-return characteristics of merger arbitrage strategy and to 
provide empirical evidence of such impact. The finding that there is little evidence 
Supporting the non-linear risk-return pattern of the strategy in the UK is in line with the 
restrictions on bidder's ability to abandon the bid imposed by UK Takeover Code. 
Combined with the evidence in the US market (strong non-linearity) and Australian 
market (no non-linearity), the impact of takeover regulation is confirmed. 
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Table 4.1: Sample description 
This table presents a summary of the takeover bids used in this chapter. Only pure cash and pure stock bids are included. The bid duration is the number 
of days from the announcement date to the date when the transaction is completed or terminated. The transaction value in GBP is recorded in SDC. 
Success rate is the percentage of the transactions reported as "completed" or "unconditional" in SDC over total number of transactions. For bid duration 
and transaction value, the figure in the parentheses is median, the other one is mean. The transaction values in different years are converted to 2007 
value using the UK Consumer Price Index - All Urban: All items. 
Cash Mergers Stock Mergers 
Year No. of deals Average Value Duration Success Rate No. of deals Average Value Duration Success Rate (£mil) (day) (%) (£mil) (day) (%) 
1987 10 610.47 (211.38) 76 (37) 60.00 10 506.06 (66.77) 60 (59) 70.00 
1988 19 950.62 (109.39) 100 (70) 63.16 6 144.29 (17.59) 251 (69) 83.33 
1989 34 464.96 (71.43) 108 (70) 70.59 11 89.46 (33.50) 41 (43) 81.82 
1990 23 100.76 (21.58) 157 (65) 65.22 7 78.62 (37.93) 128 (85) 71.43 
1991 27 92.92 (37.92) 114 (64) 70.37 19 337.45 (25.84) 64 (46) 78.95 
1992 15 84.71 (22.46) 57 (38) 86.67 8 47.00 (34.20) 86 (64) 75.00 
1993 19 163.60 (14.35) 98 (71) 78.95 9 47.52 (23.38) 58 (39) 100.00 
1994 14 75.99 (27.91) 67 (65) 85.71 11 284.01 (47.56) 56 (31) 72.73 
1995 22 192.53 (30.79) 91 (56) 86.36 9 81.99 (28.98) 42 (36) 88.89 
1996 15 213.35 (36.93) 73 (49) 93.33 16 441.72 (79.31) 153 (55) 81.25 
1997 33 290.36 (85.13) 70 (64) 84.85 17 78.45 (48.36) 66 (53) 76.47 
1998 55 126.82 (39.69) 74 (73) 85.45 22 668.60 (51.14) 66 (64) 72.73 
1999 81 129.00 (45.36) 72 (71) 87.65 32 337.40 (40.45) 82 (63) 75.00 
2000 66 295.88 (51.53) 69 (67) 81.82 23 639.87 (66.80) 69 (63) 82.61 
2001 30 213.52 (21.96) 72 (70) 100.00 13 948.71 (16.79) 58 (48) 92.31 
2002 40 62.53 (17.83) 73 (53) 95.00 9 1022.58105.77) 66 (55) 100.00 
2003 61 166.62 (33.37) 90 (SO) 90.16 13 69.01 (35.23) 62 (43) 84.62 
2004 33 264.24 (78.97) 65 (53) 81.82 10 113.14 (19.86) 67 (47) 100.00 
2005 65 403.32 (92.74) 75 (65) 83.08 12 333.25 (65.98) 83 (65) 83.33 
2006 102 779.42 (100.99) 69 (63) 78.43 16 1187.68 (98.28) 62 (59) 68.75 
2007 62 1030.36 (92.26) 67 (61) 82.26 6 1207.79146.99) 74 (67) 83.33 
Complete Sample 826 365j4 __ (5J.32) 79 (64) __ ~2.81_ 279 433.61 {40.781 77 {54} 80.65 
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Table 4.2: Annual arbitrage portfolio return series 
This table presents the annual return series for 3 merger arbitrage portfolios. In the equally 
weighted portfolio, the returns from individual bids are equally weighted. In the value weighted 
portfolio, the weight of each individual bid is based on the market value of the target firm. The 
Practitioner portfolio is created from the value weighted portfolio by imposing the 10% limit on 
the weight of individual bid. Sharpe ratio is the ratio of the return in excess of risk-free rate to 
the standard deviation of return. 
Risk-free Market Practioner Value Weighted Equally 
Rate Portfolio Portfolio Portfolio Return Weighted Return Return Portfolio Return 
-1987 8.46 0.07 -0.38 -10.11 -13.25 
1988 9.59 11.53 10.11 24.65 33.75 
1989 13.15 36.09 10.39 14.98 9.31 
1990 14.20 -9.72 4.71 7.85 -0.37 
1991 11.02 20.80 7.10 24.95 6.15 
1992 9.08 20.49 -15.35 0.15 -18.01 
1993 5.28 28.39 28.93 64.09 37.17 
1994 5.19 -5.85 29.05 40.07 45.92 
1995 6.45 23.85 12.78 10.13 19.10 
1996 5.89 16.70 34.95 37.18 53.77 
1997 6.54 23.56 6.13 4.56 5.71 
1998 7.05 13.77 20.76 9.62 15.27 
1999 5.15 24.20 34.09 35.31 35.67 
2000 5.88 -5.90 14.36 5.58 10.43 
2001 4.94 -13.29 12.34 9.01 3.80 
2002 3.89 -22.68 28.43 25.15 36.87 
2003 3.60 20.86 25.26 23.54 35.04 
2004 4.44 12.84 4.17 -1.27 3.40 
2005 4.61 22.04 3.45 3.60 4.14 
2006 4.67 16.75 24.99 32.08 19.74 
2007 5.59 5.32 -2.32 -12.11 2.55 
Annually . 
Compounded Rate 
of Return 6.85 10.32 13.23 15.27 14.95 
Annual Standard 
Deviation of Return 0.80 15.53 10.46 18.12 13.79 
Sharpe Ratio 
~nnUal) 0.22 0.61 0.46 0.59 
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Table 4.3: Benchmarking merger arbitrage return series with linear pricing models 
This table presents the result when the return to merger arbitrage portfolio is benchmarked against Capital Asset Price Model (CAPM), Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model (F&F), and Carhart (1997) four-factor model (C4): 
CAPM: Rt - R{ = a + PM(RP - R{) + Ct (12) 
F&F: Rt - R{ = a + PM(RP - R{) + PsMBSMB + PHMLHML + {t (13) 
C4: Rt - R{ = a + PM(RP - R{) + PsMBSMB + PHMLHML + PUMDUMD + Vt (14) 
where Rt is the monthly return to the merger arbitrage portfolios, R{ is the risk-free rate, RP is the return to the market portfolio. We measure risk-free 
rate using three-month UK Government bond, and use FTSE All share index as the proxy for the market portfolio. 5MB is the difference in return 
between a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of big stocks, H M L is the difference in return between a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and 
a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. U M D is the difference in return between a portfolio of stocks with high past return and a portfolio of stocks 
with low past return. P is the systematic risk associated with different risk factors. The intercept a measures the average monthly risk-adjusted return. 
Ct, {t, and Vt are the error terms of the models. Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard error of the 
coefficient estimates is reported in the parenthesis. 
Dependent Variables a PM PSMB PHML PUMD 2 Sample Adj.R Size 
Panel A: Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
Practitioner portfolio return 0.0049*** 0.1087** 0.0214 251 
(0.0019) (0.0496) 
Value weighted portfolio return 0.0064** 0.2180*** 0.0542 251 
(0.0025) (0.0696) 
Equally Weighted portfolio return 0.0060** 0.1470* 0.0229 251 
(0.0025) (0.0836) 
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Dependent Variables a. PM PSMB PHML PUMD 
2 Sample 
Adj.R Size 
Panel 8: Fama and French (1993) three-factor model 
Practitioner portfolio return 0.0046- 0.1536*- 0.1820*- 0.0927 0.0490 251 
(0.0019) (0.0484) (0.0568) (0.0757) 
Value weighted portfolio return 0.0057- 0.2952-* 0.3077*** 0.1723 0.1036 251 
(0.0024) (0.0710) (0.0841) (0.1142) 
Equally Weighted portfolio return 0.0062** 0.1991** 0.2213*** 0.0811 0.0469 251 
(0.0026) (0.0834) (0.0732) (0.1001) 
Panel C: Carhart (1997) four-factor model 
Practitioner portfolio return 0.0059-* 0.1223- 0.1036* 0.1294 -0.0122 0.0484 251 
(0.0020) (0.0578) (0.0534) (0.0814) (0.1043) 
Value weighted portfolio return 0.0079*- 0.2432*** 0.1784** 0.1655 -0.0843 0.0983 251 
(0.0028) (0.0854) (0.0832) (0.1124) (0.1231) 
Equally Weighted portfolio return 0.0065- 0.1878* 0.1592** 0.0984 0.1077 0.0466 251 
(0.0029) (0.0981) (0.0719) (0.1062) (0.1329) 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1% levels, respectively 
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Table 4.4: Benchmarking merger arbitrage return series with linear pricing models -CAReR 
This table presents the result from the re-estimation of the 3 models in Table 4.3 using GARCH (1,1) to model the form of heteroskedasticity. 
Maximum likelihood method is employed to estimate the following two-equation system: 
Rt - R{ = a + LkPkXk + et (15) 
ale = OJ + Ala[-l + A2et-l + A3Nt (16) 
where Rt is the monthly return to the merger arbitrage portfolios, R{ is the risk-free rate Pk measures the systematic risk associated with different risk 
factors specified in equation (12)-(14); Xk represent the risk factors. et is the model' residual, ale is the volatility of the residual of the models. a[-l 
and et-l capture the volatility clustering pattern. Nt is the number of active bids in the portfolio on month t. The standard errors of the coefficient 
estimates are shown in the parentheses. 
Dependent Variables (l ~M ~SMB ~HML ~UMD AI A2 A3 
Panel A: Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
Practitioner portfolio return 0.0060*- 0.1382*- 0.7823*** 0.1294*** -0.0146 
(0.0018) (0.0342) (0.0702) (0.0412) (0.0261) 
Value weighted portfolio 
return 0.0063*** 0.1873*- 0.8317*** 0.0973** -0.0062 
(0.0024) (0.0389) (0.0886) (0.0382) (0.0220) 
Equally Weighted portfolio 
return 0.0089*** 0.1174*- 0.1174 0.0428 -0.0736*** 
(0.0024) (0.0411) (0.4029) (0.0532) (0.0122) 
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Dependent Variables a 13M f3SMB f3HML f3UMD AI 1.,2 1.,3 
Panel B: Fama and French (1993) three-factor model 
Practitioner portfolio return 0.0060*** 0.1689*** 0.1301** 0.0382 0.7366*** 0.1424*** -0.0205 
(0.0018) (0.0401) (0.0574) (0.0850) (0.0850) (0.0479) (0.0216) 
Value weighted portfolio 
return . 0.0076*** 0.2486*** 0.2535*** 0.1503 0.0674*** 0.0674*** -0.0364*** 
(0.0026) (0.0542) (0.0634) (0.1161) (0.0255) (0.0255) (0.0089) 
Equally Weighted portfolio 
return 0.0082*** 0.1597*** 0.1549** 0.0090 0.1077 0.0447 -0.0752*** 
(0.0024) (0.0501) (0.0675) (0.0978) (0.4122) (0.0571) (0.0125) 
. , 
Panel C: Carhart (1997) four-factor model 
Practitioner portfolio return 0.0072*** 0.1597*** 0.0419 0.1593* 0.0225 0.7503*** 0.1416*** -0.0235 
(0.0019) (0.0501) (0.0598) (0.0909) (0.0944) (0.0785) (0.0468) (0.0211) 
Value weighted portfolio 
return 0.0096*** 0.1869*** 0.1072* 0.1893* -0.0897 0.7911*** 0.0826*** -0.0400*** 
(0.0026) (0.0525) (0.0629) (0.1064) (0.1187) (0.0790)'" (0.0299) (0.0086) 
Equally Weighted portfolio 
return 0.0093*** 0.1195** 0.0675 0.1883* -0.0094 0.0944 0.0826*** -0.0799*** 
(0.0025) (0.0479) (0.0621) (0.1103) (0.1095) (0.3765) (0.0299) (0.0124) 
., •• , ... indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1 % levels, respectively 
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Table 4.5: Piecewise linear model 
This table presents the result in estimating the piecewise linear model relating the merger 
arbitrage return to market return: 
Rt - R{ = aH + PH(Rf - R{) + CPL - PH)y[(Rf - R{) - (R M* - Rf*)] + Ut (19) 
where Rt is the monthly return to the merger arbitrage portfolios, R{ is the risk-free rate, Rf is 
the return to the market portfolio. y is a dummy variable equal to 1 in severe market downturn 
and 0 in normal market condition. The market is in severe downturn when the market excess 
. return (Rf - R{) is below the threshold (RM* - Rf*). aH and PH are the intercept and the 
coefficient of the model in normal market condition; aL and PL are the intercept and the 
coefficient of the model in severe market downturn. Ut is the error term of the model. Newey 
and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors of the 
coefficient estimates are reported in the parenthesis. 
Dependent Variables UH ~H ~L-~H Threshold Adj. R2 
Panel A: Complete Sample 
Practitioner portfolio 
return 0.0053*** 0.0789 0.3607*** -0.1220 0.0281 
(0.0018) (0.0497) (0.0929) 
Value weighted portfolio 
return 0.0069*** 0.1698*** 0.5825*** -0.1220 0.0536 
(0.0025) (0.0622) (0.1I64) 
Equally Weighted portfolio 
return 0.0072*** 0.0760 0.8588*** -0.1220 0.0540 
{0.0024) (0.0647} ~0.1211} 
Panel B: Cash Deals 
Practitioner portfolio 
return 0.0035** 0.1441 *** 0.2919*** -0.1220 0.0730 
(0.0018) (0.0441) (0.0846) 
Value weighted portfolio 
return 0.0078** 0.2222*** 1.2457*** -0.1220 0.1175 
(0.0033) (0.0787) (0.1536) 
Equally Weighted portfolio 
return 0.0071** 0.2409*** 1.3208*** -0.1220 0.1135 
{0.0034~ {0.0885} {0.1698~ 
Panel C: Stock Deals 
Practitioner portfolio 
return 0.0031** -0.0844** 0.1095 -0.0870 0.0143 
(0.0014) (0.0419) (0.0771) 
Value weighted portfolio 
return 0.0078** 0.2222*** 1.2457 -0.1220 0.0202 
(0.0033) (0.0733) (1.3462) 
Equally Weighted portfolio 
return 0.0096 -0.3589 0.0874 -0.0100 . 0.0196 
{0.0074} ~0.2537~ ~0.3755} 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1% levels, respectively 
124 
Table 4.6: Risk adjusted return estimation using contingent claim approach 
This table presents the result in estimating the risk-adjusted return to the merger arbitrage 
portfolio using contingent claim analysis. The payoff to £1 investment in the merger arbitrage 
portfolio is replicated by a portfolio that is long in one risk-free bond with the face value of 
1 + Rf + aH and short Ih number of put options on the market index. The price of the put 
option is calculated using Black-Scholes fomula. 
Practitioner portfolio Value weighted portfolio Equally Weighted portfolio 
IlH 0.0053 0.0069 0.0072 
~L 0.4396 0.7523 0.8660 
Risk-free rate (monthly) 0.56% 0.56% 0.56% 
Price of the bond 1.0052 1.0069 1.0071 
Input for Black-Scholes formula: 
Current Market Index 
Exercise Price 0.8780 0.8780 0.8780 
Time to expiration (years) 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 
Risk-free Rate (annually) 6.85% 6.85% 6.85% 
Volatity (annually) 15.53% 15.53% 15.53% 
Price of the put option 0.000014 0.000014 0.000014 
Cost of the replicating portfolio 1.005232 1.006851 1.007134 
B:isk-ad~sted return {monthly) 0.52% 0.69010 0.71% 
125 
FIGURES 
SO 
45 
III 40 
:2 
.Q 35 
.~ 30 1:) 
IU 25 .... 
0 
~ 20 cu 
.Q 
E 15 
:::1 
z 10 
5 
0 
8702 8903 9104 9305 9506 9707 9908 0109 0310 0511 0712 
Month 
Figure 4.1: Number of active bids in each month from 1987-2007 
This figure plots the number of active bids in the merger arbitrage portfolio in a particular 
month over the period 1987 - 2007. 
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Figure 4.2: Growth of arbitrage investment from 1987 to 2007 
!his figure plots the value, over the time period of 01/02/1987 to 3111212007, of £1 
Investment at 01/0211987 in three merger arbitrage portfolio return series, the risk-free 
bond and the market portfolio. 
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Figure 4.3: Piecewise linear model 
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This figure plots the piecewise linear model specified in equation' (17)-( 19). This figure follows 
figure 2 in Mitchell and Pulvino (2001). R &L A b is the monthly return to the merger arbitrage IVJerg. r 
portfolio, R I is the risk-free rate, RMkt is the return to the market portfolio. PMkt.Low and aMkt.Low 
a~e the slope coefficient and the intercept when the difference between the market return and the 
~Isk-free rate is below the threshold. PMkI.High and aMkt.High are the slope coefficient and the 
Intercept when the difference between the market return and the risk-free rate is above the 
threshold. . 
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Figure 4.4: Adjusted R-square against market excess return thresholds-full sample 
This figure depicts the value of the model's adjusted R-squared against different market excess 
return threshold in the piecewise linear regression in equation (19) 
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Fi~ure 4.5: Scatter plot of arbitrage return against market return . Th~s figure depicts the merger arbitrage return series against the market return. The fitted line 
estJmated from the piecewise linear model is also plotted 
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~i~ure 4.6: Adjusted R-square against market excess return thresholds-subsample 
hIs figure depicts the value of the model's adjusted R-squared against different market excess 
return thresholds in the piecewise linear regression in equation (19) when the observation 
corresponding to the October 1987 market crash is removed from the sample. 
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Chapter 5: LIMITED ARBITRAGE HYPOTHESIS 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4, we test the risk-based hypothesis. In doing so, we estimate the return to 
-- the merger arbitrage strategy and look at how systematic risk can explain the source of 
merger arbitrage return. The argument in Chapter 2 points out that under the perfect 
capital market setting, systematic risk should be the sole determinant of merger 
arbitrage return. The evidence reported in Chapter 4 tells a different story, nevertheless. 
We find that the strategy can generate significant positive risk-adjusted return or 
abnormal return. The result is robust to range of asset pricing models and methods to 
Control for systematic risk. This indicates that systematic risk does not fully explain the 
return to the strategy. Thus, the risk-based hypothesis can only tell one part of the whole 
story. 
In this and the following chapter, we move away from the perfect capital market setting 
to identify additional factors other than systematic risk that determine the return to the 
strategy. In this chapter we test the limited arbitrage hypothesis. Due to market 
Imperfections, the real-world arbitrageurs face different types of risks, costs and 
constraints in implementing the strategy. These risks, costs and constraints limit the 
arbitrage activities, hence the name: 'limited arbitrage hypothesis'. We will empirically 
Investigate to what extent these limits to arbitrage can explain the source of merger 
arbitrage return in the UK market. 
As reviewed in section 2.3.2, under the limited arbitrage hypothesis, there are generally 
two competing theories regarding the source of the abnormal return to the strategy- the 
Part of return that is unexplained by the systematic risk. First, the arbitrage cost theory 
POstulates that the abnormal return exists to compensate the arbitrageurs for bearing the 
different types of risks and costs. If the arbitrage cost theory holds true, there would be 
nothing 'abnormal' in the strategy's risk-adjusted return. The arbitrageurs earn fair 
return commensurate with the additional risks and costs they have to face. Second, the 
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price pressure theory proposes a contrasting view. Based on the agency-based limited 
arbitrage model developed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), it is argued that the real 
world arbitrageurs may be subject to capital constraint. When the arbitrageurs are 
capital constrained, they might not be able to absorb the selling pressure created by the 
target shareholders who do not want to bear the deal completion risk. As a consequence, 
the target stock price might fall well below the efficient level enabling the arbitrageurs 
to earn abnormal return. Thus, in contrast to the arbitrage cost theory, the price pressure 
theory suggests that the source of the abnormal return to the strategy is the inefficiency 
in the pricing of merger stocks. 
The extant evidence on the arbitrage cost theory and price pressure theory in the context 
of merger arbitrage is scanty and inconclusive. In this chapter, we investigate the role of 
different types of arbitrage costs in explaining the abnormal return to the strategy and 
perform empirical test of the arbitrage cost theory against the price pressure theory. 
Some additional data need to be manually collected. For example, the target large 
shareholders' ownership and managerial ownership for the bid outcome model 
deScribed in Chapter 3, the level of the bidder's institutional ownership as a proxy for 
short-sale constraints. As a result, this chapter employs a smaller sample of takeover 
bids than the sample for the risk-based hypothesis in Chapter 4. Because the sample is 
different, we re-estimate the returns in excess of systematic risk for this sample to make 
SUre that the result in Chapter 4 still applies to this sample. 
The chapter is structured as followings. Section 5.2 describes the methodology to test 
the limited arbitrage hypothesis. Section 5.3 discusses the sample selection process and 
provides some descriptive statistics for the variables. Section 5.4 presents the result of 
estimating the return to the strategy in excess of systematic risk. Section 5.5 reports the 
reSUlt of the cross-sectional analysis of the abnormal return to the strategy. Section 5.6 
summarizes the chapter. 
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5.2 Methodology 
5.2.1 Excess return to individual arbitrage positions 
In this chapter, we use cross-sectional analysis to investigate the impact of different 
types of arbitrage risks and costs on the abnormal return to the merger arbitrage 
strategy. In doing so, the first step is to estimate the return in excess of systematic risk 
or abnormal return to each arbitrage position. The portfolio benchmarking procedure 
employed in Chapter 4 estimates the excess return to the whole portfolio not to each 
position. Thus, we need a different procedure to estimate the excess return to individual 
arbitrage positions. 
We follow the approach adopted by Baker and Savasoglu (2002). In particular, the 
return to an arbitrage position in bid i (TAa can be decomposed into the return 
conditional on the bid success TSi and the return conditional on the bid failure rFi. The 
model of return to an arbitrage position is: 
(21) 
where 7ri is the probability of bid success. To obtain the risk-adjustment benchmark for 
the return to an arbitrage position, we calculate the benchmark for each return 
component. The benchmark represents the compensation for systematic risk. As the 
structures of the investment in stock bids and in cash bids are different, we consider 
these two types of takeover bids separately. 
For stock bids, if the bid goes through, there w~uld be no risk and the arbitrageurs are 
gUaranteed to eam the arbitrage spread. The benchmark for TSi is the risk-free rate. In 
the event the stock bid fails, the arbitrageur is left with a long position in the target 
stocks and a short position in the bidder stocks. For an average stock bid, the arbitrage 
Position is approximately market neutral. Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) and the result in 
Chapter 4 show that the merger arbitrage portfolios of stock bids show little co-
lllovement with the market. As a result, for stock bids, the benchmark return for TFi is 
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also the risk-free rate rf. Thus, the risk-adjusted benchmark return for the investment in 
a stock bid is simply the risk-free rate rf. 
For cash bids, if the bid is successful, the arbitrageurs also face no risk and therefore the 
benchmark for rSi is the risk-free rate. In case the cash bid fails, the arbitrage position 
only contains a long position in the target stock and is subject to market-wide 
_ movements. Thus, the appropriate benchmark for rFi is the return to the market portfolio 
rM· The risk-adjustment benchmark for the arbitrage position in a cash bid is: Trirf + 
(1 - rearM' The estimation of the probability of bid success Tri is discussed in section 
3.4. We use the FTSE All Shares Index as the proxy for the market portfolio and the UK 
3-month Government bond rate as the proxy for the risk-free rate. 
Using above-mentioned approach to adjust for systematic risk and the method to 
calculate arbitrage return described in Section 3.3, Chapter 3, we can obtain the daily 
excess return to the arbitrage investment in each bid. Because the bid duration varies, 
We focus on the first 3D-day compounded excess return, which is calculated using the 
following equation: 
30 
ER~? = n(1 + ERit)-1 (22) 
t=l 
where E R;? is the 3D-day compounded excess return to the arbitrage investment in bid 
i, E Ri is the daily return in excess of the benchmark to adjust for systematic risk 
deSCribed earlier. When the bid duration is less than 30 day, we first compute the 
compounded excess return over the duration of the bid then convert the compounded 
return to 3D-day return using the following equation: 
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30 ERei X 30 
ER· =----Cl D. 
l 
(23) 
where E Rei is the compounded excess return for the duration of bid i. Di is the bid 
duration, which is the number of days between the bid announcement date and the 
-- resolution date. For successful bids, the resolution date is the date on which the bid is 
declared completed or unconditional as reported in SDC. For failed bids, the resolution 
date is one day after the date on which the bid is withdrawn. This equation applies 
whenDi < 30. 
5.2.2 Research design 
frice pressure theory versus Arbitrage cost theory 
To test whether the price pressure theory or the arbitrage cost theory provides better 
description of the source of the excess return to the strategy, we adopt the research 
design suggested by Baker and Savasoglu (2002). In particular, we estimate the 
following equation: 
K 
ERt = ao + alln (TargetSizea + I ajXji + Et 
j=2 
(24) 
Where E Rt is the return adjusted for the systematic risk, or arbitrage abnormal return, to 
the arbitrage position in bid i . The methodology to estimate E Rt is discussed in the 
previous section. In (TargetSizei) is the natural logarithm of the market value of the 
target equity at the bid announcement date in 2007 GBP (hereafter 'target size'). ) Xii is 
the set of variables that proxy for different types of arbitrage risks and costs. We will 
discuss the components of Xi} later in this section. 
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We focus on the relationship between the excess return to the strategy and target size 
because this relationship helps to differentiate between the price pressure theory and the 
arbitrage cost theory. Target size proxies for both the selling pressure created by the 
target shareholders (positive proxy) and transaction costs (negative proxy). 
When a takeover bid is announced, the target shareholders face the choice of selling the 
target stock immediately or holding on to it until the bid is completed to get higher 
payoff. The later choice however exposes the target shareholders to the risk of bid 
failure. Even though the risk of bid failure is generally low, the associated loss is 
usually substantial as target stock price may fall all the way back to the level of 30 to 40 
days before the bid is announced. To insure themselves against the possibility of 
merger 'blow-up', many target shareholders may decide to sell the target stocks shortly 
after the bid announcement (Weston et al., 2004, ch21), thereby creating a selling 
pressure. The larger the target size, the larger is the selling pressure. 
Under the price pressure theory, as the capital-constrained arbitrageurs may not be able 
to absorb the selling pressure, the target stock price would fall well below its efficient 
level generating abnormal profits for the arbitrageurs. The larger the selling pressure, 
the bigger is the fall in the target stock price. The bigger the fall in the target stock price, 
the higher is the excess return to the strategy. When target size serves as the proxy for 
the selling pressure, a positive relationship between excess return and target size should 
be observed. In equation (24), the price pressure theory would predict that «1 is 
positive. 
Target size can also be a proxy for the cost of trading in target shares. Firm size is a 
popular proxy for transaction costs. The shares of large firms tend to be more liquid, 
have lower bid-ask spread and lower' price impact costs (Lakonishok et al., 1994; 
Pontiff, 1996). As a result, the costs of trading in shares of large firms tend to be lower 
than for small firms. Pontiff (1996), Gemmill and Thomas (2002) and Bradley, et al. 
(2010) report that the mispricing in the case of closed-end funds is decreasing in 
transaction costs proxied by firm size. Ali et al. (2003) use firm size as the proxy for 
transaction cost in examining the book-to-market anomaly. 
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Under the arbitrage cost theory, the excess return to the strategy compensates the, 
arbitrageurs for bearing the cost in establishing and maintaining the arbitrage positions. 
As a result, the higher are the arbitrage costs, the greater is the excess return to strategy. 
Because target size is inversely related to the cost of trading in target stock, the arbitrage 
cost theory would predict a negative relationship between the excess return to the 
strategy and target size. The coefficient al in equation (24) should be negative under the 
arbitrage cost theory. 
Regarding the relationship between the excess return to the merger arbitrage strategy 
and target size, the prediction of the price pressure theory runs in opposite direction 
with the prediction of the arbitrage cost theory. This is why target size can be deemed as 
the key variable to differentiate between the two competing theories. 
Other proxies for selling pressure 
As an alternative proxy for selling pressure, we use the average abnormal daily trading 
volume of the target stocks over the period of 3 days, 5 days, and 10 days after the bid 
annOuncement date. The following equation is used to estimate the average abnormal 
daily trading volume: 
k t=-41 
AVOLik = ~ L VOLit -1/119 L VOLu 
t=+l t=-160 
(25) 
where AVOLik is the average abnormal trading volume of the target stocks over the 
period of k days after the bid announcement date, VOLit is the daily trading volume of 
the target stocks at day t. Day 0 is the announcement date. The subscript i refers to bid i 
in the sample. We measure trading volume in 2007 GBP. 
The average abnormal daily trading volume in equation (25) is the difference between 
average daily trading volume after the bid is announced and the average daily trading 
volume over a base period. The base period starts at 160 days prior to the bid 
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announcement date and ends at 40 days prior to the bid announcement date so that no 
information about the bid is factored into the daily trading volume in this period. 
If most of the trading after the bid announcement is between the arbitrageurs and the 
target shareholders (Moore et aI., 2005), then the higher the abnormal trading volume, 
the greater is the selling pressure created by the target shareholders. Hence, when the 
average abnormal daily trading volume serves as the proxy for selling pressure, a 
positive relationship between this variable and the excess return to the strategy is 
expected. 
Other proxies for transaction costs 
In addition to target size, we also employ three other measures of transaction costs 
namely the inverse of the stock price level, the dollar trading volume and the frequency 
of zero return day. 
The inverse of stock price level (lnverPrice) 
Stock price levels are found to be inversely related to the quoted bid-ask spread and 
Commission per share (Bhardwaj and Brooks, 1992; Blume and Goldstein, 1992). 
Copeland and Galai (1983) theoretically demonstrate that the size of the bid-ask spread 
is negatively related to the stock price level. Stoll and Whaley (1983) find a significant 
negative relation between the stock price level and firm size, our first proxy for 
transaction costs. Thus, low share price firms tend to have higher transaction costs than 
high-share price firm. 
We Use the inverse of the price level of target stock as the proxy for the cost of trading 
in target stocks. We measure the price level as the average daily closing price of the 
target stock over the period of 60 days prior to the bid announcement date. If transaction 
costs play an important role in determining merger arbitrage return, we should observe a 
positive relationship between the excess return to strategy and the inverse of the target 
stock price level. 
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Dollar trading volume (DollarVol) 
We measure the dollar trading volume as the average daily trading volume in 2007 GBP 
over the period of 160 days prior to the bid announcement date. It is argued that stocks 
with high dollar trading volume are less prone to price impact effects (Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 1988; Bhushan, 1991; Kyle, 1985). Spiegel and Wang (2006) report that 
high dollar trading volume stocks are more liquid and hence have lower transaction 
costs. Thus, it is expected that the excess return to the strategy are negatively related to 
dollar trading volume. 
Frequency of zero return days (ZeroFreq) 
We measure the frequency of zero return days as the percentage of days, in which the 
target stock has zero return over the period of 160 days prior to the bid announcement 
date. This measure of transaction costs is developed by Lesmond, et al (1999). If the 
value of private information possessed by the marginal investors in a trade does not 
exceed the transaction costs, the investors will reduce trading or not trade resulting in 
zero return. Therefore, the stocks with greater frequency of zero return days are likely to 
have higher transaction costs. Ali et a1. (2003), Lesmond, et a1. (2004) and Duan, et a1. 
(2009) employ the frequency of zero return days as the proxy for transaction costs in 
their empirical studies. Under the arbitrage cost theory, it is predicted that the 
relationship between the excess return to strategy and the frequency of zero return days 
is positive. 
Holding cost 
While arbitrageurs incur transaction cost only when they open or close the arbitrage 
position, they face holding cost as long as the position remains open. As the result, the 
longer the time that the arbitrage position remains open, the greater is the holding cost. 
In case of me~ger arbitrage, as the arbitrage position is open until the date the bid is 
completed or withdrawn, the duration of bid becomes the natural proxy for holding cost. 
We use bid duration (Duration) as the proxy for holding costs in general. We also 
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consider the impact of two specific types of holding costs namely idiosyncratic risk an~ 
short-sale constraints. 
Idiosyncratic risk 
Pontiff (2006) considers idiosyncratic risk the most important type of holding cost. 
Following Baker and Savasoglu (2002), we use two proxies for the idiosyncratic risk 
that the merger arbitrageurs have to face. 
The first proxy is the variance of the estimated probability (VarProb) measured as 
1ft(l- 1fD, where 1ft is the probability that bid i will be completed. The logistic 
regression model employed to estimate 1ft is discussed in Section 3.4, Chapter 3. The 
variance of the estimated probability of bid success measures the uncertainty about the 
outcome of the takeover bid. The higher is the variance, the greater is the degree of 
uncertainty. The variance reaches its maximum value when the estimated probability of 
bid success gets closer 0.5. In this case, it is very hard to predict the outcome of the bid 
because the chance that the bid goes through is equal to the chance that the bid fails. 
The variance reaches its minimum value when estimated probability of bid success gets 
closer either to 0 or 1. In this case, the uncertainty disappears as the bid is almost sure to 
fail or succeed. 
The second proxy for idiosyncratic risk is bid premium (Premium). Bid premium 
measures the expected losses of the arbitrage investment if the bid fails. In case the bid 
is called off, the arbitrageurs can lose the entire premium offered by the bidder. Thus, 
the higher the bid premium, the greater is the downside risk. Similar to Hsieh and 
Walkling (2005) and Schwert (1996), we measure bid premium as the sum of price run-
up and mark-up. The price run-up is the cumulative abnormal return to the target shares 
for trading days (-40,-1) before the bid announcement date and is calculated using the 
following equation: 
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t=-l 
RUnUPi = L ARit 
t=-40 
(26) 
where RunuPi is the price run-up of the target share in bid i, ARit is the daily abnormal 
return to the target shares on day t (day 0 is the announcement date). The formula for 
calculating ARit is: 
(27) 
where RTt is the daily return to the target stocks on day t. RMt is the return to market 
portfolio on day t. We use the FTSE All Shares index as the proxy for market portfolio. 
a. and P are the market model parameters. We estimate these parameters by regressing 
the daily return to the target stocks against the daily return to the market portfolio for 
trading days (-160, -41). 
Mark-up, the second component of bid premium, is computed as (FP - P-1)/P-1 
where P -1 is the target stock price one day prior to the bid announcement date and 
F P is the final offer price. 
Short-sale constraints 
To establish an arbitrage position in a stock bid, the arbitrageurs need to sell short the 
bidder stocks. Mitchell et al (2004) report that the arbitrageurs' shorting of bidder 
stocks is responsible for nearly half of the decline in the price of bidder stocks around 
the bid announcement date. As a result, the arbitrageurs face short-sale constraints when 
investing in stock bids. Short selling is costly and risky for three main reasons. First, the 
short-sellers must pay the lending fees to the stock lenders. Second, the lenders retain 
the right the recall the stock at any time during the shorting period.' Third, the stocks 
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may be not available or in limited supply for lending, which makes short-selling 
impossible or very costly. 
The first constraint, the lending fee, is unlikely to cause much trouble for the 
arbitrageurs as the fee is generally quite low. DtAvolio (2002) reports that the lending 
fee in the US is around 0.25% per annum and more than 90% of the stocks lent out cost 
less than I % per annum to borrow. According to Thomas (2006), the average lending 
fee is around 0.14% in the UK and 0.4% in other European markets. The possibility that 
the shorted stocks are recalled by the lenders, the second constraints, is extremely rare. 
In the US, less than 2% of the shorted stock are recalled by the lenders in any month 
(Thomas, 2006). 
DtA volio (2002) argues that it is the third constraint, the limited supply of the stocks for 
Shorting, that makes short selling costly. Using a proprietary dataset to examine the 
impact of short-sale constraints on the profitability of shorting IPQ stocks, DotCom 
Stocks and of merger arbitrage, Geczy, et al (2002) find that the exclusion of stocks that 
are not available or in very limited supply for lending substantially reduces the 
profitability of these strategies while lending fees only have small impact on 
profitability. 
As institutions are the major suppliers of securities for loan (Thomas, 2006), short-sale 
constraints due to limited supply of lending stocks impact mainly stocks with low 
institutional ownership. DtAvolio (2002) find that institutional ownership explains more 
than 50% of the cross-sectional variation in the supply of lending shares. Thus, the level 
of institutional ownership can be used as a proxy for the short-selling costs. Nagel 
(2005), Asquith et al (2005) and Ali and Trombley (2006) document that short-sale 
costs are significantly correlated with the level of institutional ownership. 
We use the bidder firm's institutional ownership as the proxy for the short-sale 
constraints that the arbitrageurs face when shorting the bidder's stocks. The institutional 
ownership is the percentage of bidder's shares held by institutions, which have interest 
in 3% or more of the bidder's shares. Under the UK Companies Act 1985, companies 
are required to disclose in their annual reports the ownership of anyone who has interest 
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in 3% or more of equity shares. Thus, we manually collect the data about institutiona,l 
ownership from the bidder's most recent annual report prior to the bid announcement. 
Due to the 3% threshold, the measure of institutional ownership in this study has a 
downward bias. With the costs of short selling decreasing in the level of institutional 
ownership, it should be expected that the excess return to the arbitrage investment in 
stock bids is negatively related to the level of bidder firms' institutional ownership. 
Nagel (2005) notes that the level of institutional ownership may be highly correlated 
with firm size. As we discuss earlier, firm size is a proxy for transaction costs. Thus, for 
the clean test of the short-sale constraint impacts, the size effects must be controlled for. 
A simple way to control for size is to include the market value of the bidder firm in the 
model. In addition to this simple way, we follow Nagel's (2005) approach to purge the 
size effect from the level of institutional ownership. Under this approach, the residual 
institutional ownership is used as a proxy for short-sale constraints instead of 
institutional ownership. 
The residual ownership is the residual in the cross-sectional regression, which includes 
the bidder firm size in the right hand side and the bidder's institutional ownership in the 
left hand side. For the regression to be well-specified, a logit transformation of the 
bidders' institutional ownership is performed: 
Insti logit(Insti) = In (1 It) 
- ns i 
(28) 
Where Insti is the level of the biddert institutional ownership in bid i. The values of 
lnsti equal to 0 are replaced by 0.0001. The logit transformation maps the level of 
institutional ownership, which is bounded by 0 and 1, to the real line. After the 
transformation the following regression is performed: 
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where AcqSizei is the bidder equity market value at the bid announcement date. The 
square term is included to controll for possible non-linear relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm size. Si is the error terms of the regression. Residual 
institutional ownership is the residual of this regression. 
The description of all variables used in this chapter is provided in Table 5.1. 
[Insert Table 5.1, page 159 here} 
5.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
5.3.1 Data and sample of takeover bids 
The data sources are described in section 3.2.1, Chapter 3. To test the limited arbitrage 
hypothesis, we have to manually collect data on three variables: the target's managerial 
ownership and large shareholders' ownership used as the independent variable for the 
bid outcome model discussed in section 3.4, and the bidder' institutional ownership 
used as a proxy for short-sale constraints in this chapter. The data are obtained from the 
Company annual reports available in Perfect Filings. As this database provides little 
Coverage prior to 1995 and due to the heavy demand in terms of labour for the data 
collection process, the empirical tests in this chapter employ a smaller sample of 
takeover bids than the sample employed in the Chapter 4 testing the risk-based 
hypothesis. The sample selection process is described in Section 3.2.2, Chapter 3. This 
sample includes 653 UK cash and stock bids from 1997 to 2007. 
Table 5.2 presents the summary statistics for the sample. Around 80% of the bids in the 
sample are paid for in cash. For both stock and cash bids, the mean of the transaction 
value is much larger than the median implying that there are a few very large deals in 
the sample that skew the distribution of the variable. The success rate, the percentage of 
the bids that finally go through, is 82% and varies considerably throughout the sample 
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period. Over the sample period the success rates of cash bid is generally greater than th~ 
success rates of stock bids. The t-statistic of 2.03 of the paired comparison test for the 
difference between the success rates of cash bids and the success rates of stock bids 
confirms this fact. 
[Insert Table 5.2, page 161 here] 
5.3.2 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 5.3 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables described in Section 5.2. We 
divide the samples into 2 subsamples. The first subsample includes observations with 
excess return greater than the median excess return (the high excess return subs ample) 
and the second subsample contains the remaining observations (the low excess return 
subsample). Descriptive statistics for all variables in these two subsamples as well as 
the result of the tests for the difference in mean and median between these subsamples 
are reported. These simple univariate tests provide the initial idea about the impact of 
difference types of arbitrage risks, costs and constraints on the excess return to the 
strategy. 
[Insert Table 5.3, page 162 here] 
The results of the univariate tests provide little conclusive evidence about the impact of 
arbitrage risks and costs as only 3 tests show statistically significant results. First, the 
target size of the high excess return subsample is lower than the target size of the low 
excess return subsample. This negative relation between target size and excess return 
provides support for the arbitrage cost theory because the costs of trading in stocks of 
large target firm are generally lower than the costs of trading in small target firms. This 
negative relationship also invalidates the price pressure theory as this theory predicts a 
Positive relationship between target size and excess return. 
Second, price level of target stocks is found to be negatively related to the excess return 
to the strategy. Again, this finding indicates that transaction cost is an important 
detenninant of merger arbitrage return. Stocks with low price level typically have 
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higher transaction costs. The arbitrageurs facing with high transaction costs will requir~ 
higher expected returns to compensate for the costs. 
Finally, premium is greater for the high excess return subsample than for the low excess 
return subsample. As premium is the proxy for the expected losses the arbitrageurs may 
incur when the bid fails, this result is consistent with the impact of idiosyncratic risk. 
The excess return to the strategy is increasing in the level of idiosyncratic risk. 
The tests on the remaining variables show insignificant results. We will have a different 
picture in the multivariate tests in Section 5.5. 
5.4 Benchmarking the portfolio return 
Because in this chapter we use a different sample from the sample used in Chapter 4 
testing the risk-based hypothesis, to make sure that the result in Chapter 4 still holds for 
this sample we estimate the risk-adjusted return to the merger arbitrage portfolios 
constructed on this new sample. It is noted that the empirical test of the limited arbitrage 
hypothesis is interesting only because the merger arbitrage portfolio can persistently 
generate positive return in excess of the compensation for systematic risk. The portfolio 
construction process follows the procedure described in Section 4.3.2. Following this 
procedure, three arbitrage return series are constructed: the Practitioner Arbitrage 
portfolio, the value weighted arbitrage portfolio and the equally-weighted arbitrage 
portfolio. 
Figure 5.1 plots the number of active bids in a month for the merger arbitrage portfolios 
Over the sample period. The number of bids in each month varies considerably and 
exhibits a clustering pattern through time. The number of active bids is high for some 
periods, for instance 1998- 2001, and is low for the others, for example 2002-2004. 
This pattern is consistent with the fact that mergers tend to occur in waves (Sudarsanam, 
2003). 
[Insert Figure 5.1, page 170 here} 
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Figure 5.2 depicts the value over the sample period of £1 investment in the three 
arbitrage portfolios, the market portfolio, and risk-free bond starting from 0110111997. 
On 31112/2007, the investment in the PA portfolio grows into £4.67 but the investment 
in the market portfolio only translates into £2.25. The investment in other two arbitrage 
return series also outperforms the market portfolio. These initial descriptive statistics 
indicates that the merger arbitrage strategy appears to perform well in the UK market. 
[Insert Figure 5.2, page 171 here J 
We employ three asset pricing models to estimate the portfolio's risk-adjusted return 
OVer the sample period, that is, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model. and Carhart (1997) four-factor model: 
QAPM' 
(30) 
Eama and French (1993) three-factor model: 
Qarhart (J 997) (our-factor model: 
Where Rt is the monthly return to the merger arbitrage portfolios on month t, R{ is the 
monthly risk-free rate, Rt' is the monthly return to the market portfolio. In this study, 
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we measure risk-free rate using three-month UK Government bond, and use the FTSE 
All Share index as the proxy for market portfolio. SM B is the difference in return 
between a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of big stocks, H M L is the difference 
in return between a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and a portfolio oflow book-
to-market stocks. U M D is the difference in return between a portfolio of stocks with 
high past return and a portfolio of stocks with low past return. The construction of H M L 
and SM B factor for the UK market is similar to the approach adopted by Daniel, Titman 
and Wei (2001). The construction of HML, 5MB and UMD for the UK market follows 
Liew and Vassalou (2000). {3 is the systematic risk associated with different risk factors 
and is estimated with the data. Ct, {t, and vt are the error terms of the models. The 
intercept a measures the average monthly risk-adjusted return or abnormal return. 
Based on the results from existing studies we expect that a is significantly positive. We 
report the estimation of the risk-adjusted return to three merger arbitrage return series in 
Table 5.4. 
[Insert Table 5.4, page 163 here] 
The abnormal return to the Practitioner Arbitrage portfolio and the equally-weighted 
portfolio is positive and statistically significant at 1 % level when these three models are 
employed as the risk-adjustment benchmark. As for the value-weighted portfolio, the 
estimated abnormal return is positive but statistically insignificant when CAPM and 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model are used to control for risk. The abnormal 
return for the value-weighted return series becomes statistically significant in case 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model serves as the risk-adjustment benchmark. The result is 
in generally consistent with the extant studies and with the result in Chapter 4 about the 
risk-based hypothesis. Systematic risk can only partially explain the returns to the 
merger arbitrage strategy. The persistence of positive abnormal return requires further 
explanation about their source. This is what we are attempting in this chapter. 
The finding that the abnormal return to the value weighted portfolio is statistically 
insignificant when CAPM and Fama and French (1993) model are employed as the risk-
adjustment benchmark shows some favour for the arbitrage cost theory. The return to 
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the investment in large targets has more weight in the value-weighted portfolio. As the 
argument in Section 5.2.2 points out, the arbitrageurs incur smaller transaction costs 
when trading in the stocks of large target firms. The arbitrage cost theory would, 
therefore, predict that the abnormal return to the arbitrage positions in takeover bids 
with large target firms is smaller than the abnormal return in takeover bids with small 
target firms. As a result, under the arbitrage cost theory, the abnormal return to the 
value-weighted portfolio may be smaller than the abnormal return to the P A portfolio 
and the abnormal return to the equally-weighted portfolio. A weaker supportive 
evidence for the fact that the value-weighted portfolio can generate positive abnormal 
return is consistent with the arbitrage cost theory. In the next section we will perform 
formal empirical tests of the arbitrage cost theory. 
5.5 Cross-sectional determinants of merger arbitrage excess return 
In this section, we employ cross-sectional regression to investigate the impact of 
different types of risks and costs on the excess return to the strategy. The dependent 
variable of the regression is the excess return to each individual arbitrage position. 
Because the bid duration varies, we focus on the first 3D-day compounded excess return. 
Our approach is similar to Baker and Savaloglu (2002). The result is qualitatively the 
same if we focus on different event windows or use annualized excess return. The 
independent variables are the ones described in Section 5.2.2. The estimation of the 
cross-sectional regression is presented in Table 5.5 
[Insert Table 5.5, page 165 here] 
We discuss the cross-sectional result following the structure outlined in Section 5.2.2. 
First, we look at the test that helps diff~rentiate between two competing theories under 
the limited arbitrage hypothesis, that is, the arbitrage cost theory and the price pressure 
theory. 
150 
5.5.1 Transaction Costs versus Price Pressure 
Target size 
The discussion in Section 5.2.2 points out that the key variable that helps differentiate 
between the arbitrage cost theory and the price pressure theory is target size. These two 
competing theories propose contrasting predictions regarding the relationship between 
the excess return to the strategy and target size. The relationship is predicted to be 
positive under the price pressure theory but negative under the arbitrage cost theory. 
The result presented in model (1) of Table 5.5 provides strong support for the arbitrage 
cost theory and at the same time refute the price pressure theory. The excess return is 
negatively related to size of the target and the relationship is statistically significant at 
1 % level. To ensure that our result is not driven by outliers as the descriptive statistics 
in Section 5.3.2 show that the distribution of target size might be skewed toward a few 
very large deals (mean is much larger than median), we perform additional analysis. In 
Particular, we replace target size with the dummy variable LargeDeal, which is equal 
to 1 if the bid is in the top decile of the target equity market value at the bid 
announcement date, and 0 otherwise. The result in model (2) of Table 5.5 confirms the 
negative relationship between the arbitrage excess return and target size. The coefficient 
estimate of LargeDeal is negative and statistically significant at 1% level. The excess 
returns to the investment in those bids with the largest targets are on average 3.6% 
lower than the excess returns to the investment in other bids. 
The result clearly shows that selling pressure has little impact on the pricing of merger 
stocks. The marginal investors in the merger arbitrage game appear to care more about 
transaction costs when determining the price of merger stocks. As investing in large 
targets involves smaller transaction costs, the negative relationship shows that the 
transaction costs seem to be one of the primary drivers of the cross-sectional variation 
in the merger arbitrage abnormal return. 
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Other measures of price pressure 
The result about the relationship between the arbitrage excess return and target size 
seems to refute the price pressure theory. To ensure that the result is not driven by the 
poor proxy for selling pressure, we perform additional tests on other selling pressure 
proxies. The direct measure of selling pressure should be sell-initiated trading volume, 
which requires market microstructure data to estimate. As we do not have access to such 
data, we use the average abnormal trading volume as the alternative proxy for selling 
pressure. To the extent that much of the surge in the trading volume after the bid is 
announced is caused by target's shareholders' selling to arbitrageurs, abnormal trading 
volume is good proxy for selling pressure. Under the price pressure theory, arbitrage 
excess return is positively related to the abnormal trading volume. 
The result in model (3), (4) and (5) of Table 5.5 shows the opposite nevertheless. 3-day, 
5-day, and 10-day average daily abnormal trading volume are all found to be negatively 
related to the arbitrage excess return and the relationship is even statistically significant 
at 5% level. Thus, we find no support for the price pressure theory. 
Other measures of transaction costs 
In addition to target size, in this chapter we also examine the relationship between 
excess return and three other proxies for transaction costs namely the inverse of the 
stock price level, dollar trading volume and frequency of zero-return days. The result is 
reported in model (6) to (9) of Table 5.5. -
When the cross-sectional regression includes only one proxy at a time, the coefficient 
estimate is statistically significant at 1 % level and has the sign that is consistent with the 
arbitrage cost theory. Stocks with low price level or high frequency of zero return days 
have high transaction costs. Thus, the observed positive relationship between the 
Inverse of the-target stock price level, frequency of zero returns days and the arbitrage 
excess return indicates that transaction costs are an important determinant of the return 
to strategy. As for dollar trading volume, because this variable is negatively related to 
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transaction costs, a negative relationship between the arbitrage excess return and dollar 
trading volume supports the arbitrage cost theory. 
In model (9) of Table 5.5, we put all 4 proxies for the costs of trading in target stocks 
into the regression. As can be seen, only target size and the inverse of target stock price 
level are statistically significant. The other two proxies lose their explanatory power 
when considered with other proxies for transaction costs. 
The findings in this section clearly show that the arbitrage cost theory dominates the 
price pressure theory in explaining the cross-section variation of the excess return to the 
strategy. There is no supporting evidence for the price pressure theory. Transaction 
costs appear to be an important determinant of merger arbitrage return. The higher is the 
costs of trading in the target stocks, the higher is the excess return to the strategy. The 
relationship between transaction costs and arbitrage return is robust to a range of 
proxies for transaction costs. 
5.5.2 Holding costs 
In the previous section, we test whether transaction cost or selling pressure provides 
better description of the cross-section variation of the arbitrage excess return. We find 
that transaction costs are the dominant determinant of the return to the strategy. As 
argued in Section 5.2.2, transaction costs are one of the two major types of costs and 
risks that the real-world arbitrageurs have to face. The other type is holding costs. While 
transaction costs are incurred only when the position is opened or closed, holding costs 
are cost per unit of time meaning that the arbitrageurs face holding costs as long as the 
arbitrage position remains open. In this section, we examine the impact of holding costs 
on the arbitrage excess return. 
In merger· arbitrage, because the arbitrageurs need to hold on to the arbitrage position 
until the bid is consummated or terminated, the bid duration can serve as a natural proxy 
for holding costs in general. The arbitrage cost theory would predict a positive 
relationship between the excess return to strategy and bid duration. The result in Table 
5.5 confirms the impact of holding costs. In all models, bid duration is found to be 
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positively related to the excess return to the strategy. Next, we discuss the result of,the 
tests for the impact of two specific types of holding costs, that is, idiosyncratic risk and 
short-sale constraints. 
Idiosyncratic risk 
The results in Table 5.5 show strong support for impact of idiosyncratic risk. As 
expected, both proxies for idiosyncratic risk, the variance of the estimated probability of 
bid success and bid premium, are positively related to the arbitrage excess return and 
the relationship is statistically significant at 1 % level. 
The variance of the estimated probability of bid success increases when the probability 
of bid success gets closer to 0.5 and decreases when the probability of bid success 
moves toward 0 or 1. When the probability of bid success is in the vicinity of 0.5, it is 
difficult to assess the outcome of the bid because the chance that the bid goes through is 
about the same as the chance that the bid fails. Thus, the uncertainty regarding the bid 
outcome is highest when the probability of bid success approaches 0.5. The positive 
relationship between the excess return and the variance of the estimated probability of 
bid success indicates that excess return increases with the level of uncertainty about the 
bid outcome. The arbitrageurs require higher expected return to compensate for the 
uncertainty. 
The level of uncertainty regarding the bid outcome is one dimension of the idiosyncratic 
risk the arbitrageurs have to face. Another dimension is the expected losses if thing goes 
wrong. In the context of merger arbitrage, the higher the bid premium, the bigger is the 
expected losses on the arbitrageurs' part if the bid fails.' This dimension of risk also 
behaves consistently with the uncertainty dimension. The excess return to the merger 
arbitrage strategy is positively related to bid premium. Overall, the finding shows that 
the higher is the level of idiosyncratic risk, the higher is the arbitrage excess return to 
compensate the arbitrageurs for the risk. 
The risks and costs examined so far are applied equally to cash bids and stock bids. We 
repeat the empirical test in Table 5.5 to the subsample of cash bids and the result is very 
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similar. The result for the subsample of cash bids is reported in Table 5.6. For stock 
bids, the arbitrageurs face another type of holding costs, that is, short-sale constraints, 
which will be examined next. 
[Insert Table 5.6 here, page 167J 
Short-sale constraints 
As the arbitrage investment in stock bids includes a short position in the bidder stocks, 
the arbitrageurs face short-sale constraints when investing in stock bids. To investigate 
the impact of short-sale constraints, we estimate the cross-section regression that 
includes the level of bidder's institutional ownership, the proxy for the short-selling 
costs, in the right hand side of the model. To take into account the impact of transaction 
costs and idiosyncratic risk, we also include other variables that proxy for these costs 
and risk in the regression. The argument in Section 5.2.2 shows that it is necessary to 
control for the bidder firm size in order to have a 'clean test' for the impact of short sale 
constraint. To purge the size effect, we include the bidder market value in the 
regression. Alternatively, we use the residual institutional ownership, which is a 
measure free of the size effect, in place of the bidder's institutional ownership. The 
detail of how to obtain the residual ownership is described in Section 5.2.2. As the 
short-sale constraints impose only on the investment in stock bids, we employ only a 
subsample of stock bids to estimate the regression. The regression result is reported in 
Table 5.7. 
[Insert Table 5.7 here, page 169J 
The results about the impact of transaction costs, holding costs in general and 
idiosyncratic risk for the subsample of stock bids are similar to the results for the Whole 
sample and for the subsample of cash bids in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 respectively. 
However, only a few coefficient estimates are statistically significant. This may be the 
consequent of the small sample size. The size of the subsample of stock bids is only 123 
observations and even down to 102 in 2 regressions (model (2) and (7) of Table 5.7). 
Due to the small sample size, the standard errors of coefficient estimates will be large 
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resulting in the insignificant results. Thus, we should be cautious in interpreting the 
results based on statistical significance for this subsample of stock bids. 
As far as the impact of short-sale constraints is concerned, both the level of the bidder's 
institutional ownership and residual institutional ownership are found to be negatively 
related to the arbitrage excess return. Since the short-selling costs are generally smaller 
for stock with high level of institutional ownership, the result shows that the arbitrage 
excess return increases with the size of short-selling costs. This finding indicates that 
short-selling costs deter the arbitrageurs from competing away the excess return to the 
merger arbitrage strategy. The arbitrageurs facing short-sale constraints demand higher 
return to compensate for these risks and costs. 
As noted earlier, caution should be taken in interpreting the impact of short-sale 
constraint as both proxies for short-sale constraints are statistically insignificant. This 
might be the direct consequence of the small sample size but may also reflect the true 
relationship between short-sale constraints and excess return. Thus, for this sample, the 
impact of short-sale constraint is at best inconclusive. 
In summary, holding costs appear to contribute significantly to the source of the merger 
arbitrage return. The arbitrage excess return is found to increase with bid duration, the 
proxy for holding costs in general. Also, arbitrageurs facing with idiosyncratic risk also 
require a high level of return to compensate for the risk. Finally, we find that short-sale 
constraints may be another important determinant of the excess return. Due to the small 
size of the stock bid sample, the impact of short-sale constraint is still inconclusive. 
5.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter performs empirical tests on the two competing theories under the limited 
arbitrage hypothesis namely the price pressure theory and the arbitrage cost theory. 
These two theories propose contrasting explanations about why the return in excess of 
the benchmark for systematic risk or abnormal return persists. The price pressure theory 
postulates that the real-world arbitrageurs are likely to be capital constrained and might 
not be able to absorb the selling pressure created by the target shareholders who do not 
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want to bear the deal completion risk. As a consequence, the target stock price may fall 
well below its inefficient level enabling the arbitrageurs to earn abnormal return. Thus, 
under the price pressure theory, the source of the arbitrage excess return is the 
inefficiency in the pricing of merger stocks. The arbitrage cost theory, by contrast, 
proposes that positive excess return exists because the real-world arbitrageurs have to 
face different types of risks and costs other than systematic risk. The excess return 
compensates the arbitrageurs for bearing these additional risks and costs. In the spirits 
of the arbitrage cost theory, there is no inefficiency in the pricing of merger stocks. The 
arbitrageurs earn a fair return commensurate with the risks and costs that they have to 
face. 
The findings of this chapter show very little support for the price pressure theory. Using 
a range of proxies for price pressure and transaction costs, we find that the transaction 
costs effect dominates the price pressure effect. The differences in the transaction costs 
that the arbitrageurs incur appear to be one of the important forces behind the cross-
sectional variation of the merger arbitrage abnormal return. As transaction costs are one 
type of arbitrage costs that the arbitrageurs have to face, this result is consistent with the 
arbitrage cost theory. 
The other type of arbitrage costs namely holding costs is found to have significant 
, impact on the arbitrage excess return. Idiosyncratic risk, one of the most important 
holding cost~, significantly contributes to the source of the arbitrage return. Excess 
return increases with the level of idiosyncratic risk as the arbitrageurs require higher 
return to compensate for the risk. Finally, we find that short-sale constraints appear to 
be another important holding cost that the arbitrageurs concern about. Due to the small 
sample size, the impact of short-sale c?nstraints is still inconclusive nevertheless. 
Since the theoretical foundation of the price pressure theory is the agency-based limited 
arbitrage model proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), the failure of the price 
pressure theory in explaining the cross-sectional determinants of the merger arbitrage 
abnormal return may stem from the invalidity of the model's assumption. The model 
assumes that the outside investors do not understand the opaque nature of the merger 
arbitrage strategy, which in turn leads to the constraints on the arbitrageurs' capital. As 
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argued by Officer (2007), this assumption seems rather tenuous. As the main players in 
the merger arbitrage game are hedge funds, who get capital mainly from sophisticated 
investors, it is unlikely that the outside investors are completely unaware of the nature 
of the strategy. Furthermore, the parties involving in mergers and acquisitions are 
required, by the laws, to disclose a fair amount of information about the deal. Thus, it is 
easy for the outside investors to be informed about the deal. As the information 
disclosure requirements are even stricter in the UK context compared to the US 
(Kenyon-Slade, 2004; Sudarsanam, 2003), the model's assumption is even weaker in 
our study. This may help explain why we find no support for the price pressure theory 
in the UK context. In the next section, we will see in greater detail the impact of the 
stricter disclosure requirement in the UK on the merger arbitrage activities. 
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Table 5.1: Description of variables used in the limited arbitrage hypothesis 
Variable name 
ERA 
TaroetSize 
AVOL3, AVOLS, 
AVOLIO 
InverPrice 
DoliarVol 
ZeroFreq 
Duration 
Premium 
Description 
ERA is the return adjusted for the systematic risk, or arbitrage abnormal return, to the arbitrage position in 
each bid 
TargetSize is the target equity market value in 2007 GBP 
AVOL3, AVOLS, and AVOLIO are the average daily abnormal trading volume in 2007 GBP over the 
period of 3 days, 5 days, and 10 days respectively after the bid announcement date. The average daily 
abnormal trading volume is the difference between average daily trading volume after the bid is 
announced and the average daily trading volume over a base period. The base period starts at 160 days 
prior to bid announcement date and ends at 40 days prior to the bid announcement date. 
InverPrice is the inverse ofthe price level of target stock. The price level is the average daily closing 
price of the target stock over the period of 60 days prior to the bid announcement date 
DollarVol is the dollar trading volume measured as the average daily trading volume in 2007 GBP over 
the period of 160 days prior to the bid announcement date 
ZeroFreq is the frequency of zero return days measured as the percentage of days, in which the target 
stock has zero return over the period of 160 days prior to the bid announcement date. 
Duration is the duration of the takeover bid measured as the number of days between the bid 
announcement date and the date on which the bid is completed or withdrawn . 
Data source 
SDC, 
Datastream 
Datastream 
Datastream 
Datastream 
Datastream 
Datastream 
SDC 
. Premium is the bid premium measure as the sum of runup and markup. Runup is the cumulative SDC, 
abnormal return to the target shares for trading days (-40,-1) before the bid announcement date. Markup is Datastream 
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VarProb 
Inst 
AcqSize 
Reslnst 
computed as (FP - P-1)/P-1 where P-1 is the target stock price one day prior to the bid announcement 
date and F P is the final offer price 
VarProb is the variance of the estimated probability measured as 1ft(l-1ft), where 1ft is the probability SDC, 
that bid i will be completed. Datastream 
Inst is the bidder's institutional ownership measured as the percentage of the bidder's shares held by Perfect 
institutions. Filings, SDC 
AcqSize is the bidder equity market value at the bid announcement date Datastream 
Reslnst is the residual institutional ownership obtained as the residuals in the regression in which the 
bidder' institutional ownership is the dependent variable and the bidder firm size is the independent Datastream 
variable. 
(Note: We use the UK Consumer Price Index - All Urban: All items to convert value to 2007 OBP) 
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Table S.2: Sample Description 
This table presents a summary of the takeover bid sample used in this chapter. Only pure cash and pure stock\mergers are included. The transaction 
value in GBP is recorded in SDC. Success rate is the percentage of the transactions reported as "completed" or "unconditional" in SDC over total 
number of transactions. For transaction value, the figure in the parentheses is median, the other one is mean. The transaction values in different years 
are converted to 2007 value using the UK Consumer Price Index - All Urban: All items. 
Cash Mergers Stock Mergers 
Year 
Number of Deals 
Average Value Success Rate Number of Deals Average Value Success Rate (£ millions) (£ millions) 
1997 27 (64.29%) 210.95 (72.59) 92.59% 15 (35.71%) 66.16 (44.30) 86.67% 
1998 42 (68.85%) 110.24 (31.29) 92.86% 19 (31.15%) 616.61 (127.16) 78.95% 
1999 76 (76.77%) 204.64 (37.12) 94.74% 23 (23.23%) 356.51 (34.19) 86.96% 
2000 54(75.00%) 288.96 (70.13) 87.04% 18 (25.00%) 659.01 (71.21) 88.89% 
2001 23 (74.19%) 223.80 (37.40) 100.00% 8 (25.81%) 18.89 (17.12) 87.50% 
2002 24(85.71%) 77.84 (19.71) 95.83% 4(14.29%) 364.80 (418.57) 100.00% 
2003 52 (85.25%) 172.63 (39.20) 98.08% 9 (14.75%) 60.53 (31.27) 100.00% 
2004 27 (81.82%) 275.31 (83.45) 88.89% 6 (18.18%) 74.96 (23.55) 100.00% 
2005 60(88.24%) 399.57 (88.73) 90.00% 8 (11.76%) 70.15 (49.27) 75.00% 
2006 91 (88.35%) 831.08 (99.95) 85.71% 12 (11.65%) 171.84 (95.55) 75.00% 
2007 51 (92.73%) 716.19 (91.31) 90.20% 4(7.27%) 1,114.45 (146.99) 75.00% 
Complete Sample 527 (80.70%) 381.47 (53.40) 91.46% 126 (19.30%) 336.95 (40.08) 85.71% 
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Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics of limited arbitrage variables 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of all variables that proxy for different types of 
arbitrage risk and costs. All variables are defined in Table 5.1. The statistics are reported for the 
whole sample and for two subsamples. The first subsample includes observations with excess 
return greater than the median excess return and the other includes the remaining observations. 
The result of the tests for the difference in mean and median between these two subsamples is 
also reported. 
All High excess Low excess Difference 
Variable return return 
Mean Mean Mean Mean 
[Median] [Median] [Median] [Median] 
TargetSize (£2007 million) 377.6529 367.0388 388.2346 -21.1958 
[59.1347] [48.3708] [73.1860] [-24.8151]** 
AVOL3 (£2007 thousand) 888.4999 971.3913 812.9391 158.4522 
[84.5644] [88.9493] [82.6203] [6.329] 
AVOL5 (£2007 thousand) 420.9315 480.0958 366.9817 113.1141 
[43.6850] [47.5692] [42.1779] [5.3913] 
AVOL 10 (£2007 thousand) 147.3897 167.6632 128.9030 38.7602 
[18.5476] [20.4573] (17.3227] [3.1346] 
PriceLe\e1 (pence) 161.2627 158.6052 163.9122 -5.307 
[94. 9672J [75.7828] [102.59021 [-26.8074J** 
DollarVol (£2007 thousand) 1,029.0560 1,049.3890 1,010.1510 39.238 
[189.92761 [199.2153] [183.8597] [15.35561 
ZeroFreq 0.5221 0.5314 0.5128 0.0186 
[0.5813] [0.6031] [0. 5625} [0.0406} 
VarProb 0.0981 0.1002 0.0960 0.0042 
[0.0776] [0.07691 [0.07791 [-0.001] 
Premium 0.3109 0.3705 0.2515 0.119*** 
[0.2299J [0.2754] {0.1927] [0.0827]*** 
Inst 0.3495 0.3553 0.3438 0.0115 
[0.3334] [0.3408] . [0.3160] [0.0248} 
Reslnst 0.0000 -0.1748 0.1719 -0.3467 
[0.42121 [0.5050] [0. 3280J [0. 1769J 
*. **, *** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1% levels, respectively 
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Table 5.4: Benchmarking merger arbitrage return series with linear pricing models 
This table presents the result when the return to merger arbitrage portfolio is benchmarked against Capital Asset Price Model (CAPM), Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model (F&F), and Carhart (1997) four-factor model (C4): 
CAPM: Rt - R{ = a + PM(R~ - R{) + Et (30) 
F&F: Rt - R{ = a + PM(R~ - R{) + PsMBSMB + PHMLHML + {t (31) 
C4: Rt - R[ = a + PM(R~ - R{) + PsMBSMB + PHMLHML + PUMDUMD + Vt (32) 
where Rt is the monthly return to the merger arbitrage portfolios, R{ is the risk-free rate, R~ is the return to the market portfolio. We measure risk-free 
rate using three-month UK Government bond, and use FTSE All share index as the proxy for the market portfolio. 5MB is the difference in return 
between a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of big stocks, H M L is the difference in return between a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and 
a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. U M D is the difference in return between a portfolio of stocks with high past return and a portfolio of stocks 
with low past return. P is the systematic risk associated with different risk factors. The intercept a measures the average monthly risk-adjusted returns. 
Et , {t, and Vt are the error terms of the models. Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard error of the 
coefficient estimates is reported in the parenthesis. 
Dependent Variables (l < ~M ~SMB ~HML ~UMD 2 Sample Adj.R Size 
Panel A: Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
Practitioner portfolio return 0.0076- 0.0863* 0.0147 132 
(0.0021) (0.0468) 
Value weighted portfolio return 0.0050 0.1354** 0.0192 132 
(0.0030) (0.0673) 
Equally Weighted portfolio return 0.0077- 0.0636 0.0005 132 
(0.0026) (0.0543) 
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Dependent Variables (l ~M ~SMB ~HML ~UMD 2 Sample Adj.R Size 
Panel B: Fama and French (1993) three-factor model 
Practitioner portfolio return 0.0078*- 0.0937* 0.0550 -0.0233 0.0129 132 
(0.0022) (0.0544) (0.0571) (0.0799) 
Value weighted portfolio return 0.0046 0.1837** 0.1867*- 0.0563 0.0431 132 
(0.0031) (0.0788) (0.0692) (0.1008) 
Equally Weighted portfolio return 0.0088*- 0.0377 -0.0145 -0.1345 0.0016 132 
(0.0027) (0.0610) (0.0688) (0.1024) 
Panel C: Carhart (1997) four-factor model 
Practitioner portfolio return 0.0102*- -0.0019 -0.0591 -0.2626*- 0.0121 0.0728 132 
(0.0022) (0.0528) (0.0541) (0.0823) (0.0904) 
Value weighted portfolio return 0.0086- 0.0346 -0.0106 -0.3316*** -0.1064 0.0766 132 
(0.0034) (0.0756) (0.0676) (0.1160) (0.1247) 
Equally Weighted portfolio return 0.0105- -0.0405 -0.0919 -0.3020- 0.0766 0.0559 132 
(0.0025) (0.0652) (0.0672) (0.0954) (0.1162) 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
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Table 5.5: Cross-sectional determinants of arbitrage abnormal return - whole sample 
This table presents the result of the cross-sectional determinants of merger arbitrage abnormal 
return for the whole sample of takeover bids. Except for LargeDeal, all variables are described 
in Table 5.1. LargeDeal is the dummy variable that is equal to I if the bid is in the top decile of 
the target equity market value at the bid announcement date. The figures in the parentheses are 
the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of the coefficient estimates. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept -0.0454 -0.0727** -0.0639* -0.0611* -0.0606* -0.0593* -0.0675* -0.1046*** -0.0421 
(0.0319) (0.0328) (0.0350) (0.0347) (0.0349) (0.0327) (0.0346) (0.0379) (0.0453) 
In(TargetSize) -0.0115*- -0.0114** 
(0.0028) (0.0046) 
Large Deal -0.0358*** 
(0.0103) 
VarProb 0.2508*- 0.1795*** 0.1313** 0.1324** 0.1292** 0.1423*** 0.1426** 0.1991 *** 0.2281-* 
(0.0649) (0.0585) (0.0587) (0.0589) (0.0582) (0.0529) (0.0599) (0.0591) (0.0700) 
Premium 0.0402- 0.0432*** 0.0445*** 0.0445*** 0.0444*** 0.0449*- 0.0455- 0.0421*** 0.0413*** 
(0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0148) (0.0153) (0.0139) (0.0156) 
In(Duration) 0.0171** 0.0142* 0.0122 0.0115 0.0114 0.0105 0.0128 0.0145* 0.0178** 
(0.0080) (0.0078) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0079) (0.0084) (0.0081) (0.0087) 
AVOL3 (x10-3) -0.0021-
(0.0010) 
AVOL5 (x10-3) -0.0048-
(0.0021) 
AVOl1 0 (x 1 0-3) -0.0112** 
(0.0052) 
InverPrice 0.0298*- 0.0211*** 
(0.0041) (0.0055) 
DollaNol (x10-3) -0.0027*** -0.0006 
(0.0010) (0.0011) 
Zero F req 0.0487*** -0.0137 
(0.0155) (0.0235) 
N 653 653 562 564 564 653 577 653 577 
Adjusted R2 . 0.0863 0.0628 0.0518 0.0519 0.0510 0.0600 0.0586 0.0666 0.0873 
.. *, * *, * * * indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1 % levels, respectively 
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Table 5.6:: Cross-sectional determinants of arbitrage abnormal return - cash sample 
This table presents the result of the cross-sectional determinants of merger arbitrage abnormal 
return for the subsample of cash bids. Except for LargeDeal, all variables are described in 
Table 5.1. LargeDeal is the dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the bid is in the top decile of 
the target equity market value at the bid announcement date. The figures in the parentheses are 
the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of the coefficient estimates. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept -0.0481 -0.0756** -0.0828** -0.0789** -0.0785** -0.0656* -0.0788** -0.1112*** -0.0540 
(0.0334) (0.0345) (0.0368) (0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0344) (0.0358) (0.0398) (0.0456) 
In(TargetSize) -0.0128*** -0.0120** 
(0.0032) (0.0051) 
LargeDeal -0.0356*** 
(0.0117) 
VarProb 0.2672*** 0.1868*** 0.1242** 0.1246** 0.1211* 0.1528** 0.1352** 0.2085*** 0.2215*** 
(0.0733) (0.0666) (0.0629) (0.0634) (0.0624) (0.0597) (0.0650) (0.0674) (0.0769) 
Premium 0.0326*** 0.0365*** 0.0445*** 0.0445*** 0.0445*** 0.0377*** 0.0426*** 0.0359*** 0.0376*** 
(0.0123) (0.0129) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0131) (0.0145) (0.0126) (0.0138) 
In(Duration) 0.0196** 0.0155* 0.0169* 0.0160* 0.0159* 0.0121 0.0161* 0.0162* 0.0219** 
(0.0084) (0.0082) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0083) (0.0086) (0.0084) (0.0091) 
AVOL3 (x10-3) -0.0019* 
(0.0010) 
AVOL5 (x10-3) -0.0041* 
(0.0022) 
AVOL10 (x10-3) -0.0093* 
(0.0051) 
InverPrice 0.0937* 0.0154 
(0.0535) (0.0450) 
DoliaNol (x10-3) -0.0025** -0.0002 
(0.0010) (0.0012) 
ZeroFreq 0.0524*** -0.0117 
(0.0171) (0.0247) 
N 527 527 461 463 463 527 472 527 472 
Adjusted R2 0.1070 0.0698 0.0641 0.0631 0.0623 0.0619 0.0662 0.0780 0.0936 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
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TabJe 5.7: The impact of short-saJe constraints 
This table reports the impact of short-sale constraints on the arbitrage excess return for the subsample of stock bids. All variables are described in Table 
5.1. The figures in the parentheses are the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of the coefficient estimates. 
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept -0.0403 -0.0535 -0.0146 -0.0491 -0.0511 -0.0705 -0.0301 -0.0982 
(0.1055) (0.1064) (0.1165) (0.1423) (0.1007) (0.1021) (0.1131) (0.1211) 
In(TargetSize) -0.0033 -0.0079 
(0.0119) (0.0068) 
VarProb 0.2039 0.1841 0.2672 0.1907 0.2103 0.1454 0.1667 0.1780 
(0.2068) (0.1708) (0.1886) (0.1805) (0.1987) (0.1698) (0.1924) (0.1835) 
Premium 0.0553 0.0560 0.0466 0.0560 0.0523 0.0539 0.0457 0.0526 
(0.0452) (0.0455) (0.0408) (0.0459) (0.0415) (0.0424) (0.0363) (0.0414) 
In(Ouration) 0.0147 0.0140 0.0116 0.0149 0.0136 0.0115 0.0025 0.0131 
(0.0212) (0.0209) (0.0231) (0.0217) (0.0218) (0.0213) (0.0237) (0.0223) 
lm.erPrice 0.0224*** 0.0285*** 
(0.0068) (0.0052) 
OollaNol (x1o-3) -0.0016 -0.0043** 
(0.0026) (0.0019) 
ZeroFreq 0.0079 0.0376 
(0.0634) (0.0463) 
Inst -0.0101 -0.0065 -0.0104 -0.0102 
(0.0430) (0.0437) (0.0474) (0.0430) 
AcqSize -0.0060 -0.0058 -0.0125** -O.oon 
(0.0094) (0.0051) (0.0055) (0.0074) 
Reslnst -0.0034 -0.0044 -0.0055 -0.0036 
(0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0049) (0.0044) 
N 123 123 102 123 123 123 102 123 
Adjusted R2 0.0197 0.0316 0.0285 0.0190 0.0289 0.0409 0.0193 0.0234 
*, .*,.** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1% levels, respectively 
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Figure 5.1: Number of active bids in each month from 1997 to 2007 
This figure plots the number of active bids in the merger arbitrage portfolio in a particular 
month over the period 1997 - 2007 
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Figure 5.2: Growth of arbitrage investment from 1997 to 2007 
This figure plots the value, over the time period of 01/0111997 to 31112/2007, of £ 1 investment 
at 0110111997 in three merger arbitrage portfolio return series, the market portfolio and the risk-
free bond. 
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Chapter 6: ARBITRAGEURS' ROLE HYPOTHESIS 
6.1 Introduction 
The result of the empirical test of the risk-based hypothesis in Chapter 4 shows that the 
arbitrageurs can earn substantial return in excess of the benchmark for systematic risk or 
abnormal return. The empirical test of the limited arbitrage hypothesis in Chapter 5 
indicates that the excess return to the strategy may stem from the additional risks and 
costs other than systematic risk that the real-world arbitrageurs have to face. In this 
chapter, we test the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis, which provide another plausible 
explanation for the source of the excess return to the strategy. As the discussion in 
Section 2.3.3 shows, there are three roles that arbitrageurs can play during the takeover 
process, that is, the naive investors, the passive investors and the active investors. Each 
role has different implication for the source of the excess return to the merger arbitrage 
strategy. 
First, as naive investors, the arbitrageurs act like an average investor in the market and 
invest in a random portfolio of takeover bids. For naive arbitrageurs, the excess return 
represents the compensation for different types of risks and costs other than systematic 
risk or reflects the inefficiency in the pricing of merger stocks. The source of excess 
return to naive arbitrageurs is the content of the limited arbitrage hypothesis discussed 
in Chapter 5. 
Second, as passive investors, through internal research or information acquisition the 
arbitrageurs possess superior knowlege about the bid outcome. Hence, they have the 
ability to select the best bids, investment in which can generate higher risk-adjusted 
return than the risk-adjusted return to the average investors in the market. The 
arbitrageurs is passive in the sense that they do not leverage their stakes in the target to 
influence the bid outcome. For passive arbitrageurs, the source of the excess return is 
the arbitrageurs' superior knowlege about the outcome of the takeover bid. Third, when 
arbitrageurs assume the active role, they do not just 'sit on' their stakes in the target 
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stock but actively leverage the stakes to influence the bid outcome. The active 
arbitrageurs derive their excess return through their ability to alter the course of the 
takeove bid. 
Although we expect the real-world arbitrageurs should do better than the naive investors 
as the arbitrageurs are often professional asset management firms, most empirical 
studies on merger arbitrage implicitly assume that the arbitrageurs are naive investors. 
The way these studies select takeover bids is based on the availability of the data only 
and henece assume away the arbitrageurs' 'stock picking' ability or ability to influence 
the bid outcome. We are aware of only two empirical studies that take a step further to 
test the passive role and the active role of the arbitrageurs28• First, Larcker and Lys 
(1987) report that ex post success rates of takeover bids, in which arbitrageurs invest, 
are signficantly higher than the probablity of success perceived by the average investors 
in the market. This finding is consistent with the passive role of the arbitrageurs. 
Second, Hsieh and Walkling (2005) document that the arbitrageurs' holding of target 
stocks after the bid announcement date is higher for those bids with more favourable 
outcome i.e. have higher bid premium, higher probability of bid success and can 
generate higher arbitrage return. At the same, bid premium and probability of success 
increase with the level of arbitrage holding. These findings are consistent with both the 
active role and passive role. 
In this chapter, following the approach similar to Baker and Savasoglu (2002) and 
Hsieh and Walkling (2005) to identify arbitrageurs and calculate arbitrage holding, we 
attempt to provide empirical evidence about the passive role and the active role of the 
arbitrageurs in the UK context. In particular, we test whether arbitrage holding29 can 
help explain the cross-sectional variation of arbitrage return beyond the explanatory 
Power of other factors that can determine the outcome of takeover bid. Also, we test 
Whether the level of arbitrageurs' holding of target stocks has positive impact on bid 
premium and the probability of bid success as predicted by Comelli and Li's (2002) 
model. One of the premises of the model is that the arbitrageurs can hide their presence 
28 For a detailed discussion of these two studies, please see Section 2.3.3, Chapter 2. -
29 The procedure to identify arbitrageurs and obtain arbitrage holding is discussed in Section 6.4.2 
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when acquiring stakes in the target. The anonymity gives the arbitrageurs an edge in 
trading with other investors in the market enabling them to earn abnormal return. The 
strict UK disclosure rule during the takeover period makes the anonymity assumption 
rather tenuous. As argued later in section 6.2.2, since the disclosure rule during the 
takeover period is much stricter in the UK than in the US, where Hsieh and Walkling's 
(2005) study is conducted, we would expect different results about the UK arbitrageurs' 
ability to influence the bid outcome. This represents the advancement from the Hsieh 
and Walkling's (2005) study. 
It is noted that we do not aim at differentiating between the active role and the passive 
role. As we already argued in Section 2.3.3, it is impossible to separate the active role 
from the passive role by examining the relationship between arbitrage holding and 
arbitrage return, bid premium and the probability of bid success. The main purpose of 
this chapter is to test the prediction based on Cornelli and U's (2002) theoretical model 
about how the presence of arbitrageurs influences the bid outcome and the condition for 
the prediction to hold. 
The chapter is organized as followings. Section 6.2 develops empirical hypotheses 
based on the theoretical framework discussed in Section 2.3.3. Section 6.3 discusses the 
methodology for the empirical tests. Section 6.4 describes the data and sample selection 
process Section 6.5 presents the empirical results. Section 6.6 summarizes the chapter. 
6.2 Hypotheses development 
6.2.1 The relationship between the arbitrage holding and arbitrage return 
As the main purpose of the study is, to perform empirical investigation into how the 
roles of arbitrageurs can explain the source of the merger arbitrage return, we will first 
derive the hypothesis that links arbitrage holding with arbitrage return. 
The first hypothesis is predicated on the presumption that the arbitrageurs are better 
than the average investors in the market, which enables them to earn higher risk· 
adjusted return. The presumption is justified by the fact that the re'al-world arbitrageurs 
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are often professional managers, who charge a hefty fee to manage capital for clients 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Thus, they have both the resources and the ability to be 
better informed about the outcome of the takeover bids. Further, as a professional 
investor, the arbitrageurs have sufficient capital to acquire large stake in the target 
stocks and hence have the ability to influence the bid outcome. 
If the arbitrageurs are better than the average investors, it is expected that the 
arbitrageurs earn higher excess return than the average investors. In case they have 
superior knowledge about the bid outcome, they can choose the bids, investment in 
which yields better risk-adjusted return. When they have the ability to alter the course of 
the takeover, they will influence the bid in the way that enables them to earn higher 
return. Thus, if these conjectures are true, we expect a positive relationship between 
arbitrage holding and arbitrage return. 
Cornelli and Li (2002) also suggest that the relationship between arbitrage holding and 
arbitrage return may be non-linear. When the arbitrageurs buy a large number of target 
stocks, i.e. the level of arbitrage holding is high, the ensuing buying pressure might 
push up the price of the target stock, thereby reducing the arbitrage return. Thus, 
arbitrage return may be positively related to arbitrage holding when the level of 
arbitrage holding is not too high. The relationship may tum negative when the level of 
arbitrage holding passes a certain threshold. Hence our first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 6.1: Arbitrage excess return is increasing with arbitrage holding when the 
level of arbitrage holding is below a certain threshold but is decreasing with arbitrage 
hOlding when the level of arbitrage holding is above that threshold. 
It is noted that we do not assert any causal link between arbitrage return and the 
presence of arbitrageurs. As will be discussed in greater detail in Section 6.3, arbitrage 
return may be endogenously related to arbitrage holding. When the arbitrageurs are 
informed about the potential bid outcome, they adjust their investment accordingly. 
However, the arbitrage investment can also affect the bid outcome variables, which also 
can influence arbitrage return. 
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6.2.2 The impact of UK takeover regulation 
The second hypothesis tests the theoretical prediction in Comelli and U's (2002) model 
about the condition for the arbitrageurs to influence the bid outcome. As the discussion 
in Section 2.3.3 points out, the arbitrageurs have the ability to alter the course of the 
takeover process because they become the temporary large shareholders in the target 
firm after the bid announcement. As the large shareholders, their presence helps resolve 
the free-rider problem and hence increases the probability of bid success. Thus, the 
prerequisite for the arbitrageurs to affect the bid outcome is that they can acquire large 
stakes in the target firm. Because the arbitrageurs come to the takeover game not to 
influence the bid outcome but to make profits, the condition should be stated such that 
the arbitrageurs expect to earn positive abnormal return via their acquisition of large 
stakes in the target. 
Comelli and Li's (2002) argue that the condition can be fulfilled only if arbitrageurs can 
hide their presence. Since the arbitrageurs have the ability to influence the bid outcome, 
their presence, when being revealed, signals that the takeover bid is likely to succeed 
with favourable outcome. As a result, if the sellers of the target stock know that the 
arbitrageurs are in the game, they will raise their reservation price. Thus, if the 
arbitrageurs are forced to disclose their trading position too soon, they will have to buy 
the target stocks with a higher price, thereby reducing the arbitrage profits. In this 
scenario, the arbitrageurs' ability to influence the bid outcome give them little trading 
advantage. Consequently, they have no incentive to take a large position in the target 
stock and therefore are unable to influence the bid outcome. Early disclosure of the 
stake building by arbitrageurs reduces both the profitability of such stakes and their 
ability to increase the chance of a successful bid. Thus, the ability to conceal their 
presence is the crucial condition for arbitrageurs to influence the bid outcome. 
According to Comelli and U (2002), arbitrageurs can hide their position via two 
channels. First, noise traders3o, as in the trading models propounded by Kyle (1985) and 
30 Black (1986) refers to noise traders as those who trade based on things that they think are information 
but actually are not. In other words, these traders trade on pseudo-information or noises. 
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Kyle and Vila (1991), may provide a camouflage for the arbitrage community. As 
reported by Hsieh and Walkling (2005), in those bids, where the abnormal trading 
volumes of the target shares are high, suggesting high noise trading, the empirical 
evidence about the arbitrageurs' ability to influence the bid outcome becomes more 
pronounced. The higher the noise trading is, the easier arbitrageurs are able to hide their 
trades. Second, each arbitrageur only acquires the target shares up to the threshold that 
triggers a disclosure obligation (e.g. in US, UK, it is 5%, 1 % of the target shares 
respectively3)) 
The disclosure rule is of great importance for the arbitrageurs to affect the bid outcome 
because noise traders can only provide camouflage for the arbitrageurs as long as they 
own less target shares than the disclosure threshold. Above the disclosure threshold, the 
arbitrageurs are required by the laws to disclose their trading position and hence no 
amount of noise trading can help them hide their identity in such case. Empirical testing 
. of the impact of disclosure rules on the arbitrageurs' ability to influence the bid 
outcome is generally a thorny issue. As disclosure rules are set at country level, the test 
must involve cross-country studies with significant differences in the rules. As the 
evidence for the US market is already available, empirical tests of data from another 
country with different disclosure rules will provide insights into merger arbitrage. 
In this study, we argue that the UK provides this alternative empirical context that 
neatly fits such profile. The UK disclosure rules are substantially different from those in 
the US. As will be articulated later, the UK disclosure rules during the bid period (or 
more commonly called 'offer period' under the City Takeover Code) are much stricter 
than their US counterparts. Thus, by empirically examining the arbitrageurs' ability to 
influence the bid outcome in the UK and comparing the result with the US study by 
Hsieh and Walkling (2005), we can see the impact of disclosure rules on the 
arbitrageurs' ability to affect the outcome of the takeover bid. 
3\ The maximum amount of target shares that trigger disclosure obligation varies among countries. In the 
US, the threshold is 5%; in the UK it is 1 %. Please see Kenyon-Slade (2004) for more details. . 
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The disclosure rules during the takeover period are the regulatory response to secretive 
stake building. The rationale behind the rules is to allow the current shareholders of a 
potential target firm to be alerted to any imminent takeover offer. If the bidder is not 
required to disclose its share ownership, it can secretly acquire a large stake at the 
current, possibly undervalued market price and then announce the offer. In this way the 
acquiror can reduce the acquisition cost and may be able to coerce the remaining 
shareholders to tender their shares at a lower price.32 
In the US, Section 13(D) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 13D-l(a) of 
Regulation 13D provide that any person who, directly or indirectly, acquires "beneficial 
ownership" of 5% or more of any class of equity security that is subject to the 
provisions of Section 13(D) shall file a disclosure statement on Schedule 13D with the 
SEC within 10 business days after the acquisition. In the UK, under rule 8.3 of the UK 
City Code on takeovers, during an offer period a party has to disclose its all trading as 
long as having interest in 1 % or more of the target shares and the disclosure has to be 
made on the next business day after the date on which the trading occurs. 
It is quite clear that the UK the disclosure rules are much stricter on two accounts. First 
the disclosure threshold is considerably lower (1 % in the UK versus 5% in the US). 
Second, the timetable for disclosure is relatively lax in the US. In the UK because the 
disclosure must be made on the next business day, there is little chance for arbitrageurs 
to accumulate more than 1 % of target shares in secrecy. If they start buying too many 
shares in one day, their presence will be uncovered from a surge in trading volume. In 
the US, the arbitrageurs have 10 business days to accumulate more shares in excess of 
5% threshold. As a result, it is considerably easier for US arbitrageurs to become a large 
shareholder of the target firm befo~e having to reveal their identity. Mikkelson and 
Ruback (1985) find that the average size of the investment recorded in 479 13-D filings 
is 21.38 percent of the target outstanding shares, which is more than 4 times greater than 
the threshold for disclosure. 
32 Such secret stake building has been suggested as a solution to the free rider problem. See Sudarsanam 
(2003, ch 18) and Titman and Grinblatt (2006, ch20) 
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The lax disclosure rule in the US may help explain the significant empirical support for 
the arbitrageurs' ability to influence the bid outcome reported by Hsieh and Walkling 
(2005). However if the impact of the disclosure rule is true, we should expect a much 
weaker, if any, impact of UK arbitrageurs on the bid outcome due to their difficulty in 
hiding their position. Hence our second hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 6.2: In the UK market, arbitrage holding has little impact on the outcome 
and the terms of the bid. More specifically, arbitrage holding has little impact on bid 
premium and the probability of bid success. 
Cornelli and U's (2002) theoretical model is predicated on the assumption that 
arbitrageurs can effectively hide their presence and predicts, as a consequence, a 
positive relationship between the presence of arbitrageurs and bid premium and the 
probability of bid success. The above argument indicates that due to the UK's far 
stricter disclosure rules it is very difficult for arbitrageurs to hide their position. Thus we 
would expect a different relationship between arbitrage holding and those bid-related 
variables. Contrary to the model prediction of a positive relationship, we expect no 
significant relationship. 
6.3 Methodology 
6.3.1 Empirical tests 
Hypothesis 6.1 examines the relationship between arbitrage holding and arbitrage 
return. To test the hypothesis, the following equation needs to be estimated 
ERt = ao + a1holdingi + a2 holdingf + I ajXij + Ei (33) 
j=3.k 
Where ERt is annualized arbitrage excess return, holdingi is arbitrage holding 
measured as the percentage of the target's equity shares purchased by the arbitrage 
community. The procedure to identify arbitrageurs and calculate arbitrage holding is 
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discussed in Section 6.4.2. Xij is the set of control variables, fi is the error terms in the 
equation, and the subscript i denotes the takeover bid i in the sample. To calculate the 
annualized arbitrage excess return, we first compute the compounded excess return to the 
arbitrage investment in bid i over the duration of the bid using the following equation: 
Kt 
ERei = Il (1 + ERit) - 1 (34) 
t=l 
where E Rei is the compounded excess return to the arbitrage investment in bid i, Ki is 
the number of trading days from announcement date to the resolution date of bid i. For 
successful bids, the resolution date is the date on which the bid is declared completed or 
unconditional as reported in SDC. For failed bids, the resolution date is one day after 
the date on which the bid is withdrawn. E Rit is the daily excess return to the arbitrage 
investment in bid i on day t. The method to calculate ERit is described in Section 5.2.1, 
Chapter 5. 
Finally, the annualized excess return is obtained from the compounded excess return 
using the following equation: 
A ERei X 365 
ER· =----
, N· 
l 
(35) 
Where Ni is the number of calendar days from the announcement date to the resolution 
date. 
As will be discussed in the next section, the set of control variables in Xij represent the 
factors that can influence the outcome of the bid as well as the market's assessment of the 
bid outcome. Information about Xii is known to the public at the bid announcement date. 
Since arbitrage return depends on bid outcome. these publicly known factors also affect the 
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arbitrage return. If the arbitrageurs are better than the average public, the bids, in which the 
arbitrageurs invest, would yield higher risk-adjusted return. As a result, after all the publicly 
known factors are taken into account, a positive relationship between arbitrage holding and 
arbitrage return should be observed. In equation (33), al should be positive. The variable 
holdingl in equation (33) is included to control for the possible non-linear relationship 
between arbitrage return and arbitrage holding. When arbitrage holding passes a certain 
threshold, the relationship between arbitrage holding and arbitrage return might tum 
negative. Thus, if the non-linear pattern exists, we would expect az < O. 
To test Hypothesis 6.2 about the arbitrageurs' ability to alter the course of the takeover 
process, we estimate the following equations: 
Premiumi = Po + Plholdingi + L PjXji + Ut 
j=2.k 
Prob(SuccessD = Yo + y1holdingi + L yjXji + Vi 
j=2.k 
(36) 
(37) 
where Premiumi is the bid premium. The measurement of bid premium is discussed in 
Section 5.2.2. To recap, bid premium is the sum of price run-up and mark-up. The price 
run-up is the cumulative abnormal return to the target shares for trading days (-40,-1) 
before the bid announcement date. Mark-up, is computed as (FP - P-l)/P-1 where 
P- l is the target stock price one day prior to the bid announcement date and FP is the 
final offer price. Prob(Sucessi) is the probability of bid success. Xji is the set of 
'. 
Control variables, and ui and Vi are the error terms in these equations. According to 
Hypothesis 6.2, due to the strict UK disclosure rules, the UK arbitrageurs have little 
chance to exert influence on the bid outcome. In other words, when other variables that 
can affect the outcome of the bid are taken into account, arbitrage holding should have 
no impact on the probability of bid success and bid premium. Thus, we expect that PI 
and y 1 are all equal to zero. 
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Estimation 
Before discussing the methods to estimate the set of equations: (33), (36), and (37), we 
first examine whether or not these equations are sufficient in capturing the relations 
between arbitrage return, bid outcome variables, i.e. bid premium and probability of the 
bid success, and arbitrage holding. Arbitrage holding is placed on the right hand side of 
each equation as the primary explanatory variable. Thus, if we presume that these 
equations can model the true relationships between these variables, we impose an 
implicit assumption that arbitrage holding is exogenous variable, that is, it is determined 
outside these models. This assumption seems tenuous, nevertheless. As argued in 
Section 2.3.3, since the arbitrageurs are likely to be better informed about the bid 
outcome, their decision to enter the game and hold target shares, is influenced by 
arbitrage return and bid outcome variables. For instance, arbitrageurs might increase 
their purchase of target shares in those bids with higher expected returns, higher bid 
premium and higher probability of bid success. If this is true, these three equations are 
inadequate in modelling the relationship between arbitrage return, bid outcome 
variables and arbitrage holding. We need to add the following equation that shows the 
determinants of arbitrage holdings into the system: 
holdin9i = lfJo + lfJI ERt + lP2Premiumi + lfJ3Prob(SuccessD + I lPjXji + et (38) 
j=3,k 
All variables in equation (38) are described in equation (33), (36) and (37) except for eh 
which is the error term of the equation. 
The system of equations: (33) and (36)-(38) seems to be general enough to model the 
relationship between arbitrage holding and arbitrage return and bid outcome variables. 
Conditional on the true value of the parameters in equation (38), different estimation 
methods can be applied. There are two main scenarios: 
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Scenario 1 
Arbitrage holding is not influenced by arbitrage return and bid outcome variables 
(CfJi = 0, for all i = 1,3). In this scenario, we can discard equation (38) from the system. 
The initial set of three equations from (33), (36) and (37) is sufficient to model the 
relationship among the variables of interest. 
Assuming there is no measurement error or omitted variable, the assumption that 
arbitrage holding is exogenous variable is maintained. As a result, we can estimate each 
equation using a standard procedure. When the dependent variables are continuous, as 
in the case of equations (33) and (36), Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method can be 
employed. When the dependent variable is binary, as in the case of equation (37), 
logistic regression can be applied. 
Scenario 2 
Arbitrage holding is determined by arbitrage return or at least one of the bid outcome 
variables (CfJi '* 0, for at least one i = 1,3). To clearly illustrate this scenario, consider 
the simplest case where only one of the main independent variables in equation (38) is 
significant, say, bid premium. This means that CfJ2 '* 0, and CfJland CfJ3 are equal to O. 
Because arbitrage holding is not influenced by arbitrage return and the probability of 
bid success, it is exogenous variable in equation (33) and (37). Hence, for these two 
equations, standard estimation procedures can be applied. 
Turning to equation (36), the independent variable, arbitrage holding, is partially 
determined by the dependent variable, bid premium. In other words, arbitrage holding 
and bid premium are jointly determined. In such case, Wooldridge (2002) shows that 
arbitrage holding would correlate with the error term of the equation. Thus, it becomes 
an endogenous independent variable. In the presence of endogeneity, the OLS method 
will give biased and inconsistent estimates of equation (36). The traditional solution to 
the endogeneity problem is to find appropriate instrument variables (IV) for the 
endogenous variable and then use the IV estimators to get the consistent estimates of the 
coefficient. According to Larcker and Rusticus (2008), when the endogeneity problem 
183 
arises from the fact that the independent variable is partially determined by the 
dependent variable, there are two general approaches to obtain the IV estimators. First, 
we can estimate equation (36) independently using the 2 Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
regression. Second, we can estimate both equation (36) and (38) concurrently in a 
system of simultaneous equation using 3 Stage Least Squares (3SLS). While the system 
estimation method with 3SLS is more efficient than the single-equation estimation with 
2SLS, the former implies more effort needed in finding appropriate instrument 
variables. As the 3SLS method uses the information from one equation in estimating the 
other equations in the system, in order to obtain consistent estimates for any equation it 
would require appropriate instrument variables for the endogenous variables in all 
equations in the system. The 2SLS method, by contrast, only requires the appropriate 
instrument variables for the endogenous variables in the equation of interest. 
In this simplest case of the second scenario, to estimate equation (36) we would need to 
find instrument variables for both arbitrage holding and bid premium if 3SLS is 
employed, whereas in case 2SLS is employed, only instrument variables for arbitrage 
holding are needed. In a more general case where we expect that arbitrage holding is 
also determined by arbitrage return and bid outcome variables, to estimate equation 
(33), (36) and (37), we would need instrument variables for 4 variables - arbitrage 
holding, arbitrage return, bid premium, and probability of bid success - if 3SLS is 
chosen but only need instrument variables only for arbitrage holding if 2SLS IS 
employed. 
If finding appropriate instrument variables is an easy task, the straightforward 
estimation option should be 3SLS. However, it is actually a very daunting task 
(Maddala, 1986; Stock et al., 2002). As pointed out by Larcker and Rusticus (2007, 
2008), in most practical applications, the instrument variables are less than ideal, which 
means that the IV estimators are often biased and inconsistent. Such bias and 
inconsistency are magnified through the 3SLS procedure. Thus, Larcker and Rusticus 
(2008) suggest that even when the researcher chooses to use 3SLS, he/she should also 
report the 2SLS result. The result from 3SLS is valid only ifit is similar to the one from 
2SLS. 
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Given the fact that we need to find appropriate instrument variables for fewer 
endogenous variables if 2SLS is employed compared to the circumstance under which 
3SLS is employed (1 versus 4), 2SLS is clearly the better method in our case. 
Furthermore, the dependent variable in equation (37), i.e. the probability of bid success, 
is not observed and needs to be estimated by logistic regression. As logistic regression 
uses a maximum likelihood method rather than the least squares method to estimate the 
coefficients, it is impossible to simultaneously estimate equation (37) with equation (38) 
using 3SLS. As will be discussed in more detail in section 6.5.2, for this equation, a 
variation of 2SLS method can be applied to resolve the endogeneity problem. For all 
these reasons, in this paper, 2SLS will be the preferred method of dealing with the 
possible endogeneity problem. 
In the first scenario, we assume that the endogeneity problem is not present and we can 
apply standard the approach, that is, the OLS and logistic regression, for estimation. In 
the second scenario, the endogeneity problem is assumed and we use the 2SLS 
procedure. To evaluate which of these approaches is appropriate, we need to perform 
statistical test to determine whether endogeneity is present. Larcker and Rusticus (2008) 
suggest that the IV estimators are always less efficient than OLS estimators in the 
absence of endogeneity. In that case, OLS may therefore be adequate. 
The common test for endogeneity is the Hausman (1978) test. As shown by Larcker and 
Rusticus (2008), the validity of Hausman test is contingent on the appropriateness of the 
instrument variables. An appropriate instrument variable has to meet two requirements. 
First, it is not correlated with the error term of the equation. This requirement is 
equivalent to the statement that the instrument variable is exogenous. Second, it has 
non-zero correlation with the endogenous variable. The IV estimators obtained through 
2SLS are consistent as long as both of these requirements are satisfied. Thus, Larcker 
and Rusticus (2008) suggest the first step in the empirical procedure to deal with the 
endogeneity problem is to show that the instrument variables are valid. We describe the 
tests for a valid instrument variable in more detail in section 6.5. In the next section, we 
discuss the set of control variables employed in the equations: (33), (36) and (37). 
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6.3.2 Control variables 
The set of control variables include the factors that can influence the outcome of the 
takeover bid and the market's assessment of the bid outcome. These factors are 
discussed in the bid outcome model in Section 3.4, Chapter 3. In this section, we discuss 
the variable that represents the market's assessment of the bid outcome, that is, the 
arbitrage spread. We also include bid duration as the additional control variable to take 
into account the difference in durations among the takeover bids in the sample. 
Arbitrage Spread (Spread) 
The spread is defined as the percentage difference between the initial offer price and the 
target stock price one day after the bid announcement date. The spread reflects the 
prevailing market wisdom about the bid outcome around the time the bid is announced. 
Brown and Raymond (1986) and Samuelson and Rosenthal (1986) document that the 
movements of post-announcement target share price provide accurate forecast of the 
final outcome of the takeover bid. Jindra and Walkling (2004) perform a comprehensive 
study the information content of the arbitrage spread 2 days after the bid announcement 
date. The study reports that while controlling for other ex ante bid characteristics, the 
spread yields an excellent prediction about the realized terms and outcome of the bid. In 
Particular, successful bids are associated with lower arbitrage spreads; the frequency the 
bid is revised upward is negatively related to the spread; and bid duration is positively 
related to the spread. In around 23% of the cases, the spreads become negative implying 
the market perception of an inadequate offer on the table or the expectation of an 
imminent upward revision by the original bidder or a higher offer from other bidders. 
Bid Duration (Duration) 
This is the only control variable that is unobservable at the bid announcement date. As 
the annualized arbitrage return is also a function of the bid duration, this variable 
accounts for the cross-sectional variation in arbitrage return stemming from the 
difference in bid durations. 
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The description of all variables used in this chapter is presented in Table 6.1. Many of 
variables are already described in Table 3.2, Chapter 3. For convenience, we still 
present in Table 6.1 those variables that have been described in Table 3.2. 
[Insert Table 6.1, page 207 here] 
6.4 Data and sample selection 
6.4.1 Sample of takeover bids 
In this chapter, we use the same sample of takeover bids as the sample employed in the 
testing of the limited arbitrage hypothesis in Chapter 5. The sample selection process is 
reported in Section 3.2.2, Chapter 3. The sample includes 653 UK takeover bids cover 
11 year period from 1997 to 2007. The descriptive statistics for the sample are presented 
in Section 5.3.1, Chapter 5. 
Sources to collect data about the variables used in this chapter are described in Section 
3.2.1, Chapter 3. Next, we focus on the data source and the procedure to identify 
arbitrageurs and their holding. 
6.4.2 Identification of arbitrageurs and their holding 
As there is no database which enumerates the identity of merger arbitrageurs, we follow 
the empirical procedure similar to the one adopted by Baker and Savasoglu (2002) and 
Hsieh and Walkling (2005) to identify arbitrageurs and their holdings of target shares. 
Arbitrageurs are those who actively purchase the target' shares after the bid is 
announced. We only focus on the purchases of the target shares because the investment 
in both cash and stock bids involves a long position in the target stock. Thus, the 
arbitrage holding of target stocks reflects the level of the arbitrageurs' participation in 
the game. We rely on the trading disclosure filings to London Stock Exchange to record 
the purchases of arbitrageurs. 
In the UK, under rule 8.3 of the City Code, any party must disclose all their trades in the 
shares of an entity involved in mergers if the party has interest in 1 % or more of the 
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entity's share. It should be emphasized that as long as a party has interest in 1% or more 
of the target shares, it has to disclose its all trading even if the trading involve as few as 
1 share. The party has to make a filing on the next working day after the date on which 
the trading occurs. We collect all trading disclosure filings under rule 8.3 from Perfect 
Filings database. A sample of the filing under 8.3 of the City Code is presented in 
Appendix 6.1. 
Because the filing has to be made the next day, each filing typically reports all the 
trades on a single day. If a party purchases the target share throughout the merger 
period, it may have to submit dozens of filings. Thus, in case dozens of parties decide to 
buy the target's shares, hundreds of filings will be submitted in a takeover bid. To get 
the number of target's shares that each party purchases in a bid, we need to manually 
pick the figures from each filing and aggregate them. This is an arduous process that 
took us more than 7 months to complete. 
After collecting the holdings of target's shares by all parties in all takeover bids in the 
sample, we follow the procedure suggested by Baker and Savasoglu (2002) and Hsieh 
and Walkling (2005) to identify the arbitrageurs. In particular, we categorize those 
parties who purchase the target's shares after the bid announcement in at least 8 
different bids as arbitrageurs. Since arbitrageurs enter the takeover game to make a 
short-term bet on the outcome of the bid, we discard the parties having long-term 
strategic interest with the bidder or the target firm. Hence, we exclude all parties that 
quote the reason for submitting the filings as being the bidder's or the target's associate. 
After identifying arbitrageurs, we aggregate all purchases of each arbitrageur from the 
bid announcement date to bid resolution date to obtain the arbitrage holding for 
individual arbitrageurs. Next, we aggregate all individual arbitrageurs' holdings in a bid 
to get the total arbitrage position in a bid. We use this aggregate arbitrage holding as our 
measure of arbitrageurs' presence in a takeover bid. We scale the arbitrage holding by 
the number of target's shares outstanding at the bid announcement date. Thus, arbitrage 
holding measures the percentage of target shares purchased by the arbitrage community 
from the bid announcement date to the bid resolution date. 
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The way we collect data about arbitrage holding introduces a downward bias as we only 
record the purchase of those arbitrageurs who own 1% or more of the target's share 
during the takeover period. Those arbitrageurs who own less than 1% of the target's 
shares are excluded from the sample because of non-disclosure33• In other words, our 
sample includes the holdings of only arbitrageurs who cannot hide their arbitrage 
positions due to the UK strict disclosure rules. To the extent that we want to see the 
impact of the UK disclosure rules on the arbitrageurs' ability to influence the bid 
outcome, this downward bias should have little impact on the empirical validity of this 
study. If we find that the holding of the arbitrageurs, who are forced to reveal their 
presence, has no impact on takeover outcome, this piece of evidence would validate the 
prediction. On the other hand, a significant impact would clearly invalidate the 
prediction about takeover regulation. 
6.4.3 Summary statistics 
In this section, we present the descriptive statistics for arbitrage holding and some 
univariate tests to have some initial ideas about the relationship between arbitrage 
holding and bid-related variables. Table 6.2 reports the distribution of arbitrage holding 
and the number of arbitrageurs over the sample period. . 
[Insert Table 6.2, page 209 here1 
As can be seen, there is a huge variation in the distribution of arbitrage holding and the 
number of arbitrageurs across the takeover bids in the sample and across the sample 
period. The mean and median of arbitrage holding is low for the year 1997-2003 
(around 1.3% and 0% for mean and median respectively) and increase remarkably 
during the last 4 years of the sample period (around 4.5% and 1 % for mean and median 
respectively). The fact that mean holding is much greater than the median holding 
indicates that the distribution of this variable is skewed toward some bids with high 
level of arbitrage holding. While in around 25% of the takeover bids, there is no 
-
33 To this extent our measure may understate the true arbitrage position 
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presence of the arbitrageurs, the maximum of arbitrage holding is up to nearly 50% of 
target's shares. 
Table 6.3 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables used in the empirical tests of 
this chapter. We divide the samples into 2 subsamples. The first subsample includes 
observations with arbitrage holding greater than the median holding (the large holding 
subsample) and the second subsample contains the remaining observations (the small 
holding subsample). Descriptive statistics for all variables in these two sub samples as 
well as the result of the tests for the difference in mean and median between these 
subsamples are reported. These simple univariate tests provide us with some insight 
about the relationship between arbitrage holding and bid-related variables. 
[Insert Table 6.3, page 210 here] 
First, we look at the relationship between arbitrage holding and arbitrage excess return, 
bid premium and success rates. These relationships are the focus of the two hypotheses 
proposed in this chapter (Section 6.2). The result in Table 6.3 shows that arbitrage 
return is negatively related to arbitrage holding. Both mean and median of arbitrage 
excess returns are lower for the large holding group than for the small holding group, 
and the difference is statistically significant at 10% level. This result is consistent with 
non-linear relationship between arbitrage return and arbitrage holding. When arbitrage 
holding passes a certain threshold, the relationship becomes negative. In this univariate 
analysis, we do not know whether the relationship is positive when arbitrage holding is 
below the threshold. 
The success rates of the bids in the large holding group are indistinguishable from the 
SUccess rates of the bids in the small holding group. This finding shows that the 
presence of arbitrageurs has little impact on the outcome of the takeover bid. The result 
is consistent with Hypothesis 6.2 about the impact of the UK regulation on the 
arbitrageurs' ability to affect the bid outcome. Due to the stringent UK disclosure rules, 
it is expected that the level of arbitrage holding can hardly affect the outcome of the bid. 
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Interestingly, bid premium seems to be negatively related to arbitrage holding. The 
average premium is lower when arbitrage holding is larger than the median holding and 
the relationship is statistically significant at 5% level. This result runs counter to the 
prediction of Cornelli and Li's (2002) model about the relationship between bid 
premium and arbitrage holding. The result again shows the impact of the takeover 
regulation on the relationship between arbitrage holding and bid-related variables. We 
will explore the reason why the relationship between arbitrage holding and bid premium 
turns negative in more detail in the next section. 
Among the remaining variables, arbitrage holding appears to be negatively related to 
both managerial ownership and large shareholders' ownership of the target firm. The 
level of managerial ownership and large shareholders' ownership is lower for the large 
holding group than for the small holding group and the difference is statistically 
significant at 1 % level. As the managers are the insider and in the best position to be 
informed about the potential outcome of the takeover bid, they would never sell their 
shares if the probability of bid success is high. In such case, they can enjoy the full 
premium rather than giving up the arbitrage spread to the arbitrageurs. Furthermore, 
trading by insiders often trigger disclosure obligation. Thus, the arbitrageurs cannot 
acquire a lot of target shares if the level of managerial ownership is high. This explains 
the negative relationship between arbitrage holding and managerial ownership. The 
negative relationship between arbitrage holding and large shareholders' ownership is, to 
some extent, consistent with the Cornelli and Li's (2002) model. As the discussion in 
Section 2.3.3 shows, the arbitrageurs influence the bid outcome by playing the role of 
the large shareholders. Thus, if the pre-bid ownership structure of the target already 
contains high level of ownership by large shareholders, the arbitrageurs have less room 
to influence the bid. As a result, the arbitrageurs decrease their position when the target 
already has high level of large shareholders' ownership. 
Arbitrage holding is higher for bids with multiple bidders. The multi-bidder situation is 
often associated with higher offer by the original bidder or the rival bidder. thus the 
expected return is greater. The profit-seeking arbitrageurs increase their holding to earn 
higher returns. Arbitrage holding is also higher for those bids that have a termination fee 
clause, for stock bids and bids conducted via scheme of arrangement. There appears to 
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be no relationship between arbitrage holding and whether the bid is hostile or whether 
the bidder and the target are related i.e share the same 3 digit SIC code. 
There is a negative association between arbitrage holding and arbitrage spread one day 
after the bid is announced. The arbitrageurs seem to follow the initial market assessment 
of the bid outcome. The arbitrageurs increase their holding when the spread is narrow 
indicating the market perception of a more likely successful bid or an imminent 
emergence of a rival bidder. Also, they decrease their holding when the market perceive 
low probability of bid success (a wide spread). 
The level of arbitrage holding appears to be positively related to the size of the target 
firm. The percentage of the bids, whose target firms' total asset is greater than £70 
million, is significantly greater for the large holding group than for the small holding 
group. The mean of the target size is also greater for the large holding group, though the 
relation is in opposite direction for median. 
Finally, arbitrage holding is decreasing with toehold and the percentage of target's share 
irrevocably committed. It is quite obvious that the bidder would never sell their stakes 
in the target. The target shareholders, from whom the bidder obtain the irrevocable 
undertaking, also commit to only sell their stakes in the target to the bidder. As a result, 
the higher the level of toehold and the percentage of target's share are, the less target 
shares are available to be acquired by the arbitrageurs. This explains the negative 
relationship between arbitrage holding and toehold and the percentage of target's share 
irrevocably committed. 
6.S Empirical result 
6.5.1 Arbitrage return and arbitrage holding 
In this section, we test Hypothesis 6.1 regarding the relationship between arbitrage 
return and arbitrage holding by estimating equation (33). As the argument in Section 
6.3.1 shows, arbitrage holding and arbitrage return may be jointly determined; in other 
words, arbitrage holding might be the endogenous variable in the equation. The first 
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step of the empirical analysis is to find the appropriate instrument variables for the 
suspected endogenous variables. Since we use 2SLS to obtain the IV estimators, we 
only need to find instrument variables for arbitrage holding. Following Hsieh and 
Walkling (2005), we use In(l + Narbi ) as the instrument variable for arbitrage 
holding, where Narbi is the number of arbitrageurs in bid i and In is the natural 
logarithm. 
A valid instrument variable must meet two requirements: (l) it has zero correlation 
with the error term of the equation; and (2) it has non-zero correlation with arbitrage 
holding. When both these requirements are satisfied, the IV estimators are consistent 
(Wooldridge, 2003). The first requirement warrants that the instrument variable must 
be exogenous. This requirement nevertheless cannot be tested because the error term of 
the structural equation is unobservable. According to Murray (2006), researchers can 
never be certain that the instrument variable is exogenous. He also suggests that since 
the requirement cannot be subject to empirical scrutiny, reasoning should be applied to 
chase away as much doubt as possible. In this study, we argue that the instrument 
variable for arbitrage holding, i.e. the number of arbitrageurs, should have little 
correlation with the error term of equation (33). Since both the number of arbitrageurs 
and arbitrage holding can serve as valid proxy for the presence of arbitrageurs, the 
number of arbitrageurs should affect arbitrage return in a similar way as arbitrage 
holding. As a result, the error term of equation (33), the part of arbitrage return in which 
the impact of arbitrage holding is purged away, should have little correlation with the 
number of arbitrageurs. Thus, even though we are still not sure whether the number of 
arbitrageurs is completely exogenous, our reasoning shows that this is likely to be the 
case. 
As for the second requirement, it can be directly tested with the data .. Larcker and 
Rusticus (2008) argue that the evidence of non-zero correlation between the instrument 
variable and the endogenous variable is generally too weak for the 2SLS IV estimators 
to be superior to the OLS estimators in the presence of endogeneity problem. As we 
Cannot be sure whether the instrument variable is truly exogenous, the second 
requirement should be modified to incorporate that reality. In their simulation analysis, 
Larcker and Rusticus (2008) report that when the instrument variable is weakly 
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correlated with the endogenous variable, even though the correlation is different from 
zero, only a small correlation between the instrument variable and the model's error 
term will cause the 2SLS IV estimator to be more biased than the OLS one and make 
hypothesis testing under 2SLS become invalid. The authors suggest that requirement (2) 
should be modified such that the instrument variable should be highly correlated with 
the endogenous variable. Stated differently, we should find a strong instrument. When 
the instrument variable is strong, the 2SLS estimator is still preferred to OLS even if the 
instrument is semi-endogenous, i.e. has some mild correlation with the error term of the 
model. 
Following such logic, our next step is to perform statistical tests to ensure that the 
number of arbitrageurs In(l + NarbD is a strong instrument variable. We will use the 
result obtained from the first-stage regression in the 2SLS procedure to assess the 
strength of the instrument variable. The standard set-up for the first stage regression is 
to use the endogenous variable, in this case holdingi' as the dependent variable and the 
instrument variable In(l + Narbi ) and the control variables as the independent 
variables. 
The minimum requirement for In(l + Narbi ) to be valid instrument is that the 
coefficient estimate of the variable is different from 0 in the first-stage regression 
(Wooldridge, 2003). The result in Panel A of Table 6.4 clearly shows that 
In (1 + N ar bD passes this requirement. The variable is statistically significant at 1 % 
level. 
[Insert Table 6.4, page 211 here] 
Although the test shows that In(l +NarbD is a valid instrument variable, it does not 
Warrant that the variable is a strong instrument. Stock and Yo go (2005) and Stock, et al 
(2002) develop a formal quantitative benchmark to assess the strength of the instrument 
Variable based on the result of first stage regression. The benchmark set the minimum 
value for the size of the F-statistic on the instrument variable in the first-stage 
regression. In this case when we have one instrument, the F-statistic should be at least 
8.96 so that the finite sample bias from 2SLS is smaller than the bias from OLS and the 
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statistical inferences under 2SLS are valid. When F -statistic falls below the benchmark, 
the instrument variable is considered weak. 
The F-statistic of 230.91 for InC1 + Narbi ) in the first-stage regression is much higher 
than the benchmark value. This clearly shows that InC1 + Narba appears to be a strong 
instrument variable. Another way to look at the strength of the instrument variables and 
evaluate whether 2SLS is preferred to OLS in the presence of endogeneity is to 
calculate the partial R2 between arbitrage holding and InC1 + NarbD in this first stage 
regression. The partial R2 is 41.99%. According to Larcker and Rusticus (2008), the 
size of the partial R2 means that 2SLS is preferable to OLS in the presence of 
endogeneity problem unless the correlation between InC1 + Narbi ) and the error term 
of the equation is more than 0.680 (the square root of 41.99%). This means that OLS is 
only a better choice when the endogeneity problem is present if the instrument variable 
In(1 + NarbD is highly correlated with the error term. As we already argued earlier, 
given that arbitrage holding and the number of arbitrageurs are both the proxies for the 
arbitrageurs' presence in the takeover contest, there should be little correlation between 
the InC1 + NarbD and the model's error term. Thus, in the presence of endogeneity, 
2SLS seems to provide more reliable estimates. 
In the first stage regression, the underlying assumption is that the endogenous variable 
holdingi can be projected linearly on to the set of the exogenous variables. However, 
as argued by Wooldridge (2002), the assumption is only justified as long as the relation 
between the dependent variable and the endogenous regressor is linear. In case the 
relation is non-linear, it is impossible to derive the reduced form equation, in which the 
endogenous regressor is a linear function of the exogenous variables. Thus, if arbitrage 
returns are related to arbitrage holding in a non-linear way as stated in Hypothesis 6.1 
(the coefficient of holdingl in equation (33) is different from 0), the first-stage 
regression with the standard set-up is invalid. 
Wooldridge (2002) suggests a simple solution to the non-linearity issue. We can 
consider the non-linear part of the endogenous variable (holdingl) as an additional 
endogenous variable. If In C1 + NarbD is a good instrument for holdingh then the 
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square of the fitted value of holdingi obtained from the first-stage regression described 
above (fittedholdingl) can serve as the optimal instrument for the holdingl. By 
doing so, the endogenous variable can be projected in a non-linear way onto the set of 
exogenous variables (Wooldridge, 2002). A set of statistical tests in Panel B of Table 
6.4 shows that fittedholdingl is also a strong instrument for holdingl. 
To this stage we obtain the first step in dealing with the potential endogeneity problem 
by finding the appropriate instrument variable for the suspected endogenous variable. 
The next step is to perform the Hausman test on whether the suspected variables are 
truly endogenous. Larcker and Rusticus (2008) suggest that the validity of the test 
hinges on the appropriateness of the instrument variables. This explains our lengthy 
argument in selecting the instrument for the suspected variable. The result of the 
Hausman test is shown in Panel B of Table 6.4. 
The Hausman test indicates that endogeneity may not be a big problem in estimating 
equation (33). The null hypothesis that there is no endogeneity cannot be rejected even 
at 10% significance level. As argued in Section 6.3.1, in the absence of endogeneity 
problem, OLS is the preferred estimation method. The estimation of equation (33) using 
both 2SLS and OLS method is reported in Panel A of Table 6.4. 
The results under both the OLS and 2SLS show a similar pattern. The coefficient 
estimate of holdingi is positive and of holdingl is negative. This result is consistent 
with the fact that arbitrage excess return is related to arbitrage holding in a non-linear 
way as stated in Hypothesis 6.1. Below a certain level of arbitrage holding, arbitrage 
excess return increases with arbitrage holding, but the relationship tum negative when 
arbitrage holding passes that threshold. 
Under the 2SLS specification, both coefficients are not statistically different from O. As 
for the OLS result, holdingt is significant at 10% level and holdingl is significant at 
5%. The fact that the coefficient estimates of holdingt and holdingl are insignificant 
When 2SLS is used but become significant when OLS is used demonstrates that OLS 
estimators are more efficient than 2SLS estimators i.e. have smaller standard errors. As 
the Hausman test does not detect any serious endogeneity problem, we rely on the OLS 
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result. As statistical significance is obtained with the OLS result, the finding provides 
empirical support for Hypothesis 6.1. 
Some of the control variables are significant and provide interesting insights into the 
determinants of merger arbitrage return. Arbitrage excess return is significantly higher 
in hostile bids. The result of estimating the bid outcome model in Section 3.4.2, Chapter 
3 indicates that the target management's hostile attitude toward the bid is one of the 
biggest obstacles to bid success. Thus, the deal completion risk is much higher for the 
investment in those hostile bids. The higher excess return associated with hostile bid 
represent the compensation for the higher risk the arbitrageurs have to face. This result 
is consistent with the result in Chapter 5 showing that idiosyncratic risk, the major part 
of deal completion risk, has significant impact on arbitrage return. By the same token, 
arbitrage excess returns are also significantly higher for those bids with wider spread. 
The spread reflects the market's perception about the outcome of the bid. A wide spread 
implies that the market perceives a lower chance that the bid will complete and hence 
pose greater risk for the arbitrageurs. 
The arbitrage excess return increases when more than one bidder compete to acquire the 
target. For stock bids, as the multi-bidder situation increases the risk for arbitrageurs, a 
higher return is required to make up for the risk. For cash bids, the multi-bidder 
situation is like a boon to arbitrageurs, the risk is reduced but the potential return is 
greater because the bid is more likely to be revised upward34• 
Finally, target size is significantly related to arbitrage returns. In particular, arbitrage 
return is lower in bids with large targets. This evidence is consistent with the fact that 
the marginal investors in the arbitrage game require compensation for bearing 
transaction costs. As the shares of large companies are usually more liquid than those of 
small firms, the transaction costs in trading large firm stock are usually smaller. This 
finding is consistent with the result in Chapter 5 that transaction costs are one of the 
important determinants of the arbitrage excess return. 
34 Please see Section 3.4 for a detailed discussion of why the arbitrageurs view the multi-bidder situation 
differently for stock bids and cash bids. 
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To sum up, we find supporting evidence for Hypothesis 6.1. The arbitrage holding has 
incremental power in explaining the cross~sectional variation of the excess return to the 
merger arbitrage strategy after a host of factors that can determine the bid outcome as 
well as the market's assessment of the bid outcome is controlled for. The finding 
precludes the possibility that arbitrageurs are just naive investors who hold a random 
portfolio of merger stocks. The relationship between arbitrage excess return and 
arbitrage holding is non~linear. Arbitrage return increases with arbitrage holding when 
arbitrage holding is below a certain threshold but decreases with arbitrage holding when 
arbitrage holding passes the threshold. 
6.5.2 Bid outcome variables and arbitrage holding 
Under Hypothesis 6.2, due to the UK's strict disclosure rules during takeover period, 
the arbitrageurs in the UK should hardly be able to influence the outcome of the bid. 
Thus, we expect that arbitrage holding has little impact on bid premium and the 
. probability of bid success. 
A. Bid premium 
In order to examine the impact of arbitrage holding on bid premium, we estimate 
equation (36). As arbitrage holding might be endogenously related to bid premium, we 
repeat the procedure conducted in the previous section. The first step is to find an 
appropriate instrument variable for arbitrage holding. This step is fortunately completed 
as we already demonstrated extensively in the previous section that In (1 + Narbi ) is a 
good instrument variable for arbitrage holding. The large F-statistic of the first-stage 
regression (more than 200) reported in Panel B of Table 6.5 confirms the strength of 
this instrument variable. 
[Insert Table 6.5, page 214 here} 
Following the argument from Larcker and Rusticus (2008), when a strong instrument 
Variable is available, we can proceed to the Hausman test for the presence of 
endogeneity problem. The test statistic reported in Panel B of Table 6.5 is 0.78 
indicating that the null hypothesis that arbitrage holding is exogenous variable cannot 
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be rejected; hence endogeneity does not appear to be a serious problem. When the 
regressor is exogenous, OLS is the preferred method to estimation equation (36). The 
estimation result using both OLS and 2SLS are reported in Panel A of Table 6.5. 
The result shows a statistically negative relationship between bid premium and arbitrage 
holding under both OLS and 2SLS method. With OLS, the relation is highly significant 
at 1 % level; with 2SLS, it is significant only at 5% level. The OLS result seems to show 
stronger relationship because OLS estimator is generally more efficient than 2SLS 
estimator. The negative relationship between bid premium and arbitrage holding is 
consistent with the result in the univariate analysis in Section 6.4.3. 
The result is in stark contrast with the prediction of Cornelli and Li's (2002) model, 
upon which the theoretical argument for the interaction between arbitrage holding and 
bid outcome variables is grounded. Their model predicts that as the bidder likes to 
attract more arbitrageurs into the game to solve the free-rider problem, it would offer a 
high offer ex ante or revise the offer upward. Thus, according to the model, there should 
be a positive relationship between arbitrage holding and bid premium. To reconcile the 
contradictory empirical results, we need to look at the basic premise of the model. The 
model assumes that arbitrageurs can hide their identity in the takeover game. Because 
there is inherent uncertainty regarding whether the arbitrageurs will come into the game 
to solve the free-rider problem, the bidder needs to make high pre-emptive bid or revise 
the bid upward in order to attract more arbitrageurs so that the bid can succeed and it 
can make a positive profit. 
The UK's strict disclosure rule makes the assumption that arbitrageurs are anonymous 
rather tenuous. As argued in Section 6.2.2, compared to the US, where the positive 
relationship between arbitrage holding and bid premium is reported (Hsieh and 
Walkling, 2005), the UK disclosure rules are much more stringent. Thus, it is quite hard 
for the arbitrageurs in the UK to trade in target stocks without revealing their identity. 
In case the arbitrageurs are involved in the game and the bidder knows about that, it has 
no incentive to offer high bid to attract more arbitrageurs into the game. Even worse, 
When it knows that all those short-term arbitrageurs are likely to be involved in the 
game, it might even lower its offer price because if it walks away the arbitrageurs will 
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bum their fingers. In this case, the bidder, instead of increasing the offer price to attract 
the arbitrageurs, may actually decrease the offer price if it is aware of the presence of 
arbitrageurs in the game. This may help explain the observed negative relationship. 
The direct corollary of this argument is that the premia in those bids where the bidder is 
more likely to know about the presence of arbitrageurs before the bid announcement 
date will be lower than the premia in other bids. To test this corollary, we take a closer 
look at the definition of the term 'offer period', during which the strict disclosure 
threshold of 1 % under Rule 8.3 of the City Code is applied. As reviewed by Kenyon-
Slade (2004, p608), the offer period is defined as the period from the time when the 
announcement is made of a proposed or possible offer (with or without terms) until the 
date when the offer becomes or is declared unconditional as to acceptances or lapses. 
Based on this definition, the offer period starts before the announcement of the terms of 
the offer. The announcement date we use in this study is the date on which all terms of 
the offer are publicly disclosed not just the announcement of a possible offer. Thus, the 
arbitrageurs are bound by the disclosure obligation under Rule 8.3 of the City Code 
even before the announcement date. 
If the arbitrageurs trade before the terms of the bid are publicly announced and are 
obliged to disclose their trades under rule 8.3 of the City Code, the bidder would know 
about the presence of arbitrageurs well in advance. Thus, if our conjecture about the 
impact of the UK strict disclosure on the relationship between bid premium and 
arbitrage holding is correct, the premium will be lower for those bids, in which the 
bidder knows about the arbitrageurs' presence before the bidder has to announce the 
terms of the offer. 
The possibility that arbitrageurs acquire target stock before the bid announcement is 
also reported in previous studies. Larcker and Lys (1987) find that in 3 out of 111 bids, 
the arbitrageurs buy target share before the terms of the bid are announced. In a survey 
of 21 arbitrageurs, Moore et al (2006) find that 43% of these arbitrageurs admit that 
they, to some extent, also invest in unannounced transactions. The way that Hsieh and 
Walkling (2005) and Baker and Savasoglu (2002) identify arbitrageurs based on the 
change in holding from the quarter before the bid announcement date to the quarter after 
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the bid announcement date also does not preclude the possibility that arbitrageurs 
acquire target shares before the offer terms are disclosed. 
In our sample, there are 187 bids, in which the arbitrageurs need to reveal their identity 
before the bidder announces the offer terms. As nearly 30% of the sample bid, the 
bidder knows pretty well that the short-term arbitrageurs are in the game before it needs 
to announce the offer price, he may decide to lower the price. This helps explain the 
negative relationship between bid premium and the presence of arbitrageurs. 
To further investigate this relationship, we compare the bid premium of those 187 bids 
with the rest of the sample. On average the bid premia of those bids are 6% lower than 
those of the other bids and the difference is statistically significant at 5% level. To test 
whether such difference are still robust when other factors that affect bid premia are 
controlled for, we add a dummy variable DiscloseBefore, which is equal to 1 if the 
arbitrageurs have to disclose their trading before the official bid announcement and 
equal to 0 otherwise, to the model. If the conjecture about the impact of the disclosure 
rules on the relationship between bid premium and arbitrage holding is correct, the 
coefficient estimate of the new dummy variable should be negative. The result in Panel 
A of Table 6.5 shows that this is really the case. The coefficient estimate of variable 
DiscloseBefore is negative and marginally significant at 5% level. Thus, the impact is 
robust in multivariate context. 
To provide further insight into this issue, we re-estimate equation (36) in two 
subsamples. The first one includes 187 bids in which the arbitrageurs have to reveal 
their position before the bid announcement; and the second one include the rest of the 
sample. As shown in Panel A of Table 6.5 , in the first subsample, arbitrage holding is 
negatively related to bid premium and the relationship is statistically significant at 5% 
level, while in the second subsample the relationship is not significant. This result 
confirms the conjecture about the impact of the disclosure rules on the relationship 
between bid premium and arbitrage holding. 
The significance and sign of the impact of some of the control variables are also of 
interest. Whether the bid has multiple bidders appears to be one of the most important· 
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determinants of bid premium. The premia for bids with more than one bidder are 
approximately 20% higher than those with single bidder and the difference is significant 
at 1 % level. This result is consistent with the large body of empirical evidence about the 
impact of competition among rival bidders on bid premium (Eckbo, 2009). For 
example, Eckbo and Langohr (1989) document that the bid premium increases 
substantially after the introduction of the mandatory disclosure rule and the requirement 
that the offer must be open for minimum 4 weeks in the French context. The reason is 
that such regulation makes the bid more transparent and open for longer period, thereby 
attracting more rival bidders into the game. Schwert (1996) also document similar 
result in the US context. 
As the discussion in Section 3.4.1 indicates, while toehold is expected to have positive 
relation with bid premium, the result turns out to be negative in our sample. While the 
result is inconsistent with the argument that bidder can offer high premium if he has 
acquired large toehold in the target firm because such premium needs only be paid for 
the remaining shares. This can be called the toehold-related-overbidding hypothesis 
(Singh, 1998). However, as argued by Eckbo (2009), toehold also deters the arrival of 
new bidders as they may expect that it is difficult for them to win the contest. Because 
of such entry deterrence effect, toehold lowers bid premium. The evidence in this paper 
is consistent with this entry deterrence argument. Betton and Eckbo (2000) and Betton, 
et al. (2008) also report similar result. Since the number of shares irrevocably 
committed is expected to have similar impact as toehold, this explains why this variable 
is negatively related to bid premium. This also supports the entry deterrence argument. 
Finally, bid premium is significantly higher in a cash offer than in a stock offer. This 
result is consistent with the informat~on theory about the choice of payment method and 
the result reported by Betton, et al. (2008). Under the theory, a bidder chooses a stock 
offer in case it is uncertain about the true value of the target. In this case, he can 
underpay the target because any value enhancement later can be shared by both parties. 
However, a cash offer that undervalues the target will be rejected as the target 
shareholders have no involvement in the post-takeover firm. 
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In summary, the result for those control variables appears to be consistent with the 
extant literature. Arbitrage holding appears to be negatively related to bid premium. The 
negative relationship stems from the strict UK disclosure rule applied during the offer 
period. 
B. Probability of bid success 
In this section, we examine the impact of arbitrage holding on the probability that the 
bid will consummate by estimating equation (37). Similar to the previous sections, our 
first concern is the endogeneity problem and the first step to deal with this problem is to 
find an appropriate instrument variable for arbitrage holding, the suspected endogenous 
variable. The discussion in the previous sections indicates that In(l + Narba is a 
strong instrument for arbitrage holding. As reported in Panel B of Table 6.6, the size of 
the F-statistics of In(l + Narbt) (214.31) in the first stage regression under 2SLS is 
much larger than the critical value (8.96) confirms the strength of this intrument 
variable. 
[Insert Table 6.5, page 214 here] 
As long as the strong intrument variable is identified, we can perform the Hausman test 
on the presence of the endogeneity problem. The result of the test is reported in Panel B 
of Table 6.6. With the test statistic of only 1.65, the null hypothesis that arbitrage 
holding is exogenous variable cannot be rejected even at 10% significance level. 
Since the endogeneity problem does not appear be serious, we can estimate equation 
(37) using logistic regression. This logistic regression is similar to the one employed in 
Section 3.4 to estimate the bid outcome model. To recap, the dependent variable of the 
logistic regression is the outcome indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the bid is 
successful and 0 otherwise. From the arbitrageurs' perspective, a cash bid is successful 
when the target is acquired, and a stock bid is successful when the target is acquired by 
the bidder whose stocks are shorted by the arbitrageurs. The independent variables 
include arbitrage holding and the set of control variables discussed in Section 6.3.2. 
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Alongside with logistic regression we also employ the least square estimation methods 
as shown in the previous sections. In particular, we perfonn the 2SLS estimation using 
InC1 + Narba as the instrument variable for arbitrage holding. We also report the OLS 
result for comparison. As the depenent variable in equation (37) is the probabilty of bid 
success, the major shortcoming of the least square method is that fitted value of the 
dependent varilabe may go beyond the [0,1] inveval. Consequently, the least square 
methods do not accurately model the probability of bid success. Despite this 
shortcoming with the least square method, Wooldridge (2003) suggests that the 
coefficient estimates under the least square methods are still consistent and can be valid 
for inference. According to the author, in applied work, it is acceptable to present the 
least square analysis of a linear probability model. When comparing the least square 
result with the one from the logistic regression result, we can see that they are very 
similar. The result using both the logistic regression and the least square methods is 
reported in Panel A of Table 6.6. 
The results under the OLS, 2SLS and the logistic regression are similar. The coefficient 
esitmates of the variable holding are negative and statistically insignificant in all 
estimation methods. The finding indicates that arbitrage holding has no impact on the 
the probability of bid success. In other words, the arbitrageurs have little ability to 
influence the outcome of the bid. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 6.2 and 
indicates that the UK strict disclosure rule during the offer period has substantial impact 
on the interaction between the arbitrageurs' stakes in the target finn and the outcome of 
the takeover bid. 
The characteristics of the control variables are gennerally consistent with the extant 
literature. The behaviours of all these variables are discussed in Section 3.4.2, Chapter 3 
about the result of the bid outcome model. 
In summary, our finding on the relationship between arbitrage holding and the 
probability of bid success provides support for Hypothesis 6.2. Due to the UK strict 
disclosure rule, there is little chance for the arbitrageurs to exert influence on the 
outcome of the bid to their advantage. 
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6.6 Chapter summary 
Utilizing a manually collected dataset to identify arbitrageurs and their holding of the 
target stocks, this chapter performs empirical tests of the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis. 
In particular, we examine the roles that arbitrageurs play in the takeover process and the 
impact of these roles on the arbitrage excess return. Previous studies in the US market 
show that the arbitrageurs are superior in selecting the takeover bids for their portfolio, 
the investment in which would yield higher risk-adjusted return. We find similar 
evidence in this chapter. The arbitrageurs' holding of the target stocks is positively 
related to arbitrage excess return when arbitrage holding is below a certain threshold 
and is negatively related to arbitrage excess return when arbitrage holding surpasses that 
threshold. The relationship between arbitrage holding and arbitrage excess return holds 
when a host of factors that can determine the bid outcome and the market's assessment 
of the bid outcome are controlled for. This indicates that arbitrageurs are better than the 
average investors in the market in picking the best bids for the arbitrage portfolios. 
In addition to the 'stock picking' ability, the extant US evidence also document that 
arbitrageurs have the ability to exert influence on the outcome and terms of the takeover 
bid. Hsieh and Walkling (2005) report that arbitrage holding is positively associated 
with bid premium and the probability of bid success. The finding is consistent with the 
theoretical prediction propounded by Comelli and Li (2002). The theoretical model is, 
however, predicated on the assumptions that arbitrageurs have the ability to hide their 
identity during their trading with other investors. We argue that due to the stringent 
disclosure rules during the takeover period under the UK Takeover Code, this 
assumption is less likely to hold in the UK context. Thus, if the assumption is of great 
importance, our result regarding the _ relationship between arbitrage holding and bid 
premium and the probability of bid success is expected to be different from the result of 
the US study by Hsieh and Walkling (2005). We find that this is indeed the case. 
In contrast to Hsieh and Walkling's (2005) finding, we report a significant negative 
relationship between the arbitrage holding and bid premium. The fact that the strict UK 
disclosure laws force the arbitrageurs to reveal their trading position too soon 
contributes to this relationship. If the bidder knows that the short-term arbitrageurs are 
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already in the game, it would have no incentive to raise the offer price ex ante or revise 
the bid upward ex post to attract more arbitrageurs into the contest as predicted by 
Comelli and Li (2002). In fact, the bid premia in those bids, where the arbitrageurs have 
to reveal themselves before the bid announcement date, are significantly lower than the 
premia in those bids, where the arbitrageurs do not have to. Finally, we find that 
arbitrage holding is not significantly related to the probability of bid success. The 
different results in the UK context comparing to the US confirm the importance of the 
anonymity assumption and the impact of the takeover regulation on the arbitrageurs' 
ability to influence the bid outcome. 
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Table 6.1: Description of variables for the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis 
Variable name 
holding 
Outcome 
Premium 
Hostile 
MultiBidders 
ManOwn 
Description 
holding is arbitrage holding measured as the percentage of target shares acquired by the arbitrageurs 
from the bid announcement date to bid resolution date. Arbitrageurs are defined as those who 
purchase the target shares after the bid is announced in at least 8 takeover bids in the sample 
Outcome is the bid outcome indicator variable, which is equal to 1 if the bid is successful and 0 
otherwise. A cash bid is considered to be successful when the target is acquired. A stock bid is 
considered to be successful when the bidder, whose stocks are shorted by the arbitrageurs, acquires 
the target. 
Premium is the bid premium measure as the sum of run up and markup. Runup is the cumulative 
abnormal return to the target shares for trading days (-40,-1) before the bid announcement date. 
Markup is computed as (FP - P-1)fP-1 where P-1 is the target stock price one day prior to the bid 
announcement date and FP is the final offer price 
Hostile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the bid is hostile and 0 otherwise. Hostile 
measures the mood of the offer. 
MultiBidders is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if two or more bidders are competing to 
takeover one target and 0 otherwise. 
M anOwn is the managerial ownership measured as the percentage of target share directly owned by 
the target managers and their family. Managerial ownership is obtained from the target firm's most 
recent annual report prior to the bid announcement. 
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Data source 
Perfect Filings 
SDC 
SDC, Datastream 
SDC 
SDC 
Perfect Filings 
(Annual reports) 
Variable name 
LargeOwn 
Stock 
Toehold 
Irrevocable 
Scheme 
Termination 
TargetSize 
SizeTest 
Relatedness 
Description 
LargeOwn is the large shareholders' ownership measured as the percentage of target shares 
owned by the parties who have interest in 3% or more of the target shares. Large 
shareholders' ownership is obtained from the target firm's most recent annual report prior to 
the bid announcement. 
Stock is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the bidder stocks are used to pay for the target 
stocks and 0 otherwise. This variable represents the bid's method of payment 
Toehold is the percentage of target shares owned by the bidder at the bid announcement date 
Irrevocable is the percentage of target shares that a shareholder or a group of shareholders of the 
target frrm commit to tender to the bidder 
Scheme is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the bid is conducted via a scheme of arrangement 
and 0 otherwise. 
Termination is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the target agrees to pay the bidder the 
termination fee and 0 otherwise 
Data source 
Perfect Filings 
(Annual reports) 
SDC 
SDC 
SDC 
SDC 
SDC 
TargetSize is the market value of target equity at the bid announcement date in 2007 GBP. The UK D 
Consumer Price Index - All Urban: All items is used to convert target size to 2007 value. atastream 
SizeTest is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the target's total asset at the bid announcement 
date is more than £70 million and 0 otherwise. 
Relatedness is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the bidder and the target share the same 3-
digit SIC code and 0 otherwise. 
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SDC 
SDC 
Table 6.2: Distribution of arbitrage holding and the number of arbitrageurs over the sample period 
Years Number of arbitrageurs Holdings 
Mean 25% 50010 75% Max Mean 25% 50010 75% Max 
1997 0.9 0.0 0.0 1.0 8.0 1.98% 0.00% 0.00% 0.84% 39.52% 
1998 1.3 0.0 0.0 2.0 13.0 1.23% 0.00% 0.00% 1.53% 8.10% 
1999 1.3 0.0 0.0 2.0 11.0 1.17% 0.00% 0.00% 1.12% 9.45% 
2000 2.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 10.0 1.94% 0.00% 0.01% 2.53% 16.97% 
2001 1.3 0.0 0.0 2.0 8.0 1.22% 0.00% 0.00% 2.54% 6.48% 
2002 1.2 0.0 0.0 1.0 8.0 1.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.94% 11.56% 
2003 2.4 0.0 1.0 3.0 20.0 1.75% 0.00% 0.06% 1.93% 13.85% 
2004 3.8 0.0 1.0 7.0 16.0 4.76% 0.00% 0.64% 6.13% 38.89% 
2005 3.5 0.0 1.5 5.0 15.0 4.84% 0.00% 0.81% 7.42% 35.57% 
2006 4.3 0.0 2.0 6.0 23.0 4.56% 0.00% 1.85% 7.34% 29.09% 
2007 3.7 1.0 2.0 4.5 21.0 4.38% 0.04% 1.00% 4.37% 49.70% 
Complete sample 2.5 0.0 1.0 3.0 23.0 2.73% 0.00% 0.05% 3.07% 49.70% 
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Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the arbitrageurs' role 
hypothesis. All variables are defined in Table 6.1. The statistics are reported for the whole 
sample and for two subsamples. The first subsample includes observations with arbitrage 
holding is greater than the median holding and the other includes the remaining observations. 
The result of the tests for the difference in mean and median between these two subsamples is 
also reported. 
All Greater than Less than Difference 
Variable 
Median Holding Median Holing 
Mean Mean Mean Mean 
[Median] [Median] [Median] [Median] 
Managerial Ownership 11.06% 6.43% 15.67% -9. 24%**-
[3.23%] [1.37%] [7.55%] [-6.19%]*** 
Large shareholders' ownership 38.5% 36.29% 40.71% -4.43%*** 
[39.65%) [37.59%) (41.9%) [-4.31%)*** 
% of stock bids 19.3% 21.47% 17.13% 4.35%* 
% of successful bids 89.13% 88.2% 90.05% -1.85% 
% having termination fee 10.57% 13.5% 7.65% 5.85%*** 
% with multiple bidders 15.16% 22.7% 7.65% 15.05%*** 
% of hostile bids 6.43% 6.44% 6.42% 0.02% 
% with scheme of arrangement 10.26% 16.56% 3.98% 12.59%*** 
% with target's total asset> £70 47.63% 69.33% 25.99% 43.33%*** 
% with the same 3-digit SIC code 27.72% 27.91% 27.52% 0.39% 
Toehold 4.57% 3.25% 5.88% -2.63%*** 
[0%) [0%) [0%) [0%]** 
Irre\Ocable Undertaking 16.55% 11.8% 21.28% -9.48%**" 
(0%) [0%) (1.54%) [-1.54%)*** 
Target size (£2007) 377.6529 705.8028 50.5065 655.2963*** 
[59.1347) [24.0228] [178.3138] [-154.291]*** 
Arbitrage Spread 1.69% 0.98% 2.4% -1.42%**" 
[1.54%] (1.01%] (2.08%] [-1.07%]*** 
Annualized Excess Retums 16.32% 12.09% 20.54% -8.46%* 
[7.39%] [6.6%) [9.3%} [-2.7%]* 
Premium 35.79% 32.95% 38.63% -5.68%*" 
[28.88%] [29.23%] (28.34%] [0.89%] 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1 % levels, respectively 
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Table 6.4: The relationship between arbitrage holding and arbitrage return 
This table presents the estimation result of equation (33), which shows the relationship between 
the arbitrage holding and arbitrage return. All variables are defined in Table 6.1. fittedholing 
is the predicted value of holding in the first-stage regression, in which holding is regressed 
against all other exogenous variables. Panel A reports the regression result. Panel B reports the 
F-statistic of the instrument variable In (1 + Narb{), fittedholing 2 , the partial R2 between 
In (1 + Narb) and holding, the partial R2 between fittedholing 2 and holding2 in the first-
stage regression under 2SLS and the result of Hausman test.. The figures in the parentheses in 
Panel A are the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors; the ones in Panel B are the p-value 
of the test statistics. 
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Panel A: Regression result 
First stage regression 2SLS OLS 
Intercept -0.0306* -0.0053 -0.1033 
(0.0158) (0.4233) (0.4388) 
Holding 2.9676 3.1792* 
(3.4606) (1.6846) 
Holding squared -4.5988 -10.2877** 
(12.5189) (4.6615) 
In(l+Narb) 0.0459*** 
(0.0032) 
LargeOwn 0.0079 0.1968 0.1936 
(0.0099) (0.2192) (0.2304) 
ManOwn 0.0083 0.0592 0.0637 
(0.0130) (0.2268) (0.2472) 
Hostile -0.0024 0.5716*** 0.5568*** 
(0.0071) (0.1672) (0.1687) 
Spread -0.0264 1.7210** 1.6617** 
(0.0234) (0.7734) (0.7738) 
MultiBiddersxStock 0.0362*** 1.5300"* 1.5931*** 
(0.0140) (0.5210) (0.4970) 
MultiBiddersxCash 0.0189*** 0.3877*** 0.4271*** 
(0.0053) (0.1013) (0.0977) 
Toehold 0.0188 -0.1866 -0.1749 
(0.0157) (0.2272) (0.2302) 
Irrevocable 0.0046 -0.0287 -0.0287 
(0.0078) (0.1205) (0.1212) 
Scheme 0.0119** -0.0485 -0.0398 
(0.0059) (0.1135) (0.1104) 
Stock -0.0011 -0.0611 -0.0588 
(0.0046) (0.1036) (0.1025) 
Termination 0.0017 0.0064 0.0219 
(0.0056) (0.0727) (0.0749) 
I n(TargetSize) -0.0041** -0.1067** -0.0971** 
(0.0018) (0.0489) (0.0441) 
SizeTest -0.0043 -0.0586 -0.0630 
(0.0045) (0.0778) (O.0783) 
Relatedness -0.0015 -0.0950 -0.1001 
(0.0038) (0.0761) (0.0770) 
In(Duration) 0.0076** 0.1006 0.1176 
(0.0033) (0.0173) (0.0792) 
Adjusted R2 0.455 0.135 0.145 
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Panel B: Other tests for the endogenous varaibles 
F~statistic-ln(l+Narb) 
F~statistic - fittedholding 2 
Partial R2 -In (l+Narb) 
Partial R2 -fitted holding 2 
Hausman test 
230.91 
92.56 
0.4199 
0.2249 
2.15 
(0.3406) 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1 % levels, respectively 
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Table 6.5: Bid premium and arbitrage holding 
This table presents the estimation result of equation (36) which shows the relationship between 
bid premium and arbitrage holding. DiscloseBefore is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
arbitrageurs need to disclose their trading positions before the bid announcement date 
and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 6.1. Panel A reports the regression 
result. Panel B reports the F-statistic of the instrument variable In (1 + Narb), the partial R2 
between In (1 + Narb) and holding in the first-stage regression under 2SLS and the result of 
Hausman test. The figures in the parentheses in Panel A are the heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors; the ones in Panel B are the p-value of the test statistics. 
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Panel A: Regression result 
Full sample Sub-sample 
2SLS (I) 2SLS (II) OLS (I) OLS (II) OLS - Before OLS after 
Intercept 0.524*" 0.535*** 0.532*** 0.534*** 0.335** 0.550*" 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.047) (0.000) 
Holding -1.219** -0.590 -0.752*** -0.647** -0.628* -0.834** 
(0.030) (0.326) (0.002) . (0.011) (0.062) (0.026) 
DiscloseBefore -0.0764** -0.0754** 
(0.019) (0.015) 
LargeOwn -0.0290 -0.0206 -0.0223 -0.0214 -0.0470 -0.00144 
(0.737) (0.808) (0.795) (0.802) (0.780) (0.989) 
ManOwn -0.176 -0.117 -0.167 -0.178 -0.315 -0.152 
(0.199) (0.194) (0.225) (0.195) (0.132) (0.347) 
Hostile 0.0286 0.0187 0.0326 0.0185 -0.0866 0.0356 
(0.627) (0.752) (0.586) (0.758) (0.162) (0.618) 
MultiBidders 0.218*** 0.204*** 0.203*** 0.206*** 0.229*** 0.174** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) 
Toehold -0.423*** -0.435*** -0.432*** -0.434*** -0.412** -0.437*** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.019) (0.004) 
Irrevocable -0.130* -0.132* -0.127* -0.132* -0.0255 -0.166* 
(0.087) (0.079) (0.096) (0.082) (0.825) (0.074) 
Scheme -0.0627 -0.0837 -0.0732 -0.0823* -0.0632 -0.0848 
(0.210) (0.100) (0.125) (0.087) (0.361) (0.182) 
Stock -0.104*** -0.114*** -0.107*** -0.113*** -0.0442 -0.129*** 
(0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.526) (0.009) 
Termination -0.0564 -0.0528 -0.0597 -0.0526 -0.0323 -0.0684 
(0.170) (0.191) (0.143) (0.198) (0.596) (0.218) 
In(TargetSize) -0.0153 -0.0161 -0.0205* -0.0155 0.00612 -0.0182 
(0.213) (0.195) (0.067) (0.172) (0.787) (0.178) 
Adjusted R2 0.061 0.070 0.065 0.070 0.107 0.048 
N 653 653 653 653 187 466 
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F-statistic-ln(l+Narb) 
Partial R2 -In (l+Narb) 
Hausman test 
Panel B: Other tests for the endogenous varaibles 
~--- .. ~ .. -- ~-~ ~"~.-," .. ~- - ~-~~ -
2SLS (I) 
219.93 
0.2555 
0.78 
(0.3768) 
*, * *, * * * indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1 % levels, respectively 
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2SLS (II) 
207.42 
0.2448 
0.01 
(0.9164) 
Table 6.6: Probability of bid success and arbitrage holding 
This table presents the estimation result of equation (37) which shows the relationship between 
the probability of bid success and arbitrage holding. All variables are defined in Table 6.1. 
Panel A reports the regression result. Panel B reports the F-statistic of the instrument variable 
In (1 + Narb), the partial R2 between In (1 + Narb) and holding in the first-stage regression 
under 2SLS and the result of Hausman test. The figures in the parentheses in Panel A are the 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors; the ones in Pane] B are the p-value of the test 
statistics. 
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Panel A: Regression result 
Logistic Regression OLS 2SLS 
Intercept 3.5138*** 0.9992*** 0.9897*** 
(0.8551) (0.0529) (0.0544) 
Holding -1.2471 -0.0174 -0.5184 
(2.7369) (0.3002) (0.5019) 
largeOwn -0.3557 -0.0024 -0.0095 
(0.8390) (0.0594) (0.05n) 
ManOwn 0.2876 0.0020 O.OOBO 
(1.4259) (0.0638) (0.0613) 
Hostile -1.B061*** -0.3119*** -0.3173*** 
(0.4495) (0.0782) (0.0770) 
Spread -1.3900 -0.1169 -0.1081 
(3. 9717} (0.3092) (0.30n) 
MultiBiddersxStock -2.5841*** -0.4819*** -0.4611*** 
(0.8449) (0.1146) (0. 1260} 
MultiBiddersxCash 1.5854*** 0.1079*** 0.1229*** 
(0.5920) (0.0312) (0.0345) 
Toehold 1.2359 0.1064 0.1078 
(1.2422) (0.0934) (0.0920) 
Irrevocable 4.5285*** 0.1908*** 0.1884*** 
(1.4484) (0.0419) (0.0427) 
Scheme 1.04BO 0.0759*'" 0.08n"'* 
(0.6403) (0.0371) (0.0400) 
Stock -0.4233 -0.0428 -0.0401 
(0.3814) (0.0360) (0.0359) 
Termination 0.2301 0.0149 0.0185 
(0.6423) (0.0286) (0.0291) 
In(TargetSize) -0.2842** -0.0283** -0.0226* 
(0. 1417} (O.Ol1S) (0.0121) 
SizeTest -0.1714 -0.0032 -0.0034 
(0.3995) (0.0275) (0.0273) 
Relatedness -0.5133 -0.0433 -0.0458* 
(0.3231) (0.0267) (0.0264) 
PseudO/Adjusted RZ 0.267 0.205 0.199 
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Panel B: Other tests for the endogenous varaibles 
F-statistic -In(l+Narb) 
Partial R2 -In (l+Narb) 
Hausman test 
2SLSmethod 
214.31 
0.2512 
1.65 
(0.1993) 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1% levels, respectively 
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Appendix 6.1: A Sample of Rule 8.3 Filing 
RIS from Perfect Information Ltd 
Application Copyright 1995 Perfect Infonnation Ltd 
INumber: 19748F .. .... .... . , .'W' .' •.... ....,\Date,;jl~/~q/2.Q97. 
!q()ll1pany :.!STA -r:E:. STR?ET.GLOBr\.I-,r\.~Y~~()~~·ITill1~.:115:~~:?w~ .... ' 
Rule 8.3 .. isoft group 
RNS Number:9748F 
State Street Global Advisors 
18 October 2007 
FORM 8.3 
DEALINGS BY PERSONS WITH INTERESTS IN SECURITIES REPRESENTING 1% OR 
MORE 
(Rule 8.3 of the City Code on Takeovers & Mergers) 
1. KEY INFORMATION 
State Street Name of Person 
Dealing (Note 1) 
Company Dealt In 
Global Advisors & Affiliates 
iSOFT Group PLC 
Class of Relevant Security 
to Which the Dealings 
Being Disclosed 
Relate (Note 2) 
Date of Dealing 
Ord 
17/10/2007 
2. INTERESTS, SHORT POSITIONS & RIGHTS TO SUBSCRIBE 
(a) Interests & Short Positions (following dealing) in 
the Class of Relevant Security Dealt In (Note 3) 
Class of Relevant Security: Long 
Number % 
(l) Relevant Securities 2405457 1.04795 
(2) Derivatives 390466 0.17011 
0.00000 
other than options 
(3) Options & 
Agreements to 
Purchase/Sell 
Total 2795923 1. 21806 
0.00000 
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Short 
Number 
0 
0 
% 
(b) Interests & Short Positions in Relevant Securities of the Company 
(ex.Class Dealt In) (Note 3) 
Class of Relevant Security: Long 
Number % 
Short 
Number 
(1) Relevant Securities 
(2) Derivatives 
other than options 
(3) Options & 
Agreements to 
Purchase/Sell 
Total 
(c) Rights to Subscribe (Note 3) 
Class of Relevant Security: Details 
3. DEALINGS (Note 4) 
(a) Purchases & Sales 
Purchase / 
Sale 
BUY 
BUY 
BUY 
Number of 
Securities 
390466 
29509 
18354 
Price 
per Unit 
0.69 
0.69 
0.69 
(b) Derivatives Transactions (other than options) 
Product Name (e.g. CFD) 
CFD 
Long/Short 
(Note 6) 
LONG 
No./Securites 
(Note 7) 
390466 
Price/Unit 
(Note 5) 
0.69 
(c) Options Transactions in Respect of Existing Securities 
(i) Writing, Selling, Purchasing or Varying 
Product Name 
Type 
(eg call option) 
(e.g. USA, 
European etc) 
Expiry Date 
Write, Sell No/Securities 
Purchasing, Which the 
Varying etc. Optn Relates 
Relates-Note7 
Option Money 
Paid/Received 
per Unit 
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Exercise 
Price 
% 
(H) Exercising 
Product Name 
(eg call option) 
(Note 5) 
Number of 
Securities 
Exercise 
Price per 
Unit (Note 5) 
(d) Other Dealings (including new securities) (Note 4) 
Nature of Transaction 
(Note 8) 
4. OTHER INFORMATION 
Details Price / Unit 
if applicable 
(Note 5) 
(a) Agreements, Arrangements or Understandings Relating to Options or 
Derivatives 
Full details of any agreement, arrangement or understanding between 
the person 
disclosing & any other person relating to the voting rights of any 
relevant 
securities under any option referred to on this form or relating to 
the voting 
rights or future acquisition or disposal of any relevant securities to 
which 
any derivative referred to on this form is referenced. 
If none, this should be stated. 
Is a Supplemental Form 8 Attached? (Note 9) 
NO 
Disclosure Date 
Contact Name 
Telephone Number 
If Connected EFM 
Name of Offeree/Offeror 
With Which Connected 
If Connected EFM 
State Nature of 
Connection (Note 10) 
18/10/2007 
Harshil Naik 
020 7698 6213 
N/A 
N/A 
Notes: , 
The Notes on Form 8.3 can be viewed on the 
Takeover Panel's website at www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk 
This information is provided by RNS 
END 
The company news service from the London Stock Exchange 
RETMPBATMMJBBJR 
RIS item disseminated by London Stock Exchange 
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Chapter 7: CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
Merger arbitrage, also commonly known as risk arbitrage, is the investment strategy 
designed to profit from the uncertainty about the final terms and outcome of a takeover 
bid. The literature review in Chapter 2 shows that the extant research on the 
determinants of the returns to the strategy falls into three hypotheses: the risk-based 
hypothesis, the limited arbitrage hypothesis and the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis. Two 
major themes in the risk-based hypothesis are how the systematic risk helps explain the 
arbitrage return and the risk-return characteristics of the strategy. As most studies report 
that the strategy can generate substantial positive abnormal return in excess of the 
systematic risk benchmark, the other two hypotheses namely the limited arbitrage 
hypothesis and the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis, are proposed to shed light on the 
source of the excess return or abnormal return. The limited arbitrage hypothesis looks at 
different types of costs, risks and constraints that the arbitrageurs in the real-world have 
to face in implementing the strategy. The arbitrageurs' role hypothesis examines 
different roles that the arbitrageurs play in the takeover process and the impact of these 
roles on the arbitrage excess return. 
Based on the review of the incumbent literature, Chapter 2 identifies the gap in the 
literature. Except for the evidence that the arbitrageurs are able to eam significant 
positive abnormal return, the extant evidence about the risk-return characteristics of the 
strategy and about the limited arbitrage hypothesis and the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis 
is scanty, inconclusive and mostly limited to US samples. Interestingly, there is no 
empirical research on merger arbitrage in the UK market, the second most active merger 
and acquisition market in the world (after the US market). This represents the gap in the 
literature. 
The aim of this research is to fill this gap by investigating the magnitude as well as the 
factors that determine the return to the merger arbitrage strategy in the UK market. 
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Furthermore, as the UK takeover regulatory regime is different from the US regime, this 
research can also uncover the impact of takeover regulation on the factors that 
determine the arbitrage return. To our best knowledge, this is the first study examining 
the linkage between takeover regulation and the determinants of merger arbitrage return. 
On the basis of the three hypotheses about the determinants of merger arbitrage return 
we conduct three empirical projects testing these hypotheses in the UK market. Chapter 
4 performs empirical analysis of the risk-based hypothesis. In particular, we estimate 
the risk-adjusted return to the strategy using a range of methods to control for 
systematic risk. We also examine the risk-return characteristics of the strategy and test 
the impact of the UK takeover regulation on the risk-return characteristics. Chapter 5 
tests the limited arbitrage hypothesis in terms the impact of different types of risks, 
costs and constraints that the real-world arbitrageurs have to face on the arbitrage excess 
return. Chapter 6 examines the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis by looking at the 
relationship between the arbitrageur's holding of the target stocks and arbitrage excess 
return, bid premium and probability of bid success. Finally, this chapter summarizes the 
main empirical findings in Section 7.2, outlines the limitations of this research and some 
recommendations for future research in Section 7.3 and presents the contributions to 
knowledge and practice in Section 7.4. 
7.2 Summary of empirical findings 
This section summarizes the key findings reported in the preceding 3 empirical 
chapters. 
Risk-based hypothesis - Chapter 4 
Using a sample of 1105 UK takeover bids from 1987 to 2007, Chapter 4 demonstrates 
that th~ return in excess of the systematic risk benchmark to the merger arbitrage 
portfolios is significantly positive. The estimated risk-adjusted return is around 6.17%-
7.44% per annum. Three asset pricing models are employed to control for risk: the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model, the Fama and French (1993) three~factor model and the 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model. The contingent claim approach to take into account 
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the possible non-linear relationship between the return to the strategy and market risk 
produces similar result. This finding is consistent with the findings from other markets. 
As far as the risk-return characteristics of the strategy are concerned, we first make an 
inquiry into the nature of the non-linear risk-return relationship. We find that one of the 
reasons for the existent of the non-linearity is that the bidder has economic incentive to 
renege on the bid during market downturn. Thus, given that the UK Takeover Code 
imposes much more stringent restrictions on the bidder's ability to withdraw from the 
bid compared to the US regulation, we conjecture that the non-linear pattern may not 
exist in the UK market. The result in Chapter 4 provides strong support for this 
conjecture. There is very little evidence that the UK merger arbitrage portfolios in the 
UK have positive market risk during market downturn and zero market risk during 
normal market condition. This finding, combined with the finding in the US market 
(strong non-linearity) and in Australian market (no non-linearity), shows the impact of 
the takeover regulation on the risk-return characteristics of the strategy. 
Limited arbitrage hypothesis - Chapter 5 
Using a sample of 653 UK takeover bids from 1997 to 2007, Chapter 5 tests the impact 
of different types of risks, costs, and constraints on the excess return to the strategy. We 
find very little evidence supporting the price pressure theory. The theoretical foundation 
of the theory is the agency-based limited arbitrage model proposed by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997). Under this model, the capital-constrained arbitrageurs may not be able 
to absorb the selling pressure created by the target shareholders. As a consequence, the 
target stock may fall well below the efficient level enabling the arbitrageurs to earn 
abnormal profits. Employing two different proxies for the selling pressure namely target 
size and the abnormal trading volume, we find a negative relationship between the size 
of the selling pressure and the arbitrage excess return. This result runs counter to the 
prediction of the price pressure theory. Thus, this theory is not supported in our study. 
We find strong supportive evidence for the arbitrage cost theory, which attributes the 
existence of the excess return to transaction costs and holding costs, two types of 
arbitrage costs that the real-world arbitrageurs have to face. With 4 different proxies for 
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transaction costs, that is, firm size, price level, dollar trading volume, and frequency of 
zero return days, we find that transaction costs are one of the important determinants of 
the cross-sectional variation of the excess return to the strategy. 
Holding costs, the other type of arbitrage costs, are found to have significant impact on 
the arbitrage excess return. As holding costs are the cost per unit of time, the finding 
that the excess return is increasing with the duration of takeover bid is consistent with 
the impact of holding costs. Idiosyncratic risk, one of the most important holding costs, 
significantly contributes to the source of the arbitrage return. We find that the arbitrage 
excess return is positively related to the variance of the estimated probability of bid 
success and bid premium, two proxies for idiosyncratic risk. Finally, using the bidder' 
institutional ownership as the proxy for short-sale constraints, we find that the costs of 
short selling appear to be another holding cost that the arbitrageurs concern about. The 
relationship between the bidder's institutional ownership and the arbitrage excess return 
is not statistically significant nevertheless. This may stem from the small sample size 
employed in the empirical analysis of short-sale constraints. Thus, the impact of short-
sale constraints is still inconclusive. 
Arbitrageurs' role hypothesis - Chapter 6 
Using a sample of 653 UK takeover bids from 1997 to 2007 and a manually collected 
dataset to identify arbitrageurs and their holding of the target stocks, Chapter 6 tests the 
arbitrageurs' role hypothesis. In particular, we examine the relationship between 
arbitrage holding and arbitrage return, bid premium and the probability of bid success. 
We find that arbitrage holding is significantly related to arbitrage excess return in a non-
linear way. Below a certain arbitrage holding threshold, the arbitrage excess return 
increases with arbitrage holding; above the threshold, arbitrage excess return decreases 
with arbitrage holding. The relationship between arbitrage excess returns and arbitrage 
holding remains significant after a host of factors that can affect the bid outcome and 
the market's assessment of the bid outcome are controlled for. This indicates that 
arbitrageurs are better than the average investors in the market in picking the best bids 
that yield higher risk-adjusted return for the arbitrage portfolios. 
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As for the relationship between arbitrage holding and bid premIUm, we find a 
significant negative relationship between these two variables. The finding is in stark 
contrast with the finding reported Hsieh and Walkling (2005) on a US sample as well as 
with the prediction of the theoretical model developed by Comelli and Li (2002). The 
model is based on the premise that the arbitrageurs can hide their presence when 
accumulating the target stocks. The much more stringent UK disclosure rules during the 
bidding period compared to the US rules may contribute to this negative relationship 
and the different results between the UK and the US. If the bidder knows that the short-
term arbitrageurs are already in the game, it would have no incentive to raise the offer 
price ex ante or revise the bid upward ex post to attract more arbitrageurs into the 
contest as predicted by Comelli and Li (2002). In fact, the bid premia in those bids, 
where the arbitrageurs have to reveal themselves before the bid announcement date, are 
significantly lower than the premia in those bids, where the arbitrageurs do not have to. 
Finally, we find that arbitrage holding is not significantly related to the probability of 
bid success. This finding is also different from the US study result as well as the 
prediction of the theoretical model. The finding about the relationship between arbitrage 
holding and bid premium and the probability of bid success suggests that disclosure 
rules during the bidding period have significant impact on the roles that the arbitrageurs 
play in the takeover process. 
7.3 Limitations and recommendations 
Like other empirical studies in finance, this doctoral research is subject to several 
limitations; hence, caution should be taken in interpreting the result. Future research on 
the determinants of merger arbitrage return should tackle these limitations to obtain 
more robust results. 
First, the magnitude of the risk-adjusted return estimated in Chapter 4 is still subject to 
model misspecification problem. As argued in Chapter 2, to control for systematic risk, 
we need an asset pricing model that can capture the true risk-return relationship. 
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Unfortunately, to date, there is still no asset pricing model that can fully explain the 
cross-section variation of equity return. Thus, the anomalous evidence3s that an 
investment strategy can persistently generate positive risk-adjusted return might just be 
a consequence of 'bad model' problem (Fama, 1991, 1998). Aware of this problem, in 
Chapter 4, we employ 3 different asset pricing models namely CAPM, Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor model and Carhart (1997) four-factor model to obtain robust result. 
Despite the effort, the 'bad model' problem cannot be resolved completely. Future 
research can improve the rigour of the risk-adjusted return estimation by incorporating 
the newly-developed asset pricing models. Growing attention has been paid to the 
recent development of liquidity based asset pricing models (see Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2003) and Liu (2006) for two examples of liquidity-augmented asset pricing models). 
In the context of merger arbitrage, Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) argue that the 
arbitrageurs are compensated for providing liquidity for the target stocks after the bid is 
announced. Thus, liquidity based asset pricing models are particularly relevant as the 
benchmark for systematic risk adjustment and therefore should be used in future 
empirical studies. 
Second, the finding about the non-linear risk-return pattern in Chapter 4 may not be 
robust. Even though we have a large sample (1105 observations), the sample period is 
quite short comparing to the similar US study by Mitchell and Pulvino (2001). While 
the sample of the US study covers 37 years from 1963 to 1999, the sample in Chapter 4 
only covers 21 years from 1987 to 2007. Further, and more importantly, our sample 
period coincides with the bull market period in the US and the UK ( see Shiller (2005, 
ch.l) and Siegel (2007ch.1». This may be the reason why we only find weak evidence 
about the non-linear risk-return relationship. Future studies should extend the sample 
period to cover the most recent downturn in the stock market to obtain more robust 
result. 
Third, the accuracy of the proxies for selling pressure in the empirical analysis of 
Chapter 5 may be subject to further scrutiny. In an ideal world, the correct measure of 
3S See Schwert et at (2003) and Avramov and Chordia (2006) for a comprehensive review of the stock 
market anomalies. 
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selling pressure should be the volume of sell orders submitted by the sellers of the target 
stock. As we do not get access to the data on sell orders, imperfect proxies namely the 
target size and the abnonnal trading volume of target stock are employed. As these 
proxies do not differentiate between the buy and sell activities, the result should be 
treated with caution. Future research should employ the correct measure of selling 
pressure to get better result. 
Fourth, the empirical result about the impact of short-sale constraints in Chapter 5 may 
be driven by the small sample size and the biased measure of bidder's institutional 
ownership. The sample includes only 123 observations and in some tests, the sample 
size is reduced to only 102 because of missing data. The way we collect data on the 
bidder's institutional ownership, the proxy for short-sale constraints, produces biases in 
the measurement of this variable. The biases come from two sources. Firstly, because 
we only collect the ownership of the institutions, which have interest in 3% or more of 
the target equity, the institutions, which own less than 3% of the target equity, are left 
out. This creates a downward bias in the measurement of the variable. Secondly, when 
we collect data on this variable from the bidder's most recent annual report prior to the 
bid announcement date, the implicit assumption is that the bidder's institutional 
ownership changes very little over time. If the institutional ownership of the bidder finn 
varies significantly between the date, on which the bidder files the annual report, and 
the bid announcement date, our data do not accurate measure the institutional ownership 
of the bidder finn when the arbitrageurs sell short the bidder stocks. In such scenario, 
our data do not accurately measure the proxy for short-sale constraints. Future research 
should employ better dataset on institutional ownership to overcome this limitation. 
Fifth, the empirical tests in Chapter 6 on the arbitrageurs' role hypothesis use a biased 
measure of arbitrage holding. As we only collect data on the holding of the arbitrageurs, 
who have interest in 1 % or more of the target equity, we omit those arbitrageurs, who 
own less than 1 % of the target equity. This produces a downward bias on the measure of 
arbitrage holding. Furthermore, even when we have a perfect measure of arbitrage 
holding, the empirical analysis in Chapter 6 is still unable to test the active role of the 
arbitrageurs. As the argument in Section 2.3.3 shows, the active role must be 
behaviourally observed. Thus, future research should make an effort to collect data on 
229 
the activities of the real-world 'activist' arbitrageurs and examine impact of these 
activities on the arbitrage excess return. Bradley et a1. (2010) make such effort in the 
context of closed-end fund discount arbitrage. In particular, the study investigates the 
factors that affect the likelihood that a closed-end fund gets attacked by a group of 
'activist' arbitrageurs to transform the fund to open-end fund. 
Finally, there is a lack of a solid explanation for the empirical findings about the 
relationship between arbitrage holding and bid premium, and the probability of bid 
success in Chapter 6. The theoretical foundation of the empirical analysis is the model 
developed by Cornelli and Li (2002). The model is predicated on the condition that the 
arbitrageur can maintain their anonymity when trading with other target shareholders. In 
the UK context, where the anonymity condition is unlikely to hold, a finding different 
from the prediction of the model is reported. However, since the extant theoretical 
model does not show what the relationship should be in case the anonymity condition is 
violated, we find it difficult to provide a solid explanation for the empirical findings. 
Thus, future research should advance the current model to incorporate the scenario, in 
which the arbitrageurs are forced to reveal their identity. 
7.4 Contributions to knowledge and practice 
This doctoral study explores the profitability of the merger arbitrage strategy and 
presents a comprehensive empirical analysis of the determinants of the arbitrage return 
for the UK market. Furthermore, this study provides empirical evidence about the 
impact of takeover regulation on the factors that contribute to the source of the return to 
the strategy. This study makes a number of contributions to the existing literature of 
merger arbitrage and contains several implications for practitioners. 
First, using a large sample of takeover bids, Chapter 4 provides robust empirical 
evidence about the magnitude of the risk-adjusted return and the risk-return 
characteristics of the strategy. Prior to this study, other non-US studies only employ 
relatively small samples. The Canadian study by Karolyi and Shannon (1999) uses a 
sample of only 37 cash tender offers; and the Australian study by Maheswaran and 
Yeoh (2005) uses a sample of 193 cash mergers. In addition to the small sample size. 
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these other non-US studies only employ samples of cash mergers. By using a large 
sample of 1105 takeover bids which includes both cash bids and stock bids, the 
simulated arbitrage return series generated in Chapter 4 closely mirror the real world. 
The result in Chapter 4 is the first piece of rigorous empirical evidence to inform the 
academic community as well as practitioners about the profitability and the risk-return 
characteristics of the merger arbitrage strategy in the UK market. We show that the 
strategy is highly profitable on a risk-adjusted basis and has close-to-zero market risk. 
In other words, the strategy is approximately market neutral. The return series generated 
in this study can serve as the benchmark to evaluate the performance of the 
professionals who specialize in merger arbitrage. The main criterion to select takeover 
bids for the merger arbitrage portfolio in Chapter 4 is simply data availability. As a 
result, such a portfolio is accessible to any investor in the market. Thus, the professional 
arbitrageurs achieve superior performance that deserves their hefty fees only when they 
. can outperform the arbitrage return series generated in this study. 
Second, the empirical analysis in Chapter 4 shows how takeover regulation affects the 
risk-return characteristics of the strategy and provides supporting evidence. We argue 
that due to the restrictions on the bidder's ability to renege on the bid imposed by the 
UK Takeover Code, the non-linear pattern may not exist in the UK market. The 
evidence supports this argument. We find very little evidence that the return to merger 
arbitrage portfolio is positively related to the market return when the market is falling 
but has no relation with the market return in other market conditions. Our result shows 
the importance of regulation in shaping the dynamics of the risk-return relationship. The 
impact of regulation is often ignored in other research on the risk-return characteristics 
of various investment strategies. As regulation varies from country to country, the result 
in this study can be used as the baseline for future research to examine the same 
phenomenon in different contexts, which have distinctive regulatory settings. 
Third, the empirical tests of the two competing theories namely the price pressure 
theory and the arbitrage cost theory under the limited arbitrage hypothesis in Chapter 5 
help to resolve the conflicting evidence from the US studies. In the US market, Baker 
and Savasoglu (2002) report supportive evidence for price pressure theory but Officer 
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(2007) documents the opposite result. The finding in Chapter 5 shows no support for the 
price pressure theory. Our finding is consistent with the result reported by Officer 
(2007). The underlying assumption of the price pressure theory is that due to the opaque 
nature of the merger arbitrage strategy, it is very difficult for the outside investors to 
understand the ins and outs of the strategy. This assumption might not be true in the 
context of merger arbitrage as parties involved in a merger deal are required by the laws 
to disclose fair amount of information. The stringent disclosure rule under the UK 
Takeover Code reinforces the invalidity of this assumption. This result suggests that the 
price pressure theory may hold in other trading strategies, information about which is 
scarce, not in the case of merger arbitrage. 
Fourth, while refuting the price pressure theory, the evidence in Chapter 5 provides 
strong support for the arbitrage cost theory. We report that transaction costs and holding 
costs, two types of arbitrage costs, are the important determinants of the return to 
strategy. The arbitrageurs require compensation for idiosyncratic risk, the most 
important type of holding costs. We also find that short-sale constraints are likely to 
contribute to the source of merger arbitrage return. These findings are consistent with 
the costly arbitrage literature and provide support for the Efficient Market Hypothesis, 
the mainstream paradigm in finance. The excess return to the merger arbitrage strategy 
is better explained by the additional costs and risks that the real-world arbitrageurs have 
to face than by the inefficiency in the pricing of merger stocks. 
Fifth, the empirical evidence in Chapter 6 confirms the 'conventional wisdom' that the 
UK arbitrageurs are better than the average investors in the market. Though this finding 
brings no surprise because the arbitrageurs have a lot more resources to be better 
informed about the bid outcome and even have the ability to influence the bid outcome, 
most empirical research in merger arbitrage implicitly assumes that the arbitrageurs are 
the average investors in the market. There have been only two studies by Larcker and 
Lys (1987) and Hsieh and Walkling (2005) that detach from this assumption. And this 
study is the third. 
Finally, the empirical findings in Chapter 6 about the relationship between arbitrage 
hOlding and bid premium and the probability of bid success convincingly demonstrate 
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the impact of the disclosure rules during the takeover period. Because of the stringent 
UK disclosure rules, the arbitrageurs are forced to reveal their trading soon after they 
acquire the target stock. When their anonymity cannot be maintained, their presence 
actually reduces the bid premium and has no influence on the probability of bid success. 
These findings also confirm the importance of the anonymity condition for arbitrageurs 
to come into the game and influence the bid outcome proposed by Comelli and U 
(2002). The findings provide a solid ground for future work to advance Comelli and 
U's (2002) model to incorporate the situation when arbitrageurs cannot hide their 
trading. 
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